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This dissertation brings into focus the management of the global image of China and 
documents how the branded image has intervened with the national identity construction in 
transitional China. My interest in nation branding and post-communism stems from my personal 
experience growing up in China as it went through radical social and economic transitions. 
Qualitative and interpretive methodologies structured this study, with personal memory and 
analytical voices weaving through an examination of nationhood, policy, history, and culture.  
The dissertation consists of 4 chapters, besides the introduction and conclusion. Chapter 1 
outlines the historical path of China’s global image, from isolation in ancient times to Mao’s 
aggressive propaganda to the contemporary (re)branding of its national image. Chapter 2 
examines the ongoing China Dream campaign, with its historical context, current practices, and 
its implications for nation branding. Chapter 3 interrogates the branding practices which I call 
“ancientizing” the modern cities, which renders authenticity and heritage easily packaged and 
sold in the globalized market. Chapter 4 looks at the intriguing continuities and discontinuities in 
representing China’s global image in the United States, as China strives to shift from propaganda 
to publicity.  
Using China as a case study, this project aims to invite critical investigation into the 
phenomenon of nation branding. It outlines the beginning of a critique that relates nation 
branding to the rise of global promotional culture, and explains how the image makeover 
complicates the construction of identity, space, and governance, as well as China’s controversial 













This work is the culmination of a process that started many years ago—perhaps when I 
first set foot in the United States in 2007, watching the Welcome to America video at O’Hare 
airport while standing in the long line for the not-as-welcoming customs. I owe my passion for 
traveling to my ever-exploring family, who have been the best travel partners one could hope for. 
I learned the importance of cultural heritage at their feet; and this project is intertwined with their 
lessons and memories of homelands and identity. I cherish the support and faith that they have in 
me, and the memories of our trips together.  
The Institute of Communications Research at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign has contributed to my intellectual development in more ways than I can possibly 
detail. This project germinated in Prof. James Hay’s Media and Space class, and he has been a 
mentor, inspiration, and resource during the years since. Prof. Clifford Christion’s encyclopedic 
knowledge, as well as his affable friendship, have proven invaluable as I work through the 
trajectories of international communication. Prof. Amanda Ciafone’s brilliant insights on 
advertising and glocalization, together with her kind approachability, laid solid foundation for 
my critical approach of branding. Finally, Prof. Kent Ono has been an advisor par excellence, 
who has been an avid supporter and guru and I cannot thank him enough. He has challenged me 
to become a better scholar. His unwavering support was integral to the completion of this 
project, as was his groundbreaking scholarship on race, nation, and critical theories at large.  
To my partner, Dr. Hanze Ying, this work would not be what it is without you next to me, 
cheering me on, playing the piano, and telling me how great it was going to be. I look forward to 
our many joyful adventures ahead. To my son, Tango, your arrival was the best thing that ever 
happened to me. You, in your own little ways, have challenged me to become a better 
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In the heat of the middle of the summer of 2013 members of a U.S. delegation to China 
and I rode down the ever-festive Nanjing Road in downtown Shanghai on a double-decker open 
roof bus. The endless traditional red lanterns hanging on the French plane trees brushed by our 
heads, while the brightly lit logos of international boutique shops, from Rolex to Armani, peeked 
through the leaves. Dusk was setting in, the aged bell tower from colonial days tolling on the 
bund echoed against the hyper-modern skyline on the east side of the Huangpu River. A 
carnivalesque cruise boat from a distance lit up and blew its horn. “It’s like a fantasy ride,” 
marveled one of our delegation members, as the bus passed by a carefully preserved stone 
townhouse—the founding site (1921) of the Chinese Communist Party, now surrounded by 
foreign and domestic tourists for their last guided tour of the day. I glanced around as the bus 
moved a little faster. Suddenly, all these red lanterns and the scenery around them started to spin, 
converge, and (con)fuse into a glittering mixture in twilight. Riding on that double decker in 
Shanghai was the moment when I decided to devote my dissertation research to this intriguing 
and intricate “brand” new China.  
"Brand New China" refers to the way China is in the process of image transformation. As 
it makes its way out of the Cold War, during which it was conceived of as inimical to the west, 
into contemporary neoliberal globalization and a rapidly transforming technological period of 
global history, China has made more than minor adjustments to its identity. Thus far, 
communication scholars have spent little time investigating this extreme makeover, but if asked 
most could likely point to aspects of China that have changed since the fall of the Soviet Empire 




this change in image intentional? How does it differ from China's image in the past, and what is 
the strategy for China's "brand" new identity?  This dissertation seeks to answer these and other 
questions and does so from a critical, cultural studies perspective that understands that global 
relations are suffused with power and power relations, and that by paying attention to inequities, 
be they economic or otherwise, and by drawing attention to dominant, or powerful, ways of 
acting and thinking, a more just, democratic set of possibilities might be found. 
A nation’s image is the mental representation of a country, the sum of beliefs and 
impressions people hold about a certain space, and every nation has an image that can vary 
across time and space to a greater or lesser extent (Simonin, 2008). In the past decade, as nation 
states compete for resources in the global marketplace, they have adopted commercial models of 
self- promotion to gain recognition (from audiences) and benefits (from consumers), as well as 
loyalty and cohesion from the domestic audiences, making China's national identity a kind of 
brand asset. Thus, national identity is not only something that can be produced, akin to 
traditional products, but it is something that can be given an identity, something that can become 
tarnished, and something requiring maintenance and constant tweaking.  
While nations like China are working hard to adjust their identities through traditional 
and novel branding practices, such a process is not without its obstacles. In China's case, trying 
to remake itself as a "modern" nation is not altogether positive. With an increasing fear of a 
homogenized McWorld, the Western present is shaped by concerns and desires for the local and 
the authentic, at the same time as it is interested in the technologically advanced, the 
architecturally modern, and the futuristic. Thus, in China's particular case, a western and eastern 
desire for “authenticity,” “difference,” and “heritage,” encourages China, a newly emerged, 




not only as a modern superpower but as one with a monumental historical past worth preserving. 
Such “authentic”1 discourses and practices, however, while making a claim to an essential past, 
also create a highly commodifiable “different” space and identity—one that can be easily 
packaged and sold.  
To demonstrate China’s national image campaign, in the dissertation that follows, I will 
provide three case studies on contemporary China: In the first chapter I will explore how culture 
and heritage have become a recurring focal point in all kinds of Chinese national image 
campaigns, including the 2008 Olympics, 2010 World Expo, 2012 New York Times Square, and 
the most recent “China dream” campaign. In the second, I will examine how China, the nation 
state, brands itself by promoting global tourism, re-adorning its highly Westernized modern 
technological cities as exemplars of ancient Chinese civilization—which I call “ancientizing”—
to attract Western fascination, from millions of tourists to UNESCO committees. Third, as China 
strives to shift its image from “propaganda” to “publicity,” there are intriguing continuities and 
discontinuities concerning China’s national image received and (re)projected in the United 
States. This project attempts to theorize the ways nation branding discourses and practices enter 
into and alter the construction of nationhood, identity, space, and governance, among other 
cultural and political implications of commercializing nations as brands. 




1 I use the word "authentic" actively to suggest national identities are made authentic. Hence, here 






• In an era of commercial nationalism in the global marketplace, how does 
China strategically brand and re-brand its image across China and the West's cultural and 
social divides?  
• How can the distinctive historical, cultural, and social aspects of China be 
mobilized for symbolic and material profit through global(izing) communication? How 
are nation-branding projects internal (projects of national cohesion, governance and 
identity construction) and external (for the consumption of those outside the borders of 
the nation-state)?  
• The rise of global capitalism has been overwhelmingly associated with the 
increasing “loss” of difference in cultural production. How can contemporary discussions 
of key articulations of difference and globalization (e.g. transnationalism, 
postcolonialism, cosmopolitanism) be enhanced and complicated by studying the 
branding of an ancient civilization like China?  
  
The theory of Nation Branding: various roots and branches  
 
We could see the [nation branding] phenomenon as rooted in the long-standing 
relationship between the nation-state and the corporation, the two dominant social institutions of 
the last three centuries.                                 
                                                                                              –Aronczyk (2013, p. 3) 
 
The study of branding has historically been part of advertising and public relations within 
the field of communication, and this project on nation branding loosely fits within critical public 




is a relatively recent development (L’Etang, Mckie, Snow, and Xifra, 2016). As one of the early 
critical voices within public relations studies, Marchand (1985) examined how the advertising of 
“American dream” advocates modernity and commercialization, as the promotion of a nation’s 
self-image through the promotion of an enduring "consumption ethic." Stuart Ewen (1996) also 
tells the story of some of the most significant national campaigns molding the public mind, 
exploring how the rise of public relations interacted with the changing dynamics of public life 
itself. My interest in political diplomatic relations, rhetoric, media studies, China as a nation, 
historical identity over time, and the relationship between nation and subjects leads me to 
conceive this project in international public relations (which is not historically a critical field), 
from a critical perspective, as a fresh, and critical analysis of the current image transformation of 
China. “Nation branding” is a loosely defined academic/political concept, which entered the 
scope of scholarly attention not that long ago.2 Focusing on the management and advertisement 
of a nation’s image, “nation branding” is part of many transnational strategic communication 
theories, such as theories about soft power, competitive identity, place branding, and public 
diplomacy, just to name a few. Hence, I devote the first part of the introduction to defining and 
clarifying the concept of nation branding by mapping it in association and relation to its many 
conceptual counterparts and parallels, such as soft power, public diplomacy, and competitive 
identity.  
 
Soft power  
																																								 																				
2 Most literature with the term “nation branding” came after the 2000s. See Anderson, 2006, and Aroczyk, 




As early as the beginning of the 1990s, Joseph Nye coined the term “soft power,” which 
gained recognition and support from scholars who recognized that a desired image and 
reputation can often be as important, or nearly so, as military or economic power (Wang et al, 
2005, and Seib et al, 2009). “Soft power” is defined in contrast with the traditional “hard power” 
of a nation, which means a country’s territory, military, resource, and economic strength. The 
following quotation articulates the comparison and inter-relationship between hard and soft 
powers with the “sticks and carrots” metaphor. 
Power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want. One can affect 
others’ behavior in three main ways: threats of coercion (“sticks”), inducements and 
payments (“carrots”), and attraction that makes others want what you want. A country may 
obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries want to follow it, 
admiring its values, emulating its example, and/or aspiring to its level of prosperity and 
openness. In this sense, it is important to set the agenda and attract others in world politics, 
and not only to force them to change through the threat or use of military or economic 
weapons. This soft power—getting others to want the outcomes that you want—co-opts 
people rather than coerces them.    
                                                                                                              –Nye, 2008.   
           In short, soft power can be understood simply as a country’s ability to get what it wants 
through appeal and attraction. Thus, as a communicational concept, soft power approximates the 
Greek concept of "ethos," which means credibility or reputation. But, soft power also has a role 
in diplomacy; whereas, Aristotle understood ethos to pertain to a given speaker, or rhetor's, 
reputational status. Rogh (2009) used what happened in Iraq as an example to demonstrate that 
“hard power” alone is becoming more and more insufficient in achieving national objectives, 
despite the fact that America has military capabilities that are unrivaled in the world. Evidently, 
U.S. hard power strategies are not working out so well in Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, North Korea, 
etc. North Korea, in particular, also shows us that a nation with more and bigger nuclear bombs 
cannot establish political dominance over other nations effectively. On the other hand, however, 




century through its globally popular films, television, and other media (Valdivia, 2013). Soft 
power as such is also intertwined with American-dominant cultural imperialism, as Herbert 
Schiller (1976) wrote: "The concept of cultural imperialism today best describes the sum of the 
processes by which a society is brought into the modern world system and how its dominating 
stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to 
correspond to, or even promote, the values and structures of the dominating centre of the system. 
The public media are the foremost example of operating enterprises that are used in the 
penetrative process. For penetration on a significant scale the media themselves must be captured 
by the dominating/penetrating power. This occurs largely through the commercialization of 
broadcasting” (p. 9-10). Toby Miller (1999) cites Elizabeth Jacka’s recognition of the varied 
meanings of globalization as “an American-dominated cultural flow, the international spread of 
capitalist production, and the chaotic, splintered circulation of signs across cultures” (Jacka, 
1992, p. 5; in Miller 1999, p. 37). So, compared with other aspects of national image, soft power 
is highly cultural, and sometimes can have a much more enduring significance than hard power. 
For instance, the recent slow-down of the U.S. economy and the contrastingly fast pace of 
China’s was not accompanied with an equally dramatic rise and fall of the soft power in these 
two countries—the United States still retains its throne as the world’s cultural and life-style 
leader, while China, now the world’s second largest economy, is still miles behind.  That is 
precisely why, according to Wang (2011), currently “nowhere else has the idea of ‘soft power’ 
been as widely discussed, embraced, and appropriated as in China,” as China is in an urgent race 





Thus, establishing (and strengthening) soft power is one of the main goals of nation 
branding. In his later works, Nye (2008) identified the ability to combine hard and soft power 
effectively as "smart power." Although China’s impressive economic growth over the last 
several decades has surely increased its hard power, there is a clear perception among Chinese 
elites and the masses alike that it lacks the kind of soft power to support and sustain its 
development strategy (Wang 2011). As Wang (2005) summarized what Nye (2004) has argued, 
the relationship between “hard” and “soft” powers encompasses three main components. First, 
hard power and soft power are related and reinforce each other in an effort to achieve national 
goals. Second, in terms of the means to demonstrate national strength and superiority, we are 
moving from military force, population, and geography to economic growth, technology, 
information, and education. Third, relying on one source of power is insufficient to achieving 
desired goals of establishing and maintaining world supremacy. So far, the discussion of Nye's 
concept of soft power serves as one of the various roots of nation branding. In the field of 
communication scholars have conceived of a lot of terms to identify new strategies of nation 
branding, but few have pulled the various roots and branches together to form a unified theory of 
nation branding. This project will take the energy that these scholars have in discussing nation 
branding in a variety of ways, and strive for a coherent theory of nation branding that takes into 
consideration everything we can learn from studying discussions of these other terms.  
 
Competitive identity  
Being a closely related keyword to soft power, competitive identity attempts to 
harmonize policy, people, sport and culture, products, tourism, trade and investment promotion, 




diplomacy is the master discipline of international relations for developed and prominent 
countries, since its main task is the communication part. However, competitive identity is 
potentially the master discipline of emerging and less well-known countries, as it deals with the 
conception and construction part of their national identity (Dinnie, 2008, and Comaroff, 2009). 
China being the world’s second economy certainly does not belong to the unimportant or lesser-
known category; however, its government is more and more concerned about China’s 
problematic global image, which has been shaped and stereotyped as a result of the Cold War, 
and strives for an urgent image makeover.  
Competitive identity consists of two parts: competition, and identity. In today’s global 
marketplace, countries compete with each other for a share of the world’s consumers, tourists, 
attention and respect, among many others. And because of this global competition, it is of vital 
importance for a nation to build a reputation that is “fair, true, powerful, attractive, and genuinely 
useful to their economic, political, and social aims, and which honestly reflects the spirit, the 
genius and the will of the people” (Anholt, 2005) -- and this is precisely identity. In an era when 
nations are being thought of similarly to corporations (Harvey, 2009), competitive identity is a 
new model for enhanced national competitiveness in a global world; it emphasizes the building 
of such an identity, rather than the communication of its policies (public diplomacy), which the 
next section will elaborate.  
 
Public diplomacy  
Public diplomacy is in fact a subset of competitive identity: as it is mainly concerned 
with presenting and communicating aspects of national activity and government policy (Anholt, 




Law and Diplomacy in the mid 1960s, as a way of “influencing the way groups and peoples in 
other countries think about foreign affairs, react to our policies, and affect the policies of their 
respective governments” (p. 68). The term then was often used by the United States Information 
Agency and the U.S. Department of State. People in the USIA and DOS thought that public 
diplomacy works to engage, inform, and influence key international audiences. More recently, 
public diplomacy is broadly defined by Wang (2011) as a country’s engagement and 
communication with foreign publics. It can take the forms of a monologue, dialogue, and/or 
collaboration.  So, in other words, public diplomacy is the executive level of soft power found in 
various accounts of foreign policy. Diplomatic communication, historically based on mere 
government-to-government and diplomat-to-diplomat interactions, has over the years expanded 
to include “government-to-people” and “people-to-government” contacts (e.g., Manheim, 1994; 
Sprout & Sprout, 1962), and even more recently to include “citizen diplomats” (d’Hooghe, 
2011). The era of new media with the burgeoning of social media outlets (such as Twitter and 
Facebook) further complicated these communications. Increasingly, the goal of public diplomacy 
is to enhance a country’s image and reputation through everyday-level mutual understanding, as 
it goes beyond traditional diplomacy and extends to the general public (Simonin, 2008). As such, 
it has become a way to help stop, prevent, or manage war, solve mutual problems, and create 
long-term market relations, etc. According to Wang (2011), public diplomacy has three main 
components—news management, strategic communication, and relationship building. It 
encompasses the broad, interrelated objectives of promoting a country’s goals and policies, 
communicating about its ideas and values, and building common understandings. In China, the 




way into government official speeches, documents and policies, illustrating a growing awareness 
among China’s policymakers of these concepts’ possibilities (D’Hooghe, 2011).  
On the communication end, public diplomacy is not just about projecting a certain 
national image, but rather negotiating understanding with foreign publics. Wang (2011) points 
out that there has been a bias toward the use of the mass media (e.g., print, radio, television, and 
film) in public diplomatic communication. Although the power of the mass media allows people 
to develop awareness of the world beyond their immediate surroundings, much public diplomatic 
communication has remained undifferentiated—that is a one-way transmission. Although 
China’s public diplomacy strategies are becoming more comprehensive and sophisticated, they 
do not automatically lead to a more positive image of China (d’Hooghe, 2011), since effective 
communicative acts are premised on a precise definition of one’s audience and a measured 
understanding of them. Thus, compared with soft power, public diplomacy focuses more on 
communication, incorporating inter-cultural communication, inter-personal communication, as 
well as corporative communication. The goal of researching these communications is to enhance 
the effectiveness of the communicated message, so the study of public diplomacy is highly 
strategic and quantitative rather than critical and qualitative.   
 
Nation branding  
The various theories discussed and compared above lay the foundation for the key 
concept of this dissertation: nation branding, as the latter, builds itself on these former concepts. 
A pertinent, plain enough definition of “branding,” whether of a nation or any other body, is 
“altering the outside to match the inside, with an eye toward making the inside stronger” (Olins 




words (nation+ branding) is a double-edged sword, as the idea of branding being applied to 
countries, cities, and regions often bring about both benefits and controversies. On the one hand, 
brand is the perfect metaphor for the way places compete with each other in the global 
marketplace for products, services, events, ideas, visitors, talent, investment an influence: this is 
simply the reality of globalization, and its inescapable. On the other hand, branding makes many 
people think of superficial marketing tricks in communicating the nation state and other human 
communities (Anholt, 2007). Simonin (2008) also distinguishes the concept of “brand” from 
public diplomacy as a much more inclusive concept, as brand is about the overall image, the 
mental representation of a country, the sum of beliefs and impressions people hold about a 
certain place.  
In his witty arguments on branding, Twitchel (2004) highlights branding as story-telling, 
or more specifically, marketing stories in a culture of consumption. Our needs have always been 
cultural, not inborn—“Feed us food, then feed us stories” (Twitchel, 2004). He writes, “Humans 
congregate to share stories, the fantasy town is more than economic community and physical 
safety, it’s narrative community, Brandtopia. The story is told through a willingness to share a 
common fiction” (ibid). Thus, “nation branding” is a more inclusive and accurate term to employ 
in this dissertation, as it is not solely about soft power, public diplomacy, or competitive identity, 
but rather about the coherent interplay and negotiation of (re)creating, telling, and receiving 
China as a common fiction.  
The concept of brand dates back to the early days of human civilization, as the earliest 
branded product is pottery with special seals of the producer’s workshop on the bottom, 
produced in China more than 5000 years ago. In the era of early industrialization, or the “wild 




then, the right to “brand” was already in the hands of the skillful and foremost, the powerful. 
Branding also asserts a property relation, a symbol of identity and ownership, and a 
consolidation of goods and services around a single, identified owner. However much the 
“branding” concept and technique have changed over the centuries, in my opinion what did not 
change much is that the right to brand is still in the hands of the powerful. This dissertation aims 
to explore and expand what “the powerful” might imply in the contemporary shifting world 
order, in which people use branding to define the identity and reputation of nation by using 
persons, events, symbols, slogans and cultures to create a distinctive brand identity.  
 
Methodology 
   
Since the nation branding field is still dominated by marketing practitioners, the existing 
research methods for studying nation branding are naturally data-based or quantitative. This 
project alternatively uses a qualitative method, focusing on the texts, images, policies, and the 
resistance and/or adaptation that emerged out of encounters between world capitalism and local 
cultural worlds. That capitalism draws upon and produces cultural difference is not new—
exoticism has for centuries been used to sell people goods from afar. Three nation-branding case 
studies in post-communist China illustrate the ethnographic problem of how to make sense of 
these processes in particular places and at particular times.  In addition to my own memory and 
experience as a citizen of China that has undergone significant changes during my lifetime, my 
dissertation research also involved field trips to China to collect data first hand. In addition, I 
communicated with people living in China via telephone and email. One field trip to Beijing and 




discuss in Chapter 2. Besides collecting the “dream shows” on the streets and the “dream talk” 
among people, my research agenda was to have a few informal meetings with local government 
spokespersons about the current campaigns of China Dream. In 2013 and 2014, I was part of the 
U.S. legislative delegation to China as a consultant on China’s diplomacy and China-US 
relations. In various meetings between Chinese government officials and the U.S. delegation, I 
paid attention to the discussion of China Dream. During the field trips to Wuxi and Lijiang in 
2013 and 2015, I collected first-hand data of two ancient towns, the 2000-year-old authentic one 
(Lijiang) with UNESCO nominated “World Cultural Heritage,” and the newly (re)constructed 
one (Wuxi, my hometown) following the prior as a model. For my analysis, I relied on these 
experiences and critical observations, as well as interviews with the local municipal bureaus of 
culture (市政府文化办公室) in both cities, pondering how the branding of historical heritages in 
China creates “exotic spaces of attention” to attract international visitors, and how this city 
branding/ global tourism branding may contribute to the grand nation branding project in China.  
 Visual analysis is also widely used throughout the chapters. Wisely put by Sontag 
(1973), “Photographs are themselves a species of rhetoric. They reiterate. They simplify. They 
agitate. They create the illusion of consensus” (p. 6). Pictures can become mnemonic shorthands, 
whether as icons or in the stream of familiar “pictures of the past.” This dissertation will analyze 
the strategic uses of visual images, revealing not only how a certain theme is represented, but 
also the cultural and institutional apparatus behind these visual representations. The visuals 
created for promoting China (e.g., posters, new images, video shots, architecture and space 
design) will be examined in terms of content, color, spatial organization, light, and expressive 
content (the combined effect of subject matter in visual form). According to Gillian Rose’s 




the notion of discourse articulated through various visual images, the “content”), and visual 
discourse analysis II (focusing on the practices of institutions beyond the content of the visual 
images, concerned with issues of power, regimes of truth, institutions and technologies). In the 
face of the breadth of source material demanded by discourse analysis, I begin by selecting the 
sources I think are particularly representative and am most familiar with as a starting point (i.e., 
image makeovers of my hometown city, where my own experiences and memories can be a 
research subject). Then, I widen my range of archives and sites in later chapters.  The 
combination of the lived experience with critical analysis provides a holistic view of how 
identity as inscribed in a commodity system is enacted throughout the flows of globalization 
integral to our lived experience.  
With its historical roots in soft power, competitive identity, place branding, public 
diplomacy, commercial nationalism and so on, the nation branding literature is interdisciplinary 
by nature. By inviting the less-heard voices from the Chinese scholarly community, as well as 
unfiltered voices from Chinese government officials, to the Western-dominated field, this project 
seeks to add a fresh and multi-vocal perspective to the study of nation branding. The underlying 
structure of a national image is highly complex, since it incorporates elements from numerous 
sources: history; sciences and arts; religions and philosophies; natural wonders, human structures 
and artifacts; ecological and human habitats; cultural traditions, languages, and value systems; 
legal, political, ideological, military, and economic orders; and past and contemporary 
civilizations, people, and events. For example, China's approach to nation branding relies on a 
dual modern/ancient bifurcated strategy. The tensions associated with that strategy are 
fundamental to contemporary globalized capitalism, where mutual desires for both authenticity 




that shuttle between these two important modern vectors. As Oswell (1994) uses Giddens (1990) 
to explain the multi-layered relationship between globe and empire: The different dynamics 
between capitalism, industrialism, militarism, and the system of international relations between 
nation-states cannot be reduced to a single causal factor, but need to be understood in a manner 
that takes into account an inherent multi-causality. Globalisation should be thus understood in 
terms of the interconnected dimensions of these dynamics and in the context of the underlying 
conditions of modernity. After all, a nation’s brand is a reflection and consolidation of this 
kaleidoscope of different factors and research fields. 
Experience and knowledge are messy, multi-vocal, and layered. I write in a manner that 
explicitly seeks to move between the individual, communal, and structural on a global level 
throughout these pages. Narrative memories are interwoven with academic discourse. As a 
cultural scholar and a painter, I am interested in cultural representations in the visual form, as 
well as the governmental, economic, and material (non-representational) aspects of "culture." For 
example, one part of this dissertation deals with the physical and material construction of 
“Chinese authenticity” through the large-scale renovations and the simulations of pre-modern 
structures and environments, arguing that visual communication, identity, and branding do not 
simply occur through screen images. Rather, the material construction—and reconstruction—of 
the physical environment can be understood, in their materiality, as forms of “mass 
communication.” Hence, this part of the project bridges over space and architectural studies, 
global tourism, visual analysis, studies of memory, and critiques of modernity and 
consumerism… an organic web of all the disciplines that are engaged with current ways of 





Examining nation branding through a critical and cultural lens 
 
The current field of nation branding is still in its infancy, and research on the subject is 
largely dominated by political, diplomatic, and marketing practitioners. After all, most of the 
three thousand business books published each year are written for people in business who want 
to make a profit and who think branding is just the ticket (Twitchel, 2004), whether it be for 
branding a product, culture, or more recently, a nation. And the whole “power” discourse, 
despite hard or soft, leans more toward political science than communication.  When 
communication does come into the picture, usually by communication what is meant is a highly 
strategic and pragmatic method utilized to serve a political or economic objective, whether to 
build, re-build, or makeover a product or company for an international audience.  
This dissertation does not intend to add China’s examples to the pile of case studies of 
nation branding or public diplomacy; rather, it attempts to introduce a cultural and critical 
perspective, which is by far a minority voice in this nation branding research field dominated by 
marketing practitioners. China is re-packaging itself to compete for likeableness in the global 
marketplace, but it still remains a centralized government, non-democratic, and economically 
protectionist, even as it engages in both soft and hard power strategies. With China’s repeated 
assertions about control over Taiwan, the disputed islands with Japan and Vietnam, the imperial 
relationship with Tibet, the vexed and increasingly confused relationship with North Korea, the 
exclusion of Google (yet the simultaneous exportation of WeChat), etc., China faces obstacles, 
even despite all of its friendly rebranding. This project does not seek to evaluate and polish 




discourses and practices enter and alter the construction of nationhood, identity, and governance, 
as cultural and political implications of commercializing nations as brands.  
Also, current accounts on nation branding usually focus on a certain singular event or 
aspect of promoting the nation—for example, the Olympic Games, a certain reality TV show, or 
a tourist site. This project attempts to reveal and analyze multiple aspects of nation branding in 
China in a coherent way. It offers an inclusive angle that lends to a horizontally and vertically 
broad picture of nation branding in China as a historical phenomenon. This project also sheds 
light on nation branding beyond the territorial boundaries of China itself, as Oswell (2006) points 
out, “the question of the 'nation' is now posed in terms of the constitution of a national culture 
and its circulation, not simply within the context of the nation” (p. 208).  
 
The Nation Still Matters 
In his various accounts on globalization and post-modernity, David Harvey (1989, 1996) 
advocates for “the annihilation of space by time,” originally expressed by Karl Marx (1857) in 
Die Grundrisse. Mobilized in conjunction with space and time compression, this phrase has 
come to mean that, while space is collapsing and time is speeding up in absolute terms, under 
globalization time is becoming relatively more critical than space. There then have been many 
scholarly voices arguing that nations matter less and less in the context of globalization. Doreen 
Massey argues otherwise in her "A Global Sense of Place" (1994), in which she suggests the 
“time-space compression” will produce insecurity. She writes,  
There is the need to face up to - rather than simply deny - people's need for attachment of 




recrudescence of some very problematical sense of place, from reactionary nationalisms, 
to competitive localisms, to introverted obsessions with 'heritage.' (Massey, 1994, p. 151) 
Aronczyk (2008) advances Massey’s point by arguing that nation branding is currently justified 
among state and corporate actors as a necessary corrective to the waning importance of the 
nation-state in the context of globalized economic, political and cultural exchange (Aronczyk, 
2008).  In other words, nations states ask to be rebuilt, and they need branding in order to 
reconsolidate their significance and power. My research is similar with Aronczyk’s work in 
terms of examining nation branding through a critical and cultural lens, whereas it adds new 
dimensions to the nation branding theory by introducing China – a historically and culturally 
different nation than the eastern European cases, with great complexity and burgeoning on-going 
transitions.  
Although communication research often emphasizes that the nation now matters less as a 
territory of media production and distribution amidst the current “globalism,” this dissertation 
argues that the nation continues to matter as a nexus of mediated, cultural, economic, and 
governmental importance. As Oswell (2006, p. 190) puts it, “the boundaries of the nation are 
themselves constituted through particular cultural technologies,” such as communication. Thus, 
even if we would want a denationalized future, discourses continue to rely on the existence of the 
nation-state and, thus, also continue to assume and reconstitute its very thingness. Eric 
Hobsbawm and others have talked about “the invention of tradition” (Hobsbawm and Ranger, 
1983), arguing that certain national rituals that seem timeless, such as the Queen of England's 
Speech at Christmas, are in fact relatively recent constructions. Benedict Anderson (1983) has 
talked with a view to the relationship between print technology and capitalism about the nation 




sense of the boundaries, limits and chronicity of the nation are constructed through, for example, 
the co-location of peoples and places in the novelistic form or through the repetition and 
regularities of a national press. Other writers discussing media have talked about how cultural 
technologies, such as radio, television and print, do not simply carry the content of a national 
culture, but are constitutive of that national time and space (Donald, 1992; Schlesinger, 1991).  
The emergent field of nation branding represents a growing interdisciplinary interest in 
taking nations seriously (again), as globalization (in the economy, or in culture, or in anything 
else) does not necessarily entail simply homogenization. On the contrary, the globalization of 
social relations is yet another source of geographical uneven development as well as the 
uniqueness of place (Massey, 1994). This complicates our understanding of the global, national, 
and urban nexi, which are seen as much more complex than are typical in both older and more 
recent accounts of the role of media in globalization. Also, the emphasis on "nation-branding" 
with a shifting global power status quo provides an alternative to arguments about media/cultural 
imperialism typical of international communication during the second half of the twentieth 
century.3 Thus, this research pushes for the need to reassess the viability of the notion of nation-
state; as well as the contradictory presence of globalization that gives vent to nationalism and 
mass commodity consumption at the same time. This dissertation will address the intersections 
of nation and fantasy, culture, identity and (de)globalization. At the same time, Chinese Party 
leaders, policy makers, private corporations, international tourists, the United Nations, etc. have 
brought the politics of the production, marketing, and consumption of the branded nation under 
new public-private partnership into public discourse.  
 
																																								 																				




Overview of Chapters  
 
Chapter1 and Chapter 2: Propaganda rethought and re-contextualized  
As early as the 17th century when the Roman Catholic Church spread Christianity to the 
New World, the term “propaganda” has come to public attention as “congregation for the 
propaganda of faith” (Combs and Nimmo, 1993, p. 201), when the spread of idea would not 
occur naturally, but only via a cultivated artificial generation. Oxford English Dictionary defines 
propaganda as “Information, especially of a biased or misleading nature, used to promote a 
political cause or point of view” (p. 296). In the most neutral sense, propaganda means to 
disseminate or promote particular ideas. In Latin, it means “to propagate” or “to sow” (Jowett 
and O’Donnel, 2006). The term propaganda is a subject throughout 20th-century theory and 
research on "mass communication," from Lasswell (1924) and Ellul (1965) to Chomsky (1988) 
and many more. The Western tradition of thinking about propaganda always understood the term 
as carrying negative connotations, and the concept of propaganda became value-laden, and was 
seen as “immoral” in an ethical sense (Wilkins and Christians, 2008). In the Chinese context, 
however, the term “propaganda” (xuan chuan in Chinese) shares very different origins and 
perspectives with its Western counterpart. In historic works dating back to 200 AD, xuan chuan 
has been used to describe the dissemination of wisdom and merits to the masses. Over the years 
the definition and connotation of the word have not stopped evolving, and it is practically too 
simplistic to assume its meaning to be equal to the Western understanding of “propaganda.” This 
dissertation re-defines propaganda in its particular Chinese context, bringing out the intriguing 
complexity of the word, as well as problems of “intranslatability” (Hall and Ames, 1995) in 




Chapter 1 is titled “Historicizing Branding China: From ‘Propaganda’ to ‘Publicity’” and 
illustrates the historical trend of China’s national image, from Mao’s communist red China to the 
contemporary China as a new center of world capital. The historical path shows that China 
shifted from the strictly Party-led, top-down means of “propaganda” to the contemporary 
commercial “management” of its national image to appeal to both domestic and international 
audiences. The public-private partnership in communicating China’s national image has become 
more and more prominent over the years, with Party leaders, policy makers and private sectors 
all work as a seamless whole. The second chapter, titled “China Dream: the Great Rejuvenation 
of a ‘New and Benign’ World Power” exemplified one of the most recent nation branding 
slogans since President Xi came into power—China Dream. It encourages China to return to its 
historic glory centuries ago (when China boasted the rest of world’s GDP combined). The Dream 
is advocated as a common goal for all people promising peace and “a good life,” and the world 
should greet China’s rise peacefully.   
One of the observed patterns in these two chapters is that the image of contemporary 
China is promoted in an increasingly de-politicized and hyper-cultural way, in its effort to blend 
in the global market with the least turbulence and resistance as a social and political “Other.”  
These cases also provide new ways to re-contextualize the theory of propaganda in China, a 
nation state that has undergone astonishing changes over the past decade in the grand shifting of 
power of the globalized world. The literature for this chapter is comparative—fostering a 
dialogue among communication, political, and cultural theories between China and the West. I 
will draw from a rich cluster of Chinese theories from Chinese-language publications ranging 




contextualize, with great caution and historic awareness, the taken-for-granted terms and 
concepts between the West/China cultural and lingual divide. 
 
Chapter 3: Space and Media, Space as Media  
Titled “‘Ancientizing’ the Modern Cities: Branding China through (Re)Constructed 
Space in Global Tourism,” Chapter 3 unveils an interesting phenomenon of many Chinese 
modern cities being re-designed to look and feel as they did in antiquity. With the collaboration 
of the different levels of government and various private sectors, such “ancient towns” (with 
their special Chinese name “古镇 (gu zhen)” are constructed in order to generate domestic and 
international fascination, to encourage global tourism as well as more nominations of World 
Cultural Heritage from the UNESCO. Theoretically, this chapter uses the ancient towns to argue 
that space, with all its materiality, is not non-representational and, indeed, can be understood 
through the lens of communication to be part of a larger process of nation branding and 
positioning within a vast web of global power. Drawing upon Umberto Eco’s (1996) theory of 
semiotics and the materiality of architecture, and Hannigan’s (1998) “fantasy city,” this chapter 
situates constructed visual space as key to the exploration of cultural flows that continue to alter 
the classic markers of human identity such as nation, culture, and modernity. This chapter 
questions the move by China as a nation to counteract the fading of “differences” in global 
cultural production and circulation through its city rebranding practices. Increasing attention to 
claims of “heritage and authenticity” encourages China and many other nations to reach back 
into their histories and generate narratives that both claim an “authentic” past and perform a 




there is the specificity of place which derives from the fact that each place is the focus of 
a distinct mixture of wider and more local social relations […] All these relations with 
and take a further element of specificity from the accumulated history of a place, with 
that history itself imagined as the product of layer upon layer of different sets of linkages, 
both local and to the wider world. (p. 156)  
The ancient town case captures the vivid process of the glocal space takes its shape in the unique 
historic context of contemporary China.  
 
Chapter 4: “Strategic Partnership” in Contemporary Market Diplomacy 
Chapter 4, titled “Continuities and Ruptures: The Image of China on the U.S. End” 
compares the image of China on Time Magazine covers from the 1960s to the present. These 
visual images as discourse play a crucial role in the construction of understandings of self and 
others in contemporary society, as well as the positioning of commodities within the global 
commodity image system (Hall, 1997; Leiss et al., 1990). As the last section of the larger 
research project analyzed the overall status of the branding of China, this chapter will examine 
how China’s image is received, and reproduced, as represented by the U.S. media, as well as the 
continuities and discontinueties of how the image of China has been portrayed in the United 
States across time. This chapter sampled the American representation and re-creation of the 
Chinese image, illustrating the challenges, achievements, and complexities of the branding of 
China. As China transfers from United States’ Communist enemy to its most important economic 
and political strategic partner, such a strategic relationship between the two countries is based 
on the constant pursuit of profit and efficiency in the new global economic status quo. This 




the US news media, underscoring not only how the “partnership” is predicated on branding 
(representing through marketing strategies) but also how that partnership is highly tentative and 
fraught with ambiguities, ambivalences, and contradictions. 
These four chapters jointly present through the China case that at no time in history has 
nation branding played a more significant role in world affairs and international relations. As a 
result, global interest in this promising but problematic nation-and-brand combination has 
escalated, creating a substantial academic and professional audience for new works in the field. 
This combination, though rapidly gaining popularity in recent years, is after all not a naively new 
topic, since nation-states have historically used various forms of persuasion to advance their 
political, economic, and cultural agendas. As Oswell (1994) reminds us, the idea of a “nation” 
will not disappear in the face of a global culture, but will be refigured according to a different set 
of dynamics. For example, localized cultures that cannot be repackaged for international 
distribution might find survival in this new environment more difficult. The brand, bearing 
profuse commercial, political, cultural, and historical negotiations, is indeed the identity and 
image of the space we inhabit, and has become a seamless extension of the identity and image of 






HISTORICIZING BRANDING CHINA: 
FROM PROPAGANDA TO PUBLICITY 
 
In the last days of the Cold War the mantra – “technologise, liberalise, globalize” - 
seemingly lauded the inevitable cracking open of the centralised bureaucracies of state socialism: 
how could the Soviet Bloc and Communist China resist the temptations of the “free market?”  
                                                                                                 -- Oswell, 2006.    
 
Aside from the elusive tales told about the ancient Silk Road, official written accounts of 
the imagery of China in the West’s eyes date back to the 13th-century Italian merchant traveler 
Marco Polo, who traveled to China and stayed for 17 years. Despite the fact that his journal was 
filled with exaggerated descriptive words like “paradise on earth,” his was the first concrete 
instance of China’s national image having travelled to the West. The depiction of ancient China 
as a “kingdom of superior wisdom and power” and the “splendid land of gold and treasures” 
triggered an immense curiosity about the Orient (Yan, 1986), contributing to its later exploration 
by the Western fleets crossing the ocean.  
Advertising techniques—those that promote objects for consumption and sale— has a 
long history in China, with merchandises such as pottery from 2700 BC marked with the 
manufacturer’s identity and workshop.4 However, ancient China did not use advertising in 
relation to its national identity; indeed, it was a most isolated civilization for thousands of years 
(Zhang, 1904) .5 Even the world-renowned Great Wall was initially built to maintain and guard 
																																								 																				
4 This imformation is based on the Textbook of Chinese History, People’s Education Press.   
5 Taiyan Zhang wrote A General History of China in 1904, right after the fall of the China’s last Dynasty, 




China’s comfortable and privileged isolation, known for “keeping the ‘barbarians’ off site” 
(Sima, 91 B.C.).6 Consequently, while the name (and fame) of China has been heard by the rest 
of the world for a very long time, China’s extended periods of isolation and structures to 
maintain it has limited the degree to which China has branded itself historically. Henry Kissinger 
(2011) stressed the fact that ancient China was never obliged to deal with other countries or 
civilizations that were comparable to it in scale and sophistication. Instead, it maintained a 
friendly aloofness to foreign visitors, claiming that “those who come modestly are all sent off 
generously” (The Ming Emperor, 1372), while showing very little interest in further diplomatic 
interaction. China’s isolation nurtured a particular Chinese self-perception: that China was 
unique—not just a great civilization among others, but “civilization itself” (Kissinger, 2011). Not 
until the massive colonizing invasion from the West at the end of Qing dynasty (1900 A.D.)7 did 
China realize that the idea that, “if we are strong we will be liked,” was too arrogant and 
simplistic, and that diplomacy is much more than “handling barbarians.”  
During the turmoil of colonialization, China was forced to converse and merge with the 
West in various ways, including commercialization and advertising. As many Western 
merchandise flooded into the market of China, such as cigarettes, matches, and glasses, which 
were all branded as “yang huo” (洋货 in Chinese characters, translated as “luxuries from across 
the oceans”). A quintessential advertising poster from that time period would be a delicately 
groomed Shanghai lady, dressed in qi pao (a silky Chinese traditional dress that embraces 
curves) but with Westernized make up and European-movie-like hair style, smoking the 
																																								 																				
6	Sima Qian (Sima being his family name) is the author of “Shiji” (Records of the Grand Historian), 
which is considered a foundational text in early Chinese civilization.  
7 In 1900, the “Seige of the International Legations” invaded Beijing, China, leaving massive damages to 
the historic city with some remain unrecoverable today. The Seige was participated by eight countries: 




particular cigarette that was branded as “elegantly exotic.” Advertisements as such made it clear 
that by consuming goods from the West, one makes the statement of his/her taste and class in 
China. At the same time, Chinese merchandise such as tea, silk, and spice were also being 
massively exported to the West, which were also branded in Western style with Chinese 
characteristics. This historical period marks the emerging of branding techniques negotiating the 
domestic and the West, as well as the emergence of the negotiation of commercialization and 
national identity (crisis) through the practice of branding. During WWII, Propaganda and 
Maoism certainly put this trend to a sudden end, as not only anything Western is considered evil 
and has to be wiped out, but also anything commercial (capitalist) needs to be demolished. 
However, after the Mao period, the last section of the chapter will come across a continuity of 
such negotiation, as the international market re-emerged. Although this time the techniques of 
publicity was re-arranged, as the international market China wanted to appeal was not only for 
promoting Chinese goods, but also (more importantly) for promoting the Chinese nation.  
After the half-century of continuous warfare with allied forces from the West, China 
suffered from the Japanese invasion in 1937,8 during which China was reduced to a semi-
colonized and semi-feudalist nation. During this eventful period, China was forced to sign 
treaties that positioned it as subordinate, with crumbling sovereignty and massive poverty. The 
end of WWII and the establishment of People’s Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 put the chaotic 
situation to an end, but simultaneously opened perhaps the most controversial and difficult 
chapter of China’s external relations. This chapter will chart the path of PRC’s struggle to build 
and re-build its national image as a newly minted communist government, from aggressive 
																																								 																				
8 The massive Japanese invasion in China took place from 1937 to 1945, killing over 35 million Chinese 




communist propaganda (before 1980) to soft, de-politicized nation branding (from 1980 to 
present).  
Over the last century, the study of “propaganda” was an important part of Western 
communication theory. Indeed, as a counterpoint to communication itself, propaganda, along 
with violence, for instance, was seen as what communication was not or should not be. As one of 
the founding fathers of political communication, Harold Lasswell (1927) defined propaganda as 
“the management of collective attitudes by the manipulation of significant symbols” (p. 627), 
and suggested that “the technique of dictating by the dictator is named propaganda” (p. 631). 
Similarly, Jacques Ellul (1965) suggested that “Propaganda stops man from feeling that things in 
society are oppressive and persuades him to submit with good grace” (p. 3). Of course Lasswell's 
appraisal of propaganda is more stark, aligning propaganda necessarily with dictatorship, and 
Ellul's is more rhetorical, seeing propaganda as a strategic communicational choice in how to 
interact with people. Given these iconic definitions of propaganda, the following pages will 
sketch a particular history of propaganda, that of Communist China in its earliest communist 
phase. 
This chapter begins by discussing China's approach to public relations and branding 
during early phases of Communism. This approach could be characterized as propaganda in the 
Western sense--top-down government and one-way strategic communication characterizing the 
state in a particular way. The chapter then transitions into a discussion of a much more 
complicated form of contemporary publicity–a multi-level, dynamic form of branding and P.R. 
that is now being used in China. This public relations discourse does not fit the old western 
definition of propaganda; rather, it falls into the realm of what I have defined in the introduction 




building is not simply conceptual/theoretical; it is also historical. This chapter puts the two terms 
in quotation marks to suggest that I intend to unpack what is complicated about them, but also to 
alert readers that I intend to examine what the term propaganda meant in the past, and why it was 
abandoned, even though it still bears a significant historical relationship to nation-branding. 
Western theories typically suggest that propaganda is almost always related to a tyrant 
(such as Hitler), or other political leader(s) or political power(s) being put on the pedestal 
through oppressive and/or deceptive ways. This is true for China as well during Chairman Mao’s 
era of ruling from 1950 to 1976 on which the first section of this chapter will elaborate. 
However, the second section of the chapter will chart how China moves from advocating a 
political leader and a political belief to advocating simply the “good life” and modernity, and 
from “governing” its national image to “managing” it. 
The first section of this chapter will briefly sketch a "subjective" and selective history 
(White, 1984) of the way China self-reflexively portrays itself during the Cultural Revolution. 
Doing this helps lay the groundwork for a discussion of branding that will be used throughout the 
rest of the dissertation. According to Hayden White (1984), a "subjective history" is a historical 
analysis without doing archival research; nevertheless, a subjective history captures large trends 
in history that lay a foundation for further research. Taking an approach like White's to my study, 
the first section will touch on key critical moments of the evolution from propaganda to 
publicity. As White's subjective history suggests, my own approach is not a complete history, but 
rather a history constructed in order to illustrate how changes in communication occur in China 
during specific historic turns. In this way, the chapter shows how Communist China began not 
by being conscious of its own global identity and being over-focused on internal propaganda and 




opening-up in 1979, China became more reflective of its identity as a global power and strove to 
carry out a massive image makeover for both its domestic and international audiences.  
The chapter will later point out that there is a lot lost in translation between the English 
word “propaganda” and the Chinese native language xuan chuan. The Chinese language uses 
xuan chuan to cover a much wider area of information rather than State-controlled information 
with a deceptive nature.  Also, there is a profound but at the same time subtle difference between 
propaganda as state-generated communication and publicity as commercially, corporate 
generated communication (Marchand, 1985). That leads to the question as in what way the 
latter—publicity—is simply an indication of privatization and marketing being conducted and 
perceived in China now. 
 
First historic period (1949 - 1976): “War and Revolution” (Mao)  
 
 The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas; i.e., the class which 
is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The 
class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time 
over the means of mental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas of those 
who lack the means of mental production are subject to it.  
                                                                           – Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels (1846).  
In 1949, the people of China welcomed a new China on a generally positive note, one 
that spread literacy, controlled inflation, abolished foreign privileges, stamped out the opium 
trade (and ended the Opium Wars) and corruption generally, liberated women from male 
domination, and brought the citizenry into a multitude of social activities to repair public works. 
Under the Chinese Communist Party as its singular leading institution, however, strict control 




people (Fairbank and Goldman, 2006). “Mao Zedong Thought” became the primary (and in most 
cases the only) ideological beacon leading new China’s idealistic and ambitious citizens, which 
also dominated China’s single-minded aggressive foreign policy: “extreme left” propaganda 
towards the domestic audience, and defensive isolation from the international (especially the 
Western) audience. 
1. The “kitchen,” the “room,” and the “guests” 
From 1950 to 1972, foreign affairs, as well as China’s national identity, were dealt with 
in accordance with Mao’s three diplomatic strategies: (1) "Set up a separate kitchen," (2) "clean 
the room before inviting guests" and (3) "leaning to one side" (Mao, 1950, p. 55). These three 
simple, but interestingly vivid, diplomatic mandates guided P.R. China’s international relations 
for almost three decades, from 1950 to mid 1970s (Pei, 1994). More specifically, setting up a 
separate kitchen means new China would downplay its semi-colonial relationship with Western 
countries (UK, France, Germany, etc.), and would establish its own diplomatic relations as an 
independent sovereign nation. Cleaning the room before inviting guests means that China will 
concentrate on eliminating the remaining imperial powers domestically before considering 
establishing diplomatic relations with other countries, in order to prevent capitalism from 
regaining power within a newly socialized China. The last phrase, leaning to one side, means that 
China would only consider supporting and collaborating with the communist side of the world, 
in an effort to unite the world’s working class and to establish an “international socialist united 
front” (a slogan by Lennin in the 1920s) that fights capitalism and imperialism to their death.  
With such aggressive strategies guiding the way, China’s projection of its domestic and 




youth, women, and everyone else to “eliminate counter- revolutionaries (anyone with capitalist 
tendencies), resist America, aid (north) Korea, and correct corruption at all levels” (Mao, 1950, 
p.18). Such campaigns, massive in scale and powerful in their ability to lure working class and 
incapacitate would be anti-revolutionaries, became part of ordinary government processes. In 
this way, propaganda became a routine part of government, and a routine, naturalized way of life 
for citizens, as the rosy promise and ambition of a new leadership rendered the masses (with 
uncertainty and a lack of security living in a new-born socialist country) easily mobilized.                   
From 1966 to 1976 China’s propaganda machine reached its historical peak. Now one of 
the major Cold War enemies of the West, China became even more protectionist than after the 
PRC was founded. The decade-long Anti-Rightist Campaign was part of a readjustment 
campaign for all citizens from the top down, with combined forces from the central government, 
the People’s Liberation Army, and the civilian Red Guards9. Numerous propaganda teams swept 
mainland China, promulgating extreme leftist ideas at the cost of the maltreatment of millions of 
people, mostly land and business owners, intellectuals, and government officials (Deng, Li, Wu, 
and Su, 2013). 10 
 
																																								 																				
9  Red Guards is a specific term generated during China’s cultural revolution, meaning a selected group of 
“outstanding” youth who were in charge of propagate the ideas of Mao, including distributing flyers, giving talks and 
performances, and carrying out discipline to the masses.  
10 Deng et. al wrote Years of Turbulence, systematically illustrating the major historical events during the 






Figure 1.1 archival photographs from the Cultural Revolution; loud speakers were installed in 
every city and village, routinely announcing propagandistic messages. Enthusiastic “Red 






Figure 1.2  Reprints of original Cultural Revolution posters, sold in souvenir stores in the streets 
of Beijing. Translation: “Strengthening the military-civilian united front; always ready to eliminate 
the external enemies” (left); “All the counter-revolution imperial powers are paper tigers” (right).  
 
Figure 1.2 shows two of the iconic posters mass distributed during the Cultural 




Like any religious icons, these posters work in several registers in ritual and response, which 
orient the individual within the context of collective identity, obligation, and power (Hariman 
and Lucaites 2007).  These posters are mostly dominated by the “communist red”11 color, and 
usually show a number of threatening firearms in the foreground and background. The Precious 
Red Book (many volumes of official publications of Mao’s quotes regarding political and social 
ideas) can be seen held tight in the fighting figures as their guiding star of revolutionary 
activities. These posters were mostly designed, printed, and distributed by the Bureau of 
Propaganda under the central government of China, but local county offices, publishers or 
printing factories also contributed to the production if the official channel of supply was not 
sufficient to satisfy people’s demands. They were usually posted in bulk, by government officials 
as well as ordinary citizens, on stone walls around towns and villages, around schools and 
classrooms, as well as inside each household, such as on the main walls of the living rooms, 
bedrooms, and even kitchens. All other house decorations should make room for these posters 
due to the posts’ utmost priority and their power to “lead the right way of thinking”12 (Cong, 
1988). “Red and glowing like the sun” was the visual theme of these posters, as it symbolized 
that the Party and Mao himself were the source of light and power (Cushing and Tompkins, 
2007).  
Inevitably, China’s foreign relations during the Cultural Revolution suffered from the 
same mindless zealotry as did its domestic politics, for “the animus of the time was not only 
against anything on the political right, but also against anything foreign” (Fairbank and 
																																								 																				
11	The red color is to represent “the blood of the workers” honoring the suffering and sacrifices of the 
proletariat. 
 
12 The literacy rate in China increased from 20% to 50% from the year 1949 (when Mao came into power) 




Goldman, 2006). Facing such undisguised hostility, many countries that have been cautiously 
approaching Mao’s China scattered, as a totalitarian fanaticism under dictatorial leadership earns 
itself very little charm. So far, this section shows how the global image of China then also 
reached the lowest point in terms of popularity with such strictly top-down administrated 
propaganda, and the next paragraphs will elaborate more on the context of the concept of 
propaganda, laying the foundation of the second section, which introduces the change from 
propaganda to publicity in China’s global image management.  
 
2. The “intranslatability” of Propaganda 
In the West's communication scholarship, propaganda was a way of describing state-
management of information via mass media in the twentieth century.  It was a term used in 
Europe in the early twentieth century, while later the United States began to use the term to 
describe what its enemies (Germany, Italy, Japan, and eventually the USSR and China) were 
doing—since media in the United States was mostly not state-managed. However, with the end 
of the Cold War and the fall of the communist powers, far fewer scholars are talking about 
propaganda in the twenty-first century. My research on contemporary China’s self-branding 
shows how the century-long scholarship of propaganda is not yet well defined, and hence my 
clarity about its definition is a relevant contribution. Historically, propaganda was vital to 
communication as a field; in fact, propaganda study was the cradle of the modern version of 
communication research, fundamental to the paradigm of public opinion study in the West. 
Analyzing propaganda during World War II, Harold Lasswell (1977) described what later 
scholars called the “hypodermic needle model of communication." He suggested propaganda 




until the smashing powers of the Allied armies knocked them into submission.” Associated with 
totalitarianism, especially Nazi Germany, where Hitler orchestrated a mass media campaign to 
influence public opinion, propaganda, in Lasswell's view, was an extremely effective tool for 
those seeking world domination. 
Concerned about the enormous communicative power of mass media, a group of 
American social scientists and historians (the Chicago School and beyond) even created the 
Institute for Propaganda Analysis in 1937, after the government established the Department of 
Propaganda. The Institute published a series of booklets trying to educate the public to think 
independently and avoid becoming victims of propagandistic power such as in totalitarian states 
in Europe and Asia, which was, ironically, albeit a more subtle form of U.S. propaganda itself.  
In their well-cited piece, “A propaganda model,” Herman and Chomsky (1988) illustrate the role 
of propaganda more precisely in the contemporary context: “media function to amuse, entertain, 
and inform, and to inculcate individuals with the values, beliefs, and codes of behavior that will 
integrate them into the institutional structures of the larger society. In a world of concentrated 
wealth and major conflicts of class interest, to fulfill this role requires systematic propaganda” 
(p. 1), and that propaganda bears an important role in creating hegemony. Propaganda, then, in 
the Western (particularly US) tradition, has a largely negative cast, usually provoking 
associations with deliberate deception, control, and often violence. However, the word 
“propaganda” in Chinese (xuan chuan) means something quite different. Reaching back to its 
historical origin, the xuan chuan first appeared in a history book from the XiJing Dynasty (266-
316 A.D.) recording politics and warfare in the Three Kingdoms era: “xuan chuan jun shi, zhi 
shou zhu jiang,” meaning “(the government consultant) propagates his mastery of the art of wars, 




Chinese, contrary to the West, was associated with education, pedagogy, and rhetoric, as to 
disseminating beneficial information to the masses. 
Xuan chuan was also widely used in association with Confucius, as he propagated the 
importance of education and life-long learning to both the noble class and to commoners in 
ancient China. Confucius, who worked his whole life as a teacher himself, used the word xuan 
(propagating) to mean sowing seeds and breeding. In his world-renowned book, The Analects 
(206 B.C.), Confucius wrote, “Education breeds confidence. Confidence breeds hope. Hope 
breeds peace.” Arguments like these were regarded as progressive in 200 B.C., when China was 
in her last few turbulent years transitioning from a slave society to a feudalist one, with a deep-
rooted social hierarchy already in place. Knowledge and education were considered exclusive 
and hence were only available to the noble class, who were “entitled” and thus not 
“propagatable” (spreadable), as were the masses.  However, since Confucius's goal was to reform 
the government, his activism in education, much like the educator Isocrates in ancient Greece, 
was to produce people who were capable of serving in government in decisive roles. He 
attempted to propagate chun tzu, which, when translated into English, is quite similar to the 
word, nobleman— not one born into a high social station, but one with noble and proper 
upbringing, behavior, cultivation (through observation, study and reflective thought), regardless 
of birth. Abundant examples conclude that in the Chinese context, the word propaganda has a 
much broader and more neutral (and indeed in most cases favorable) meaning: to spread, to 
educate, and to communicate to, and also to enlighten, the mass audience. The derogatory cast to 
the concept of propaganda in the West, then, of control and totalitarian zealotry can be contrasted 




The past decade has seen increasing scholarly attention to the problem of the word, due to the 
inevitable foreign misunderstandings in China’s increasing international communication. One of 
the many debates is that the Chinese government should change the name of its “Propaganda 
Department” to “Publicity Department” to avoid the derogatory connotation of the word 
“propaganda.” However, the counter-argument is that this may lead to two interrelated problems: 
(i) the cultural phenomenon of propaganda is de-culturalized and de-contextualized, becoming 
universal and (ii) saluting to Western culture, it acknowledges that propaganda is evil in its 
nature, neglecting the alternative interpretation outside the West (Lin, 2013). The previous 
section used “propaganda” mostly as defined by the West, because, since the beginning of the 
Cultural Revolution, China did use extreme means to achieve mental control over citizens and to 
threaten other (capitalist) countries, much like totalitarianism in Italy, Germany, and Japan 
leading up to World War II. However, contemporary China strives to avoid the negative 
connotation of propaganda and move to publicity, as part of its nation branding campiagn. By 
situating the concept propaganda within the Chinese historical and cultural context, China wants 
outsiders to understand that its propaganda is not dictatorial, as part of China's goal to de-
dictatorship its national identity. In some way, China is trying to dissociate itself from the 
dictatorships associated with World War II, hence, it becomes a friendly super power. This 
section, while making a comparison of the earlier days of propaganda and the contemporary 
efforts in branding China, also strives to complicate and contextualize the concept of 
propaganda, lending academic accuracy based on the awareness of cultural and lingual 
difference. In fact, linguistic scholars around the world have long noticed the “intranslatability” 
among different languages, historic contexts and cultures, and the most organic way to deal with 




Global expansion is matched by capital accumulation, and a nation’s reputation is a 
valuable form of cultural capital. After China’s period of isolation during the Cultural 
Revolution, during which it had little interaction internationally, today China has begun to 
change its international identity, in part because of global capitalism, in which it plays a new role 
as an emerging global power (Moley, 2001). Hence, China has moved to a more conscious and 
more strategic branding strategy—it still to a large degree uses a government controlled or 
government involved mass communication system, but branding today distinguishes itself from 
propaganda of the past, since the latter is to meet the needs of transnational global capitalism.  
From the Cultural Revolution to the current branding campaigns, China shifts from governing its 
mass communication to managing its mass communication. This management, still a means of 
social control, is achieved both by reducing government involvement and increasing 
participation of private media and advertising companies, such as Wanda Crop, Huayi Bros. 
Media Group, and many more (Xinhua Daily, 2001). Private companies actively compete for the 
opportunities of such partnerships with the government in order to gain recognition as well to 
generate profits. The combination of public and private efforts uses the new set of policies to 
make the publicity of China function globally, although propaganda in China is nonetheless still 
constantly under the watchful eyes domestically and internationally. The following section 
explores this problem by examining how the national image of China moves from the past into 
the present, and how it moves from one side to another geographically and historically, and how 
it may move into the new era marked by the shifting of global power.  
 






1. Re-Branding China for the external audience – highlighting “Peace” 
Markets are constructed, shaped and governed by a range of actors working at 
international, regional, local and national levels. The economy, in and of itself, does not contain 
the means to govern, regulate and organise itself. Legislation, regulation and politics are not 
thrown out of the window, but are importantly re-construed within the complexities of the 
current situation. Thus, for example, the opening of new satellite television markets in China and 
East Asia in the 1980s and 1990s went hand-in-hand with forms of regulation and political 
governance that made it possible to show programmes across national boundaries and to a large 
extent this meant negotiating with the national governments to hand.                   
                                                                                                                     -- Oswell, 2016.  
  
Historians say that in the last thirty years China has changed faster than any nation in 
history (Harvey, 2005). By taking its own peculiar path toward “socialism with Chinese 
characteristics” (Jiang, 1992), or phrased differently, “privatization with Chinese 
characteristics,” China managed to construct a form of state-manipulated market economy that 
delivered spectacular economic growth (averaging more than 10% a year) and rising standards of 
living for a significant proportion of the population for more than twenty years (Harvey, 2005). 
Economic growth in China, despite the recent slowdown, still hits around 10% per year over the 
past decade, compared to less than 2.5% in the United States (World Economic Forum, 2016). 
The economy in China has lifted hundreds of millions out of poverty. The spread of market-
based economics has remade the cultural and political environment of the country. And, a new 
generation of optimistic, engaged and worldly Chinese are planning a future that would have 
been unimaginable 30 years ago (Ramo, 2007). Deng Xiaoping’s economic-oriented political 
reform in 1979, turning China from socialist planned economy to (capitalist) market economy, 
“paved the way for massive growth in trade and of capital inflows that have now positioned 




China is a proto-Socialist and quasi-Capitalist state, few scholars or economists could 
confidently nail down precisely what China's relationship to Capitalism is. Is its capitalism 
"historically capitalist" or "newly neoliberal?"  Many Chinese scholars (such as in textbooks and 
history/sociology books) choose to give China a break in thinking about its capitalism because it 
says it is something other than Capitalist—with the official label as socialism with Chinese 
characteristics (Deng, 1991).  The complexity as such makes China a controversial, yet active, 
participant in the globalization of capitalism, which invites uncertainty and suspicion around the 
world. In response to such international distrust (when overt war has been replaced by economic 
war), Mao’s “war and revolution” (zhanzheng yu geming) foreign policy has been postponed, if 
not completely ended, while Deng’s “peace and development” (heping yu fazhan) has become 
China’s new mission.  
The idea of a “Peaceful rise of China” was first raised by Bijian Zheng (2003), vice 
president of the Party School of the CPC Central Committee, at the 2003 BoAo forum of Asia. It 
later became the primary diplomatic principle by the 4th (Hu and Wen) and 5th (Xi and Li) 
generation of Chinese leadership. “Peaceful rise” was a response to a school of thought among 
some Western scholars and policy makers known as “China Threat Theory” (Al-Rodhan, 2007), 
although precisely what the threat is is now somewhat different from the China threat of Mao’s 
era, which understood China as an aggressive and inimical communist power. The new China 
Threat Theory suspects that China’s powerful emergence at the start of the 21st century will harm 
the economic status of other countries and interrupt the established world order. China’s identity 
as a “simultaneously humiliated and arrogant” (Ramo, 2007) nation reasonably worsens the 
international concern. As is evident in this discussion, China is always already in a situation of 




what at least some people might think of China's international image as a nation. As I suggested 
in the introduction to this dissertation, the key to branding is story telling (Twitchel, 2009)—the 
“stories” associated with the brand make a whole world of differences when one drinks “Evian” 
water versus drinking Wal-Mart “Great Value” water, despite the fact that they are both equally 
capable of helping hydrate the body. It is worth mentioning, however, that some fictions can 
hardly work in a world where many competing fictions preexist (Twitchel 2004), which is 
especially true in the case of China. China certainly does not fall into the category of the 
“insignificant or lesser-known” countries which needs to “build” its competitive identity from 
scratch, but it certainly struggles among those indisputably very important but not universally 
loved, trusted or admired countries, such as Russia, India, and maybe the United States—
everyone knows where they are, but only so that they can avoid them (Anholt, 2010).  
To help make sense of the way China faces certain obstacles, as not having an already 
attractive image globally, scholars have addressed the notion of “branding unattractive nations” 
(Amujo and Otubanjo 2014). They suggest mainly using the case of Nigeria as a destination of 
dark tourism and post-trauma tourism that, despite its scale and strategies, nation re-branding and 
identity redeployment could be like feeling one's way across a deep and murky river: 
It is challenging to rebrand a nation in post conflict or atrocity in the absence of an agreed 
single national identity, and so nation rebranding in post political conflict, genocide or 
atrocity should be constructively undertaken with high sense of responsibility to 
counteract or reformulate the myths, prejudices and stereotypes that result from negative 





In a similar way to Nigeria, China’s nation branding not only aims to build a brand, but 
also to re-construct one, one that overwrites the aggressive communist stereotype.  The negative 
nation branding heritage may be abandoned, as in the case of Cambodia under Pol Pot and after 
the Rwandan genocide, replaced with a new nation brand built on a new vision, specifically 
politics, culture, and economic prosperity (Amujo and Otubanjo, 2014). For modern China, then, 
there is a makeover story to tell, but that story is haphazard, and the outcome is not guaranteed. 
And this is not merely because the world always seems to be watching China these days, with its 
dramatic rise in global economic, political, and cultural prominence, but also because the 
Chinese public is paying greater attention to how its country is perceived and judged overseas, as 
well. Thus, for Chinese people, the nation's collective identity and prestige, also know as China’s 
“face” (面子), is arguably more connected to their own in an increasingly connected global 
society (Wang, 2011). As such, China's rebranding its image, and doing so without the advantage 
of having a positive image to begin with, bears a similarity to both international and internal 
national audiences. Aronczyk (2008), for instance, summarized the distinctive but inter-
connected internal/external tasks of nation branding in her work on nation branding: while 
internally nation branding is used to manage consensus by encouraging positive perceptions of 
international decisions, in terms of external audiences within the court of international opinion, 
nation branding is used for both reactive and proactive purposes, such as greasing the wheels of 
accession to the European Union, the United Nations, or some other multilateral organization; 
repairing reputations damaged by legacies of hard power; or dodging the spotlight of unfavorable 
international media attention.  
Deng’s market economic reform launched in 1989, and improving the global image of 




only having been working on rebranding its identity for two decades, in short order China has 
become an expert in extreme self make-overs: while internally China's strategies privilege 
national power and pride (which the next paragraphs will elaborate), externally, its branding has 
an alternative emphasis: peace, mutual respect, and “blending.” So what is blending”in 
branding? The “lead engineer” of China’s reform, Deng XiaoPing, has a famous pragmatic 
metaphor: “Ask not if it is a white cat or a black cat, whoever catches the mouse is the good cat” 
(meaning why bother figuring out whether China’s system is socialist or capitalist, as long as it 
boosts the economy and people’s life quality, it is a good system). As such, the hybridizing art in 
China's branding approach is strategic: it blurs and de-politicizes China’s socialist or capitalist 
prefix, so it can blend in the globalized capitalist world market and do so by avoiding turbulence 
and resistance.  
However, it did not take China too long to figure out that the international tensions and 
resistance it now faces come less and less from continuing cold-war pressures or between a 
capitalist system and a socialist system; rather, China's rebranding challenges result from a 
power relation, one between an established power (the West) and an emerging one (China, 
among Japan, Korea, Singapore, and India, etc). Within this power relation, China's great 
challenge is to blend in with minimized resistance. Thus, it tries to accomplish that by 
highlighting its “peaceful rise,” “A brand new type of super power,” “the powerful China would 
be the anchor of world peace instead of the threat to it,” “harmonious China,” “peace and 
development”… all these statements flood across all kinds of media, from news (CCTV as well 
as local news) to reality TV to schoolbooks (Zhang, 2012), anchoring the harmless image of 
China on the global stage. Figure 1.3 is a snapshot of the month-long grand screening of 




January 2012, capturing a most de-politicized (overtly, anyway) China, featuring successful 
Chinese entrepreneurs, astronauts, friendly people, and movie stars with peaceful doves in the 
background— a sharp contrast from its more aggressive Communist image during Mao's era. 
China’s current President Xi Jinping’s “China dream” campaign launched in 2013 as the new 
Chinese leadership came to power also sticks onto this peace card, which will be elaborated more 
in the next chapter.  
 
 
Figure 1.3  
“China Unveils a” 
promotional video 
screened at New 






However, promising a “peaceful rise” does not automatically guarantee international 
credibility; most press coverage of China still makes it appear dangerous and unstable, and 
Westerners still look at the country with views freighted with ignorance and bias (Ramo, 2007). 
The juxtaposition suggests that, just because this campaign launched, its international reception 
may not be as was hoped. The reception of such branding videos is complicated by the different 
audience inside and outside of China, people from different interest groups, and so on—it may 
be uneven and not be the same everywhere or for everyone, as will be further elaborated in 
Chapter 4 of this dissertation.  
In the eyes of U.S. foreign news sources, China is either a land of Mao-suited citizens, as 
the “last surviving large communist country on earth,” or a mix of “Fu man chu” and gong-fu 
stereotypes with more modern authoritarian images (ibid, and Ono and Jiao, 2008). Faced with 
the complexities of China’s rapid change, foreigners tend to use words that are familiar and 
comfortable, such as “nationalism,” or “communism,” to try to make sense of China. Even when 
the country is also frequently labeled an economic “miracle,” for example – a meaningless catch 
all term that does little to get at the heart of what drives growth in China—such a description 
really says nothing of the nature of that growth or China's ongoing challenges. China’s problem 
is more complex than whether or not its national image is “good” or “bad”—the world’s view of 
China is too often an unstable cocktail of out-dated ideas, wild hopes, and unshakeable 
prejudices and fears. Simultaneously, China’ expressed self-image often shifts between self-
confidence and insecurity and assertiveness and confusion. Chinese officials and intellectuals 
themselves also “struggle to project a clear image of what the country is and what it hopes to 
become” (Ramo, 2007). That being said, Deng Xiaoping’s “peace and development” (heping yu 




party leaders who advocated for more aggressive ruling agendas. The recent leadership of China 
has been far more generously checking nation branding against reality (Wang, 2012), with a firm 
acknowledgement that the old-style “broadcast” propaganda campaigns cannot work anymore in 
the modern social and cultural context at both home and abroad.  
 
2. Branding China for the internal audience – highlighting “development” 
National images abroad and at home are widely regarded as a state’s intangible soft-
power resource (Nye, 2004). While externally becoming essential elements of a state’s strategic 
asset, internally, they contribute to political capital for both democratic systems and authoritarian 
regimes (Chen, 2012). The past decade witnessed the peak of mega events hosted by China, 
including the Beijing Summer Olympics in August 2008, the Shanghai World’s Fair in May–
October 2010, and the BRICS summit in April 2011, just to name a few.13 Research (mostly 
using quantitative method) show that all the hosting rights of mega events actually have a much 
stronger effect in branding China internally (for the domestic audience) than externally (for its 
international audience). Chen (2012), for instance, argues that  
while it is generally assumed that internationally oriented mega events target chiefly the 
international community for country’s branding purpose, […] they may also aim at the 
																																								 																				
13 The XXIX Summer Olympic was held in Beijing in 2008, August 8- August 24. The 2010 World’s 
Fair, also called Shanghai Expo, was held in Shanghai from 1 May to 31 October 2010. It was a 
major World Expo registered by the Bureau International des Expositions (BIE), in the tradition of 
international fairs and expositions, the first since 2000. The 2011 BRICS summit took place on the island 







internal audience in order to legitimize the ruling regime and leadership, which is 
particularly so with authoritarian regimes such as the one in China. (p. 732) 
In addition, media consumption behaviors and sources of information prove significant in 
forging a positive association between mega-event images and that of the sponsoring country and 
government. It is particularly interesting with the media aspect, as in transitional China, there 
exist difficulties to achieve a clear-cut distinction between government and social media and 
between government and commercial media, as social media users may draw on and post articles 
from government media; and to be “commercial” does not free a given medium from 
government control (Chen, 2012).  It is known to Chinese citizens that the Chinese government 
engages in active and comprehensive censorship of all media in China (including, and perhaps 
especially, social media), but the linkage between China hosting mega-events and citizens’ 
support of the events and the nation/government is still prominent, as will be discussed in the 
following case.  
 
Shopper-tainment, Securi-tainment, and Commercial nationalism  
Similar to advertising, building loyalty to the nation as a brand is key to the internal 
audience. Shoveling Smoke (2003) elaborates on China's successful KamaSutra advertising 
campaign that combines two seemingly paradoxical discourses: aspirational luxury consumption 
and public service (Mazzarella, 2003). This phenomenon echoes contemporary global trends of 
combining purchasing activity with a noble “cause,” such as what scholars have labeled 
“buycotts” and “shoppertainment.”  Purchasing products “For our nation” naturally can qualify 




Andrejevic (2008) write, “Ask not what you can do for your country but what you can shop for 
it.” They invoke the term "commercial nationalism" to designate transformations in the 
ideological forms that enable the reproduction of a concept of nation (115) and they do so by 
focusing on post-socialist Yugoslavia that went “through the process of transition from a 
centralized, socialist, state-run economy to a privatized, market-driven one.” Similar cases were 
also gathered and examined in Kaneva’s (2012) Branding the Post-Communist Nations, where 
post-Soviet nations such as Poland, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Romania and Hungary are “branding” 
their way, or, “purchasing” their way through all the social-political transitions.  
China shares considerable under-lying social/historic similarities with post-socialist 
eastern Europe, although China never publicly named itself “post-socialist,” trying to cover its 
transition from planned economy to market economy (starting from Deng’s reform) by labeling 
it socialism with Chinese characteristics. However, it does not take one too long to figure out 
what this phrase really means: “Capitalism with Chinese characteristics.” So, a capitalist 
economy in the hands of the Communist Party could make a political/economy Frankenstein—an 
uncomfortable patchwork of incompatible parts. Eastern European countriess like China share 
similar uneasiness: “the change in political systems did not result in a wholesale change in 
political leadership, but rather in a hasty series of makeovers: former party insiders transformed 
themselves into ardent post-communist, capitalist and/or nationalist opportunists” (Volcic and 
Andrejevic, 2008).  
How can China's citizens gain a sense of security during such turbulent transitions? 
According to Li Zhang, a state official who accepted my invitation to interview with me in 2013, 
the most urgent task for branding China is to help the Party sustain its legitimacy and acceptance 




by “buying” them national pride, and hence, a form of security for being a Chinese citizen. A 
China News Survey from 1998 to 2010 shows that a big percentage of Chinese citizens respond 
positively regarding the hosting of the Shanghai Expo, with the percentage climbing to over 90% 
in 2010, and among the surveyed citizens, over 80% express proud in their nation, associating 
the hosting of mega events as a “credit” for the Chinese government (Li, 2010). In the past 
decade, billions of dollars were devoted to massive hosting rights campaigns of world mega 
events (such as the Olympics, World’s Fair, among others). These successes not only publicized 
a new China to the world, but also increased the credibility of China among its own citizens, who 
had been longing for a sense of security ever since the disappearance of the common communist 
goal.  Hundreds of “national image promotion” videos are produced all over China, at city, 
province, national, and international levels, including the “China Today” series, “Beijing 
Welcomes You” series, and the month-long “China Unveils” series displayed on the screens in 
Times Square in the US, just to name a few. These exercises, which are carefully orchestrated by 
the Chinese government (partnered with private commercial media companies), do more than 
merely construct and manage China’s “reputation,” as they are also a powerful pillar in the 





Figure 1.4 The China Pavilion in the 2010 World Expo in Shanghai 
Figure 1.4 captures a poster of 2010 World Expo hosted in Shanghai, with the motto as 
“Better City, Better Life.” On the one hand, the grand outlook of “a good life” blurs the 
boundaries between the nation and the individual; on the other hand, the de-politicized prosperity 
and peace blur the boundaries between China and the Party. As was argued earlier, these 
exercises work to instill loyalty and pride to the nation and strengthen the government’s own 
legitimacy amongst its domestic population. Aside from buying security for its citizens, these 
branding campaigns also encourage citizens to buy their own security and entertainment, or what 
Andrejevic has named, “securitainment” (2011). The trick is to link and unify the interest of the 
individual and the national. “Better city, better life” is actually a deviation from the original 
Chinese version: “城市让生活更美好,” meaning “(modern) cities make our lives better.” 
Repetitively projected throughout contemporary Chinese media (most channels on TV, radio, 




modernization and urbanization (and thus capitalization) in the developing China coincide with 
people’s individual pursuit of a “better life.” With the World Expo being a grand showcase of the 
best wisdom/technology/innovation of a nation, China wishes to show its deep-rooted ancient 
wisdom brought alive with new leadership and opportunities, and that China today is a modern, 
powerful, and peace-loving country with an increasing awareness of its global environmental 
responsibility (China Daily, 2008). The metropolis skyline of the city of Shanghai stands behind 
the historically-designed China pavilion building, showing the "modernizing,"14 branding 
strategies at work. Also, these modernizing images are neoliberalizing, too, as a stark contrast 
from an outsider's imagination of China as a (mostly) pre-modern and poor communist nation. 
Likewise, Times Square’s “China Unveils” video (mainly targeted to 
American/international audience) together with the “China Miracle” video on Tiananmen 
Square’s big screens (mainly targeted to domestic audience as well as foreign visitors in China) 
both highlight fancy modernity in science, fashion, and sports—a promotion of national cohesion 
and creativity in order to meet the individual’s spiritual demands of a modern life, as well as to 
strengthen China's competitiveness within the international arena. These promotional videos with 
impressive colors and visuals are usually designed and created by renowned private media 
companies hired by the central government (Xinhua Daily, 2009). The intrigued foreign tourists 
and the proud domestic consumers explicitly mirror the path led by commercial nationalism, in 
which “nationalist appeals migrate from the realm of political propaganda to commercial appeal: 
that is, the appeal to nationalism as a means of increasing ratings, popularity, and sales” (Volcic 
and Andrejevic, 2008). Both the hosting rights campaign and the tourism campaign promote a 
																																								 																				
14 The “modernizing” strategy here is a parallel with the “ancientizing” branding strategy, which will be 




vision of nationhood that runs along commercial lines. Almost 100 million tickets were sold for 
the Shanghai World EXPO, making it the most “popular” World’s Fair in history. Countless 
tickets were sold, flights taken, and hotels booked for the burgeoning “world famous” tourist 
destinations all over China, purchased by citizens with rising income and more leisure time. The 
commercial nationalism phenomenon (Volcic and Andrejevic, 2008) is highly visible in these 
massive displays of consumption – indeed, “ask not what you can do for your country, but how 
you can shop for it.”  
Commercial nationalism is a shorthand for the coordination of government and citizens’ 
efforts to manage a country’s branding – whether through tourism, investments, or foreign 
relations. Commercial nationalism requires increased scholarly attention, as it pushes the need to 
reassess the viability of the notion of nation-state; as well as the contradictory presence of 
globalization that gives vent to nationalism and mass commodity consumption at the same time 
(Volcic and Andrejevic, 2008). Aronczyk (2008) also introduces the concept of “living the 
brand,” meaning that nation branding promotes a particular organization of power, knowledge, 
and commercial exchange in the process of articulating a collective identity: the primary 
responsibility for a nation's successful branding lies with individuals (the nation’s citizens, 
members of the diaspora, or even non-citizens in distant locations), who may find cause to 
engage with the nation and thereby have a stake in its success. For national citizens in particular, 
the key function is to “live the brand” – that is, to perform attitudes and behaviors that are 
compatible with the brand strategy. Foucault (1976) theorized the notion of governmentality and 
responsiblisation to maintain the state's efforts to get individuals to be held accountable for that 
which should be a social and governmental responsibility, employing strategies and tactics to 




1991, p. 87). Similarly, China's branding strategy seeks to transfer obligations and 
responsibilities for the success of the national brand to the people. By “immers[ing]” themselves 
in the brand identity, citizens carry “the microbes of the brand” and “infect” those with whom 
they come into contact (Aronczyk 2008).  This role is described variously as a “brand 
ambassador,” “brand champion,” “brand exemplar,” or “brand carrier” (ibid). Similar honorable 
titles for Chinese citizens, such as “National Image Ambassador” were also widely used in the 
2008 Beijing Olympic Games (Xinhua Daily, 2008). The Ambassadors, included celebrities and 
elected citizens from various walks of life and communities, were encouraged to live up to the 
brand of China.  
These cases cover a wide range of commercial nationalism embedded in the nation 
branding campaigns in China. Many of the events are mainly governmentally planned and	
approved (such as the 2010 Shanghai Expo), while the carrying out of these events are 
decentralized, funded and implemented through many private and commercial venues (such as 
the JinJiang Group and the Shendi Group for the Expo case, both are private tourism/real estate 
conglomerates). Despite the variety, however, what these cases share in common is the fact that 
the marriage of commercial culture and nationalism has adjusted to the rise of global capital. The 
local can be understood as a product of the global—a means of carving out a particular brand 
identity that takes shape as a response to globalization itself. With the “mysteries of power 
struggles” within a Communist Party maintaining its singular and unique hold on power (Harvey, 
2011), China as a controversial but active participant in capitalist globalization serves as a rich 
and informative site that reveals the complexity of such process.			
	




Of course, simply blending in is far from enough to brand a nation effectively, especially 
for China, the ambitious second largest global economy. As a number of scholars remind us, we 
are now in an “attention economy”— an environment where “a wealth of information creates a 
poverty of attention” (Herbert Simon, qtd. in Davenport & Beck, 2001, p. 11). Thus, attracting 
positive recognition by “breaking through the clutter” with a distinctive image is a critical 
dimension of the nation branding practice (Aronczyk, 2008). Simply put, one needs to stand out 
in this attention economy game, but that is not easy because of the massive amount of popular 
cultural material out there, much of which might distract or occlude national branding efforts. 
The question for China becomes, then, how to stand out while simultaneously blend in? Culture 
is the key held tight in China’s hand. Every country has a culture, a heritage, resources, natural 
beauty, and internal qualities that can be identified and defined, highlighted and captured, in a 
nation-branding initiative which may become both pleasing and economically effective.  
“Culture” has always been a central feature in both the hosting rights campaign and the tourism 
branding for China. A large number of Chinese scholars and policy makers stress that “domestic 
cultural revitalization” is a key component of the branding of China, because culture stands in as 
the main source of Chinese soft power projection is more likely to promote a unique, and 
simultaneously de-politicized and harmless image of the “peaceful rise of China,” and create the 
least amount of tension between classes and different social groups domestically and 
internationally. The following case demonstrates this strategy; in it, China is branded in a most 







Figure 1.5 one of the official posters of A Bite of China, incorporating old-fashioned food items 
into a traditional Chinese watercolor 
 
A Bite of China is a documentary television series introducing delicate and sometimes 
obscure Chinese traditional cuisines to the world. Screened on CCTV1 in May 2012 and released 
to the world market on Blue-ray and in four different languages, this documentary series became 
such a best seller both at home in China and abroad that CCTV rushed to produce a second 
season in May 2014. There is no shortage of food shows all over the world, usually featuring a 
charming master-chef creating magic in his frying pan, with celebrity guests and usually an 
attractive hostess, reacting with amazement, uttering sounds of delight, providing superlative 
adjectives to describe his skills and the deliciousness of his final products. However, A Bite of 
China does something uniquely charming compared with most entertainment food shows, as 




Traditional grass roots cultures as a tranquil but almost forgotten way of life barely touched by 
globalization and mass commodification are for the first time made visible and examined 
carefully under a humane microscope.  
There are seven episodes in the first season of A Bite of China focusing on the local 
residents from less developed parts of China, from the snowy mountains of northeast China to 
the valleys and rainforests along China’s southwest borders. They usually appear in the 
documentary as family units: the lotus root digging brothers living on wild ponds in Hubei 
province, the Huang father and sons collaborating on drying their hams in the clay-covered wind 
rooms in ethnic minority communities of Yunan province, Korean Chinese Miss Kim traveling 
to her hometown to learn kimchee making from her aged mother, and immigrant worker Bai can 
only go home and enjoy dumplings once a year with his parents and young children on the 
occasion of Spring Festival. Food is linked with family. When together members of a family talk 
of memories they have never mentioned. Like the food, families are warm, and food is an 
occasion to share emotions, bond, and become closer. 
Over the years the subject of food has entered the scope of communication studies. Lévi-
Strauss (1966) famously claimed that food is not only “good to eat” but also “good to think” (p. 
89), meaning that food is discursively mediated. Shugart (2008) notes that the prominence of 
food in mainstream media has led to the “food film” becoming a bona fide genre, as she finds 
that food functions rhetorically to rationalize and reconcile the desire for the other that the films 
seek to satiate. Film, on the other hand, has been identified by some scholars as a way of 
providing vicarious cultural experiences (Landsberg, 2004). For the mass audience who live in 
modern cities and barely step out of their office doors, A Bite of China opened a window from 




tranquil lifestyles, forgotten traditions and festivals—a refreshing breeze for those buried deep in 
China’s (and the world’s) hectic steps towards modernization.  
In the first episode, “Nature’s Gifts,” which is set in Shangri-la in west China, Tibetan 
woman Zhuoma (Tibetan general name for “lady”) and her teenage daughter had to hike 18 
miles in early morning to the virgin forest in order to collect matsutake mushrooms before the 
sun shines through the trees. After carefully and respectfully collecting the mushrooms under the 
giant pine trees, the Zhuomas carefully cover the dirt bed with dried pine leaves to moisturize 
and protect the delicate fungus roots—for the sake of the continuity of the “nature’s gifts,” the 
mother and daughter will have to humbly obey the rules of nature by maintaining sustainable 
development and the sacred cycle of life. Meaning “paradise on earth” in Tibetan language, 
Shangri-la remains herself in the caring hands of the local people. The wild mushroom special 
treat not only evokes the audiences’ admiration of nature’s generous offer, but also reminds them 
the important and achievable harmonious coexistence between human and nature. This also 
suggests that China has not lost its pre-modern roots, and it capitalizes on its popular 
construction in the West as an ancient civilization. In the official TV poster itself (Figure 1.5), 
the emphasis on China’s ancient culture is pronounced. The overall design of the poster is a 
classic piece of traditional Chinese watercolor (shan shui hua), one of the most ancient forms of 
ink on rice paper, usually featuring mountains and rivers in an abstract form of presentation with 
poetry and stone seals in the corner. The poster here cleverly modifies the mountain into what 
seems to be a slice of aged Chinese ham, and the river into the crispy edge of a fried pancake 
between chopsticks. A traveler in a distant boat is sailing down the foggy river of such a 
miraculous landscape, a fantasy of culture and ancient delicacies. It implies that the audience will 




remote years, as well as a journey to re-learn and re-member the precious traditional cultures that 
seems to be somewhat watered down in the big tide of globalization.  
A Bite of China is causing a culinary craze that continues long after the program credits 
roll, according to Sina News, 2012. Data shows that within the first week of airing of the show, 
there were about 6 million searches for the specific food items featured in the show on 
Taobao.com (the leading online shopping platform in China), making the weekly sum of 
transactions on all food items increased by 16.71%.  The vast audiences of food-lovers in China 
and abroad started looking for those traditional and obscure delights and ingredients tucked back 
in the remote areas of China. Searches and bulk purchases for "Mao Tofu," a traditional snack in 
Anhui Province, have gone up by a shattering 100 times more than before the airing of the show. 
Fermented Pu’er tea leaves and Nuodeng Ham from the remote Yunnan Province are also seeing 
huge sales increases, so that many villagers local to these food origins quit their jobs and became 
professional makers of these foods to meet the soaring market demand (China Daily, 2014). But 
just like everything else in contemporary China, A Bite of China as a successful and refreshing 
way of branding China and Chinese culture still bears some controversies. Since its first shooting 
in March 2011, the documentary crew has covered more than 60 geographic locations throughout 
vast China, including Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan, and from the muddy swamps below sea 
level to the snow-covered Plateau of more than 15,000 feet above sea level. It is also the first 
mega food-themed documentary by China shot in Blue Ray with full HD sound quality. With 
such high labor and supply expenses, few media companies in contemporary China could have 
competed with CCTV in making such a show. However, as an historic media outlet for the 
government, CCTV can hardly escape its role of being the "mouthpiece" of the “mainstream” 




CCTV is known for producing extensive documentary series that unveil favorable 
cultural sides of China after its market reformation, from The Legend of Yangtze River in the 80s, 
to Journey of the Great Wall in the 90s, to The Forbidden City and The New Silk Road in the 
2000s. These documentaries, although not overtly political (apolitical, even) and drastically 
different than the Mao time political propaganda, are still visibly didactic, and created from an 
authoritative top-down angle, lecturing audiences about the historic greatness of the Chinese 
nation. A Bite of China distinguishes itself with its soothing, eye-level camera angle, with the 
camera focusing on the vivid deliciousness intertwined with the down-to-earth joys and pains of 
the ordinary people. The emotional quality of the documentary series, the values of ordinary 
people working hard to make food, and the series' nostalgic tone seemingly aim to empower the 
grassroots. However, the wide grin across the rice farmer’s face, the slow-paced everyday life of 
the villagers and the self-sustaining satisfaction of the local fisherman all diverge from a 
contemporary China fully in the process of modern transformations such as in material wealth 
and neoliberal efficiency. While troubled with an increasing number of food safety concerns in 
China, such as worries about using recycled cooking oil, concerns about fake liquor, and distress 
over unhealthy baby formula and illegal food coloring, A Bite of China provides a timely contrast 
that promises worry-free food, along with all the simple virtues of life. In a sense, de-politicized 
simplicity is the selling point of the documentary, as advertisers will want to “avoid programs 
with serious complexities and disturbing controversies that interfere with the ‘buying mood.’ 
They seek programs that will lightly entertain and thus fit in with the spirit of the primary 
purpose of program purchases – the dissemination of selling a message” (Herman and Chomsky, 




As a documentary that praises the “untouched local,” however, it is immensely 
interesting to find out that the commercials shown before and after the show included an ad for 
McDonalds’ new burger and Hong Kong HSBC Bank’s foreign currency service. Both marketers 
and anthropologists have understood that the local and the global are not opposites; rather, they 
are mutually constitutive elements that must be considered together as mutually-reinforcing parts 
of social, economic, political, and cultural change. The global is constructed locally just as much 
as the local is constructed globally. Among the various projects that seek to manage and profit 
from cultural difference, the global marketing and advertising apparatus is uniquely positioned in 
terms of its access to the mass media (Mazzarella, 2010).  
The “Chicken Soup for the Heart” effect of this documentary marks a new trend of 
branding contemporary China, one very different from Mao’s diplomatic aggressiveness, and 
different from the latter party's high profile boastfulness, A Bite of China unveils the fact that the 
elegance of China lies in its original culture and the earthy virtues among its common people. 
The humble farmers in rural China, the shepherds living in harmony with Mother Nature, and 
those who decide to stay and carry on the practices with the skills learned from their ancestors. 
All of this provides a clever and convenient alternative to the fickle and hectic lifestyle in fast 
developing/modernizing China. The contrasts of past/present, hard work/simplicity, pre-
modern/modern, and family/individualism function to bridge across dialectical divides, key 
aspects of China's long transition to modernity, service as a tonic to help citizens of China come 
to terms with the tensions and complexities a shift to modern life portends. The reviving of 
history and tradition is only a small part of the large-scale re-branding of China through its 
identity as a unique ancient civilization. As the “Ancientizing” chapter will elaborate later in this 




Mao’s revolution) has become a vital part of reviving the Chinese national identity as a uniquely 
charming ancient civilization in the increasingly generic modernized/Westernized world.  
 
The world famous Chinese food pairing with such tranquil wisdom evokes fascination for 
the international audience, and a sense of nostalgic national pride for the internal audience. It is a 
delicious and delicate way to bridge the gap between the past and the present, and the pre-
modern and modern. As a documentary made by the controversial CCTV, A Bite of China is to 
some extent an example of the progress that has been made in televisual narrative in China in 
detaching itself from being the total mouthpiece of the powerful and the mainstream. And it is 
also an example of the government becoming more sophisticated in branding China using totally 
de-politicized means such as a charmingly innocent televisual documentary.  However, many 
real-life concerns in rapidly developing China cannot be concealed and smoothed out only by a 
CCTV bestseller documentary. 
  
Conclusion  
Every nation has an image that varies across time and space to a greater or lesser extent 
(Simonin, 2008). This chapter, through various examples across space and time in China, 
outlined the development of the global image of China, from the aggressive, hyper-political 
state-led propaganda to the current multi-dimensional and de-politicized “management” of 
China’s publicity through the intricate partnership among the state, the private/commercial 
sectors, and the individuals.  Nation branding is “a very long-term project, and it is worthy of a 




governments, national governments, tourism authorities [and] any force, including private 
companies, who help to define the way all those billions of people out there, in particular the 
several millions who really matter, view your place” (Aronczyk, 2008). For China, besides 
promoting an international image and maintaining domestic stability and favorable internal 
conditions, China’s peaceful rise and sustained growth are of paramount importance. As Harvey 
(2005) points out, China certainly embraced economic reforms in order to amass wealth and 
upgrade its technological capacities so as to be better able to manage internal dissent, to better 
defend itself against external aggression, and to project its power outwards onto its immediate 
geopolitical sphere of interest in a rapidly developing East and South-East Asia. With the 
complex internal and external challenges it continues to face, China certainly has a long way to 
hike—because after all, if the internal cannot match the surface, the brand is but an empty shrine.  
Henry Kissinger opened up his new book On China with a comment about China's 
“singularity”: an aged civilization that is less than a conventional nation-state than a natural 
phenomenon – the extent and variety of this territory bolstered the sense that China was a world 
unto itself (2011). This chapter traces the national image of China from its ancient aloof 
isolation, the latter-day humiliation, Mao’s war and revolution, and Deng’s reform and openness 
to marketization that sets the tone of China’s contemporary branding focusing on peace and 
development. China’s national image is still rather foreign to the West, as “China’s civilization 
originates in an antiquity so remote that we (the West) vainly endeavor to discover its 
commencement” (Kissinger, 2011), and it is to some extent also foreign to Chinese citizens 
themselves, as they live amidst a critical conjuncture that witnesses the rapid and radical changes 
in China’s position and packaging of itself. Unlike the propaganda and broadcasting era, the 




and real publicity. Bringing opposites into harmony (both in Confucianism and Taoism) is one of 
the great charms of Chinese culture; thus, China should be able to sort helpful criticism from 
harmful attacks and respond effectively (Ramo, 2007). China needs a Taiji-like national image, 
one that harmonizes opposites— and “the contradictions we see in modern China are not always 
signs of dishonesty or weakness, but rather signs of change” (Ramo, 2007). Branding 
contemporary China is a brand new cultural project after all—with its distinctive complexity and 
challenges, there are no prior examples to follow. But as LuXun (1926), father of modern 
Chinese literature and a world-class leftist critic reminds us in his novel Hometown: “There was 
initially no path on this planet—Path is shown up only when thousands of people walk through.” 
            Throughout the various examples, we can see that the intricate knot of “propaganda” in 
the past, the present, and perhaps the near future. To sum up in an alternative way, the diplomatic 
communication of China actually transferred form a blunt  boycott method (by totally denying 
capitalism and the West) to a buycott one (to actively participate in global capitalism). The 
critical approach to this case also unveils the capital-based interrelationship between the state 
and the individual in transitional China, from Ellul’s (1965) identification of propaganda as an 
outlet for the individual to gain satisfaction as a member of society (for participating in the 
decisions of the state and having contributed to the state), to Foucault’s governmentality (1991), 
with the government working as "apparatuses of security," providing its citizens a feeling of 
economic, political, and cultural well-being. The future configuration of global politics and its 
relationship with multinational capital will undoubtedly cast its shadow on both cultural 









 CHINA DREAM: THE GREAT REJUVENATION OF A BENIGN WORLD 
POWER 
 
Introduction: Dreaming the New China 
When the new leadership of China came into power in 2013, the “China Dream,” as a 
new nation’s manifesto, had already been in full swing.  The first official announcement of the 
plan appeared in the President Xi Jinping inaugural presidential speech March 2013, when he 
declared, “China Dream is to recover our confidence which existed for over 500 years. 500 years 
ago China made up one third of the world’s GDP. Historically China was a great nation. Now 
China is returning to its historical position. The world should greet China’s rise peacefully” 
(NPR News, 2013). Advocacy for China Dream since then has been widely discussed by the 
domestic Chinese audience, which ranges from government agencies to the private sectors and to 
common people.  China Daily, the official newspaper of China in 2015 described China Dream 
as an expectation “to realize the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, and is considered the 
greatest dream for the Chinese nation in modern history” (China Daily, 2015). This chapter will 
first introduce the China Dream manifesto in detail, then examine how the new ideology fits into 
the larger nation branding campaign, and how it is currently received by domestic and 




In a 2013 article from the People’s Daily, China’s leading newspaper, Liu Qibao, head of 
the China Communist Party’s (CCP) Publicity Department, defines the importance of China 
Dream for the Party and the country. Liu refers to China Dream as the new leadership’s mission 
statement and political manifesto for the Party and the country’s future; he also said it is “a major 
strategic thought” for developing socialism with Chinese characteristics (Liu, 2013). Judging 
from the CCP’s efforts to publicize the slogan, China Dream has become the signature ideology 
for President Xi’s term, as well as a coherent utterance of contemporary China's global policy 
and political future. As Wang (2014) points out understanding the concept of China Dream is 
essential to understanding China’s current administration and its future public policy orientation.  
For President Xi Jinping, the main context for promoting the Chinese Dream narrative is 
domestic politics. However, a major challenge for the concept is whether the outside world 
understands China Dream. Given that it is deeply rooted in history, there is an unavoidable 
understanding gap between the Chinese and the rest of the world regardin what the narrative 
means. The reason is that those outside of China are less likely to know much about Chinese 
history and would not necessarily connect historical events with current affairs (Wang, 2014). As 
a consequence, China hosted an international dialogue about China Dream in Shanghai, six 
months after the manifesto had been announced to the world (Figure 2.1), targeting an 
international audience consisted mainly of politicians, economists and scholars. To understand 
China Dream it is necessary to examine segments of government speeches about China Dream 









Figure 2.1 China Dream forum in Shanghai on December 2013 
Below are a few key statements form the forum: 
For over 2,000 years in its history, China maintained great power. But its influence 
didn’t stem from territorial expansion or the occupation of foreign countries. China is rather 
an introversive country, focusing on developing its culture rather than its military might. 
Chinese civilization has never displayed force or made bellicose policies; instead it 
emphasizes “harmony is of the utmost value.”  
China hopes to share its dream with the rest of the world, as it is the time-honored 
consensus among its 1.3 billion people that “the interests to be considered should be the 
interests of all, and the fame to be sought should be the kind that could go down in history.”  
China intends to forge a new type of relationship with the U.S. featuring “non-
conflict, non-confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation.” It vows to coexist 
with all its neighbors, supporting each other in weal and woe.  
                                                                                                      (Chung, 2014) 
 
Several international events held in 2014, including a meeting of APEC, the East Asia 




and its new role in the contemporary world. During the APEC opening session, for example, 
Chinese President Xi acknowledged that economic leadership is not enough if China wants to 
become a comprehensive global leader. With tens of billions of dollars invested in multiple 
global venues, China still faces the accusation from major Western news outlets such as New 
York Times, the BBC, and the Washington Post that money cannot buy love. Even with its 
wealth, China is a long distance from being an internationally respected normative power. The 
core of the government's argument is that China can and should promote justice and equality at 
the global level, and this new idea challenges Western-dominant norms of global power and 
democracy. China claimed that China Dream is also an "Asia-Pacific dream and World dream,” 
at the 2014 APEC Summit to try to calm regional nerves (especially China's southeast Asian 
neighbors), and gain international support, especially from the United States. President Obama’s 
trip to China for APEC addressed a wide range of issues extending from climate change, to 
cyber-security issues, to the pace of China’s economic reforms in relation to the United States. 
While both countries have long agreed that a “New Type of Great Power Relation"15 (Hu 
Jintao,16 2012) is needed, it was still not clear to the public what such a relationship entailed. 
However, President Obama’s trip to China did offer a critical opportunity to shape and clarify the 
U.S.- China relationship and seize upon the cooperative spirit of the APEC meeting to strengthen 
China's power relations in Asia (Brookings, 2014). As The Diplomat reported, “As evidenced by 
the climate change deal between China and the United States, the two countries will need to 
work together" (2014).  
																																								 																				
15 “New Type of Great Power Relation” was the theme of the China-US Economy Forum hosted in Beijing, 
2012. It advocates a new big power relation featuring “mutual respect, cooperation, and win-win 
partnership.”  




This is one of the many examples that “China is ready to assume global leadership and 
bear global responsibilities along with the United States” (Xi, 2014), and leaders from both 
nations agreed the mutual-beneficial nature of such leadership (Xinhua Daily, 2014). At least, in 
Obama's words, China's announcement of its China Dream policy was met with support. As he 
said during his visit to China in 2014: “It’s not a zero-sum game . . . one country’s prosperity 
does not come at the expense of another. The United States has helped integrate China into the 
global economy, and it’s in America’s best interest and in the world’s best interest. We want 
China to do well” (Washington Post, 2014). Such mutually-beneficial promises to collaborative 
prosperity also occurs between China and many other countries. For example, China’s FTA deal 
(Free Trade Agreement) with Australia has important strategic implications: on the one hand, it 
assures Australia that China’s purpose is not to ask Australia to choose a side between China and 
the United States.; on the other hand, through an agreement, it helps Australia and China to 
achieve peace and prosperity together. This is partly why China and Australia upgraded their 
relationship to “comprehensive strategic partners,” in a joint press statement hosted by the two 





Figure 2.2 President Obama and Chinese President Xi Jinping toasting at the 2014 APEC submit 
in Beijing, where Obama agrees to the mutually beneficial nature of China Dream 
 
As shown above, China worked to put its foreign policy into place through China Dream, 
via a series of global activities and events. Multiple Chinese news outlets responded positively to 
the conclusion that “what China has demonstrated lately is a unique kind of global leadership, 
though there is still a long way to go for it to truly become a comprehensive global leader. The 
international community, thus, should welcome China’s efforts rather than viewing them with 
suspicions. Only by working together will the Chinese Dream and the ‘APEC dream’ be 
achieved” (The Diplomat, 2014).  In addition to his famous China Dream slogan, Xi called for 
pursuit of the “Asia-Pacific Dream” during an address at the APEC CEO Summit. The Asia-
Pacific Dream is the latest iteration of China’s vision for a united Asian community with Beijing 




and international occasions, leading Western media to call Xi “quite the dreamer” (New York 
Times, 2014).  
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce and analyze China Dream through an 
examination of how multiple materials have come together to support the dream, as these past 
three years witness the coming together of these various media to fire up the new Dream 
narrative, albeit often in a complicated and sometimes contradictory way.  To examine this 
dream, I analyze official government statements/propaganda, international conferences, policy 
analysis, street posters, promotional movies, and museum exhibitions. All these resources, 
although from various outlets, help explain the complex way the China Dream campaign 
unfolded, including its many contradictions. The term “dream” is of particular interest because, 
as a national dream, China Dream approximates a “national psyche,” such as in Kracauer’s From 
Caligari to Hitler (1947), where in the years following WWII Kracauer proposed to explain a 
German national consciousness or sub-consciousness (dreaming state). Kracauer’s analysis saw 
the nation as “dreaming” in a certain sense under Nazism--through movies and movie-watching. 
One could say that Kracauer’s analysis became an early way of talking about film and ideology--
how the consumption of mass media pulled a viewer into an ideology. Counter to this notion of 
national consciousness being mass media consumption, this chapter examines how multiple 
materials come together—not just films—to form China Dream.  
This dissertation as a whole is a project about nation branding, and this chapter shows 
how various media worked together by using post-communist and post-propaganda techniques 
through which China Dream, the new branding campaign occurs in contemporary China. The 
China Dream case is of critical relevance to research on nation branding, as current crises of 




and provisions offered by the nation-state may be powerful antidotes to the anxieties of global 
disjunctures. Amidst calls to regulate and rebuild the architecture of global integration, the 
potential of the national imaginary has come to the fore (Aronczyk, 2009). The China Dream 
campaign with the new leadership is of particular interest in China’s own history of nation 
branding, because it distinguishes itself from any former Chinese leadership campaigns (which I 
will compare later in the chapter), as it anchors a most de-politicized promise of prosperity, and a 
universal conscience which does not exclude other nations from mutually beneficial progress. 
This campaign is less-Chinese specific but more internationally inclusive, as it claims to follow 
the contemporary universal values in international communication. As Clifford Christians has 
written, “our international web is not primarily political power or economic interdependence or 
information technology but a commitment of conscience that preconditions the ethos of these 
external apparatuses” (Christians, 2010). China Dream does give an expression to universal 
values of international communication, such as truth, human dignity, and non-violence. This is a 
big leap from the closed-minded, state-led propaganda China used to use during and after Mao’s 
era.  Consequently, the case of China Dream helps us understand China’s larger branding 
processes internationally, from propaganda to publicity.       
                                                                                                       
Historical origins of China Dream as a part of Branding China 
 
As discussed earlier in the dissertation, as nation states find themselves competing for 
economic and political resources and capital in the global marketplace, most, if not all, have self-




economic globalization, in which international relations remain caught up in networks of 
interdependence and economic competition, nations have adopted a commercial model of self-
promotion (for the international audience) and loyalty building (for the domestic audience) that 
treats national identity as a brand asset to be managed in an attempt to build and profit from the 
cultivation of forms of loyalty to the brand (Volcic and Andrejevic, 2008). This trend is most 
visible in the marketing of international tourism and international campaigns to win hosting 
rights of mega global events, where the deliberate creation of a national brand image goes hand-
in-hand with the development of catchy slogans to portray countries as desirable tourist 
destinations or investment opportunities. By successfully hosting the 2008 Olympics, 2010 
Shanghai Expo (World’s Fair), and gaining over 10 World Cultural Heritage Nominations from 
the United Nations, the last decade marked a historical peak of the massive project of branding 
China.  
As a new agenda for the contemporary branding of China as a nation, China Dream can 
be simplified as “the great revival of the Chinese nation” (Xi, 2013). A less ambitious and more 
detailed explanation of the Dream talk, is that of de-politicized soft power: As former president 
Hu states,  
Besides its enormous economic and trade contributions, as well as poverty reduction 
contributions, China needs to contribute in four other key areas: human development, 
science and technology, the green movement, and culture. These four contributions 
would represent China’s modern renaissance, with domestic and international 
significance. (Hu, 2011)  
Here, Hu summarizes that China’s hard power contribution to the world (economy, trade, 




power (education, green movement, culture) to materialize. Although still a relatively new 
political phenomenon, China Dream has already been dominating the Chinese People’s 
Congress, TV and radio, buildings and streets, and was recently edited into students’ textbooks 
in nation-wide public schools.  In the West, however, it has only been occasionally mentioned in 
US news and political commentaries, with or without elaboration. The following section attempts 
to bring China Dream into academic discussion among communication and cultural scholars in 
the West, from its historic roots to its contemporary significance as an active part of China’s 
nation branding campaign.  
When examining China’s recent history, it became possible to see early traces of China 
Dream in governmental discourse. Even though President Xi Jinping is probably the first 
Chinese leader to use the term “dream” in his signature narrative, Chinese leaders have a long 
tradition of providing its people with rosy pictures of the future. A vision for the future may 
provide compelling moral motivations to inspire people to participate in the government’s 
political cause. Lacking the procedural legitimacy of democratically selected leaders, it is 
perhaps even more important for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to create its own 
narratives and stories in order to bolster its legitimacy and to mobilize mass support (Wang, 
2013). According to Fiske (2011), a slogan is a pleasing and memorable “label badge” (p. 34). 
The adoption of a slogan—one that conveys a sense of beyond-normal wisdom and vision in a 
short, memorable and perhaps somewhat opaque phrase—has been a rite of passage for all 
Chinese leaders since Chairman Mao Zedong (The Economist, 2013), with many pompous and 
aggressive slogans such as “the growth of all living depends on the sun (Mao himself),” “smash 
imperial America,” “all anti-revolutionists are paper-tigers,” just to name a few. As was 




of socialism. Mao pictured an ideal society without capitalist oppression or class inequality, and 
he envisioned a future ideal socialist society with such an abundance of material goods that 
people could take what they wanted based on “needs” instead of “labor” (Mao, 1949), but such 
an idealist version of socialism lapsed into an out-of-control aggression, and continuous wars 
against capitalism and imperialism. In 1978, crowned as the lead engineer of China’s newest 
modernity, Deng Xiaoping enacted the “Reform and Open up” campaign, which sounds like 
more of a policy rather than a slogan, and it aimed to inspire rather than to convince. By using 
the word “reform,” the campaign implied China should revise its extreme left politics; whereas, 
“open up” suggested China should become less protectionist and open its doors to the rest of the 
world to form political, economic, and cultural collaborations. Compared to Mao’s various 
aggressive slogans, the Reform and Open up slogan is much more plain, realistic, and moderate. 
This is because at that time it was dangerous to challenge the current power structure publicly 
based on extreme faith in communism, and Deng himself did not know if his unprecedented 
reform policy would work at all within China’s circumstances. But as China gains successes at 
each step carrying out the reform, there are multiple less timid follow-up slogans of the original 
plain Reform and Open Up, such as “Rising Power,” and “Creating Socialism with Chinese 
Characteristics.” These new slogans bear more confidence in the social changes of China, 
gearing up a new era of China transitioning from socialist planned economy to global market 
economy.  
At the beginning of the new century, former Chinese President Jiang Zemin started the 
“Three Representatives” slogan, mainly stressing that the Party needed to represent advanced 
socially productive forces, China’s advanced culture, and the fundamental interests of the 




Communist Party. Ambitious and rosy as it was, it was actually a stress call for the Party, since 
the market economy of China steers people’s attention away from the legitimacy or even the 
relevance of the Party. In 2006, in the keynote speech on the Sixteenth People’s Congress 
meeting, former President Hu Jintao formally raised the legacy of “A Harmonious Society” (Hu, 
2006). This highly Confucian slogan aimed to soften and harmonize the accumulating social 
tensions brought on by the socioeconomic and cultural transformations that followed China’s 
reforming and opening-up. It highlighted a traditional, Confucian-based concept of “harmony” to 
promote harmonious relationships inside China as well as between China and other countries 
throughout the world. These examples of historical slogans demonstrate that, after Mao, China's 
policies began to be more attuned to its relationships with other countries, hence a need for a 
more harmonious projection of itself and that this progression toward harmony was gradual, but 
nevertheless quite emphatic. China Dream follows these lines of development, while with added 
charm in uniting the people and the nation, which the following paragraph will elaborate.  
By 2013, Marxism and socialism, ideologies which had united China for nearly half a 
century, began dying out with everyone riding the tide of market economy and globalization. 
China’s new leadership saw an urgent need to (re)unite an increasingly diverse but divided 
nation, with a widening gap between the rich and the poor, and without a common belief that 
used to bind the people. Lacking the procedural legitimacy of democratically elected officials, 
while simultaneously facing the collapse of communist ideology, the Party had no choice but to 
fall back on using China’s history, culture and patriotism as its “societal glue” (Wang, 2014). 
The rise of an immense new middle class in contemporary China “needed” a new Dream: “a 
dream of a strong nation, a dream of a wealthy people” (Chen, 2013). By saying that the interest 




and self-branding individuals. It is interesting that the Dream slogan is actually rather vague and 
arbitrary, while the absence of substance creates room for discussion and disagreement over what 
the dream is really about, as well as where China should be heading— a productive vagueness.  
By discussing various slogans Chinese governmental officials have used to describe 
modern China, it becomes clear that there is a visible trend from the Mao era’s War and 
Revolution slogans to the Xi era’s Dream slogan: these slogans are vaguer and vaguer, softer and 
softer, and increasingly meaningful to a wider, international audience. Despite being the 
youngest of all government slogan campaigns, the Dream talk triggers wide discussions among 
the US audience, on radio call-ins, magazines, and even social media sites, mostly suspecting 
and criticizing the “authenticity” of the Dream: “They (the Chinese) already took away 
everything from us, now they are even trying to knock off our dream (American dream)!” 
complains one YouTube user in her/his comment to a China Dream music video (YouTube.com, 
2014). The Economist goes further, arguing that the Dream designed as a knock-off of its 
American equivalent—is even intentional – as an eye-catcher to attract attention from the West. 
President Xi deliberately used the China Dream term as a way to trigger a dialogue with 
America. Although in Xi’s multiple talks about China Dream within China and with leaders of 
different countries, he avoids publicly mentioning that China Dream would eventuate in China 
surpassing America economically and politically. When asked the exact question regarding 
whether China Dream implies China will surpass America in a press conference in Russia in 
2014, Xi vaguely responded by saying “the fulfillment of China dream would benefit all 
countries.” How exactly does China Dream benefit all countries? And how could China convince 
the world as well as its own people this idealistic slogan should be taken seriously?  Because of 




outside world over its precise meaning. Although China Dream may be less hard to understand at 
home, it unfortunately remains opaque to people located outside of China. Given that China 
Dream is deeply rooted in history—particularly China’s interpretation of its own history, the 
interpretation of the slogan may differ in crucial ways from other countries’ teachings and 
narratives—there is an unavoidable chasm between how China perceives itself and its goals and 
how foreign audiences do (Wang, 2014). The following sections will examine the Dream 
philosophy through a variety of different angles, and demonstrate how it is engineered to be 
morally and practically appealing to an international audience.  
 
China Dream with Universal Values in International Communication 
 
In the contemporary debate about globalization and differences, “communication ethics 
at this juncture has to respond to both the rapid globalization of communications and the 
reassertion of local identities, the intersection of the global and multicultural” (Christians, 2010). 
International communication ethics includes three basic values: “human dignity, truth, and non-
violence” (Christians, 2010), despite racial, religious, geographic, cultural, or political 
differences.  Communication among different nations, in particular, needs to follow these 
guidelines to be universally effective and convincing. China, however, stood out historically as a 
major country that did not comply with many guidelines in international communication. As 
Kissinger (2012) points out, “nations usually cherish a tale of their origin. A special feature of 
Chinese civilization, however, is that it seems to have no beginning. It appears in history less as a 




demonstrated in the previous chapter, the arrogance of the everlasting Middle Kingdom 
dominates most of China’s ancient diplomatic history, without much attention given to any 
international values. After the establishment of PRC dominated by Mao’s leftist regime, China’s 
aggressive and “one side only” (explained in the previous chapter) diplomatic communication 
left little room for international communication ethics. Subtle, but fundamental, changes only 
happened fairly recently, when a nation brand actually started to matter after China joined the 
global economy.  
As the previous section outlined the historical origin of China Dream, the following 
section will analyze the content of China Dream in detail, and how it is carefully designed to 
address the universal values in international communication ethics: truth, human dignity, and 
non-violence. China’s leadership, despite remaining authoritarian, is striving to follow these 
international values in order to gain maximum international understanding and support. After all, 
a nation’s image is not the one projected; rather, it is the one received, and a major international 
campaign could only be understood (and potentially popular) when it engages in an international 
cultural system, which is increasingly democrat and highly mediated.  
 
Truth  
“We advocate truthfulness, accuracy, honesty, and reason as essential to the integrity of 
communication.” This is the first principle for ethical communication approved by the NCA 
Legislative Council in 1999. “Truth” has been a valued premise of many forms of 
communication throughout history, and among different regions and cultures. The violation of 
truth, seen in many forms, such as war-time propaganda, biased news coverage, etc., are usually 




“language is the primary means of social formation, so it’s important to have an overriding 
commitment to truth” (Christians, 2010). With a long history of government-controlled 
propaganda, China is certainly seen as a counterexample of honoring this principle. China 
Dream, for good reasons, certainly does not want to mess with this unmanageable task as to 
address truth by attempting to clean up the truth of its half-century long propaganda tradition, so 
it chooses to advocate truth in an alternative way: branding China through China Dream is 
unveiling the truth—because the image of China has undergone Western media 
misrepresentation for centuries, and now it’s “our turn to let the world know what China really 
is” said Liu (2013), an author who wrote the best-seller book China Dream: China’s Goal, Path 
and Confidence.   
As discussed in the previous chapter, nation branding is of particular importance for 
lesser-known countries. China certainly does not fall into the category of the “insignificant or 
lesser-known” countries which needs to build its competitive identity almost from scratch, but it 
certainly struggles in the pile of indisputably very important but not universally loved, trusted or 
admired countries, such as Russia, India, and the United States. So China’s Dream talk not only 
aims to build a brand but also to re-construct one. It not only has a makeover story to tell to the 
world, but it also is imperative for the country to do so more effectively by labeling it as the 
unseen truth. Aronczyk (2008) also summarized the distinctive but inter-connected 
internal/external tasks of nation branding: while internally nation branding is used to manage 
consensus by encouraging positive perceptions of international decisions, in external mediation, 
nation branding is used for both reactive and proactive purposes, such as repairing reputations 
damaged by legacies of hard power; or dodging the spotlight of unfavorable international media 




image-makeover mission: while internally the branding privileges national power and pride, 
externally, the branding has an alternative emphasis: disseminating the truth of China by 
advocating against the “authoritarian” and “China threat” misrepresentations that circulate 
widely outside of China.  
Soon after the China Dream slogan was launched, there have been a variety of large scale 
image makeover projects within and outside of China, ranging from special exhibitions in 
museums to global conferences to special documentaries aired on TV and other media outlets, 
such as the China Unveils video screened in New York City discussed in the previous chapter. 
As Foucault (1976) pointed out long ago: it takes power to deploy truth, and that controlling 
truth and the meaning of truth was, itself, power. The truth of China gets deployed on the land of 
China’s old-time Cold War foe US, definitely owes to the shifting power structure, from the new 
strategic relationship between the two countries, to the multi-billion budget to “Chinesefy” the 
world-renowned Times Square. Later, this chapter will examine the Times Square promo video 
in further detail.  
It is noteworthy, though, that the idea of truth is narrowed down significantly in the 
Dream talk. The extreme makeover of national image can work as a deflection to steer public 
attention away from other important aspects of truth, for example, the muddy truth about China’s 
social system. What does Socialism with Chinese characteristics really mean? It seems that few 
still care to seek the answer any more, as long as the cat still catches the mice17 (Deng, 1989). 
The blurry truth has been kept for China hoping to blend into the globalized capitalist world 
without too much turbulence or resistance; and internally, as well, not admitting a fundamental 
																																								 																				
17 The “cat and mice” metaphor was discussed in detail in the previous chapter, regarding the economic 




social structural change (such as that of Russia and the East bloc of Europe) would help maintain 
social stability, at least for a while. Another deflected aspect of truth is the rule of law, and the 
freedom of speech, among others. An online survey shows that three quarters of Chinese citizens 
would associate China dream with Constitutionalism, which means that the constitution should 
have an authority that overrides the whims of the Party. Besides, “how truthful is China’s 
mainstream media” has been questioned by the international community for a long time, and is 
growing to be one of the top concerns among the Chinese people themselves. Ward (2010) 
introduced the term “global patriotism” for global journalists, whose first duty is to serve 
humanity at large, with truth, integrity, and openness. It is still true that China is unlikely to be 
trusted when all communication coming out of China is doctored, and trying to fix the untruthful 
representations of China by way of an equally untruthful makeover would not work in the long 
run. As Wang (2005) argues,  
while government is still the driving force behind public diplomacy, the onus can no 
longer fall on the nation-state government alone. The credibility and efficacy of the 
government, as the primary communicator, is now often suspected, because people tend 
to perceive communication by a foreign government as political propaganda. Without 
source credibility, no amount of communication and information will ever be effective 
and, worse, could even be counter-productive. (p. 49). 
It is not uncommon that places, or nations, often suffer from an image which is out-of-
date, unfair, unbalanced, or cliché-ridden. It is one of the tasks of media workers with “global 
patriotism,” not nationalism, to ensure that the true, full, contemporary picture is communicated 




A best selling Chinese-language book, Where China’s Anxieties Come From (Yushi Mao, 
2012), reveals cluster after cluster of deep-rooted social problems in China, not only including 
the distrust among people against the media industry that routinely distorts truth, but also the 
ominous truth of inequality behind China’s apparent prosperity. The book is sold on the same 
best-seller shelf as the piles of China Dream books. The Anxiety book receives no less attention 
than the Dream books, and it won the Milton Friedman Prize for Freedom. Interestingly, the 
publisher of this book can be translated into English as “Truth Voice Press.” On the other side of 
the coin, after all, that such a critical book can appear on the best-seller shelf is itself a somewhat 
promising phenomenon. Among the citizens as active truth-seekers, the Dream talk has to 
monitor and modify itself intensely to accommodate the more-than-ever heard opposing voices.  
 
Human Dignity 
The UN Universal Declaration in1988 announces: “recognition of the inherent dignity 
and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of 
freedom, justice and peace in the world” (Qtd in Christians, 2010). Dignity is definitely one of 
the ace cards China Dream plays. The Dream talk attempts to address the universal value of 
human dignity in three different ways:  
 
1. China Dream unites people for a good life, and opens up new opportunities for other countries 
to realize their own dreams or visions.  
On the domestic side, China dream is used to promote national cohesion and creativity in 




within the international arena. President Xi Jinping states, “We 1.4 billion Chinese people should 
bear in mind the mission (realizing our China dream), unite as one for our dignity in our risen 
life standards” (Xi, 2013). In this talk, dignity is somewhat simplified as the pursuit of a good 
life, and uniting for a common goal, for China as well as its Asian neighbors. According to Fu, a 
spokesperson of China Dream, in 2012, China's contribution to Asia's development was an 
astonishing 58% and China's trade with the rest of Asia amounted to $1.3 trillion. Half of China's 
$77 billion of overseas investment is in Asia and China has become the largest trading partner of 
Malaysia and Vietnam, as well as Japan and South Korea. Meanwhile, Chinese tourists made 83 
million trips overseas, of which more than 90 percent were to other Asian countries. Citing 
China's 12th Five-Year Program, which includes the importation of goods worth $10 trillion and 
a total overseas investment of $500 billion, Fu concluded, "achieving the 'Chinese dream' will 
bring more opportunities for Asia and therefore help the realization of the dreams or visions of 
other countries in the region. Evidently, the Chinese dream is also part of the dream of many in 
the developing world who now have a great opportunity to grow their economy” (Fu, 2013). 
Simply put, the argument, although unrealistic to the skeptical eye, is that China is not fighting 
for a bigger slice of a pie, but trying to grow the pie bigger for everyone.  
 
2. China Dream promotes, and “recovers,” human dignity by fighting colonialism and fixing its 
long-lasting damages.  
Postcolonialism is widely discussed in the field of international communication. Dirlik 
(2005) stresses the relevance of modernity to a postmodern, postsocialist, post-Third World 




crisis of understanding produced by the inability of old categories to account for the world” 
(Dirlik, 2005, p 580, qtd. in Wasserman, 2010). China Dream advocates the re-gaining of human 
dignity (with China as a postcolonial victim) by overcoming the trauma and damage 
colonialization has cased for the nation and its people. “The dream of the great revival of the 
Chinese nation” (Xi, 2014) for the returning of the glorious days before Western colonialization, 
clearly demonstrated this point.  
 
Figure 2.3 The map archive (from the 1880s) of colonizers from different Western countries 
(with the eagle symbolizing America, the sun symbolizing Japan, the bear symbolizing Russia, 
the sausage symbolizing Germany, the dog symbolizing the Britain, and the frog symbolizing 
France) dividing China, retrieved from the “Road to Revival” themed Museum exhibition as part 
of China Dream campaign. 
Road to Revival, as part of the China Dream project, is a grand exhibition series in 




France, Germany, Russia, America, Japan, Italy, and Austria occupied China all together, with 
the ambition to jointly colonize the giant ancient civilization. It narrates China’s century-long 
suffering at the hands of Western colonial powers in the “century of humiliation” (2014) and its 
eventual glorious rescue and recovery under the Party rule. A clever connection is made here: 
Road to Revival serves as a new source of legitimacy for the Party, because the Party bears the 
mission of washing off the historical humiliation China suffered from colonization, and led to 
“the revival of the Chinese nation.” Most importantly, with such splendid mission in mind, the 
Road to Revival makes China Dream sound like something much more than merely achieving 
new middle-class wealth and comfort. Now there is a much nobler reason behind China’s 
prosperity—regaining the dignity it lost during the trauma of colonization. The rejuvenation 
narrative has provided political leaders with special resources for social mass mobilization. 
Different generations of Chinese political leaders (such as Mao, Jiang, Hu, and Wen) have used 
the country’s traumatic national experiences to raise popular support, and each of these leaders 
underlined that their work was to restore China to its former great position and glory (Wang, 
2014).  
 
3. Dignity regained through the “good life” 
Beginning in early 1990s, the Party used the phrase “the great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese nation” (中华民族的伟大复兴) in describing its mission. By using the word 
“rejuvenation,” it stressed that the Party’s work was to restore China to its former position and 
glory. The mission of the Party was no longer the realization of communism, having deviated to 




time. It reflects the reality in China and people's expectations and serves the need to unite the 
people to achieve a higher objective" (Lumpur quoting Xi, 2013). China achieved significant 
economic growth in the past three decades, with hundreds of millions lifted from poverty. "As 
China is going beyond basic needs, people are embracing new dreams," he added. With the 
rising complaints and unrest from the grassroots level about social inequity, Xi Jinping and the 
Party have also made special efforts to connect the Chinese Dream with the Chinese public. 
Instead of only emphasizing the Chinese Dream as the goal for the country and the government, 
Xi endeavored to convince the general public that the dream was also for each individual 
Chinese, “the dream for you and me” (Xi, 2015). And the realization of this dream for the 
country would be the catalyst for the realization of the dream for the individual, including 
housing, employment, public health, education and environment. As such, the Chinese public 
could feel connected with the China Dream narrative, because China Dream is for individuals to 
have better lives and for the country to provide conditions for achieving it, and that individual 
efforts would add to the country's prosperity. China dream is thus a culmination of the traditional 
Chinese philosophy of dignity, in "dedicating oneself to the well-being of the family, country 
and the world" (Li, 2013). However, as is advocated by most, if not all, scholars in the field of 
international communication, human dignity should be understood in various contexts, instead of 
being reduced to a certain aspect of it in a central to a certain culture. Trying to simplify human 
dignity as “the good life” and to simplify “the good life” as material wealth is a narrow 
simplification of the concept of dignity in the context of China Dream.  
More importantly, the “revival” from colonialization as the recovery and regain China’s 
dignity could be even more problematic, although in a less naive and a more subtle way.  It is 




bring to the fore those voices that have been marginalized, and opposes theoretical frameworks 
that contribute to such exclusion and inequality” (Wasserman, 2010). China dream does start off 
from such critical perspective, playing as a role-model on its road to revival as a post-colonial 
victim, with the potential to enhance global media ethics in a Postcolonial era. However, before 
too far down The Road to Revival, the journey has gone wrong with a clearly nationalist bias: 
“branding a long-standing sense of historical victimhood means that the rhetoric of resurgent 
nation could all too easily turn nasty” (The Economist, 2013). This is increasingly concerning, 
especially accompanied by the “Strong Army dream” (as one section of the multiple components 
of China Dream)—nobody should mind a confident China at ease with itself, but “a country 
transformed from a colonial victim thumbing its chest is certainly somewhat ominous” (ibid). 
The “Revival” slogan would very likely be a crude invocation of postcolonial values,  create new 
forms of exclusion, and become a new manifestation of global inequality (Wasserman, 2010).  
 
Non-violence  
Non-violence is an unquestionable ethical value in both Eastern and Western 
communication and beyond, as “a commitment to live together peacefully is a non-negotiable 
imperative rooted in the sacredness of life” (Christians, 2010). If the “revival” focus is the take-
home point for the domestic audience of China Dream, the “non-violence” focus in the peaceful 
rising China is definitely designed to be the take-home point for the international audience.  
“A more powerful China secures, rather than challenges, global peace.”  




As a political and economic Other, China has long been used to all kinds of hostility from 
around the world. However, it did not take China too long to figure out, that the tensions it faces 
today comes less and less from the cold-war aftermath, say, between a capitalist system and a 
socialist system, but rather, it comes from between an established power (the West) and an 
emerging one (a more powerful China). This gives China great challenge to really blend in with 
global resistance; thus China tries to minimize such resistance by highlighting its peaceful rise. 
“A brand new type of super power,” “a powerful China would be the anchor of world peace 
instead of the threat to it,” “harmonious China,” “peace and development” (UN, 2014)18 – 
statements as such dominated recent Chinese diplomatic addresses, in order to anchor the 
harmless image of China on the global stage. The brand new China Dream campaign launched in 
2013 also emphasizes peace: “The China Dream embodies the common aspiration of other 
countries and peoples in the world as it highlights peace, development and mutually beneficial 
cooperation” (Li Wuwei, Vice President of the Chinese People's Association for Peace and 
Disarmament, 2013).  Sponsored by the Beijing-based China Arms Control and Disarmament 
Association, the China Dream conference (Dec. 2013) was attended by peace experts from a 
number of countries, including China, the United States, Australia, Russia, and officials from the 
European Union, as well as international organizations and think-tanks. They addressed the non-
violent feature of China dream in three ways:  
 
1. China Dream promotes harmony and sustainable development for all 
																																								 																				
18 This talk was given in Feb 2014 by the Permanent Mission of PRC to the United Nation’s Office in 




“Harmony” has been a favorite term of promoting cohesion and peace even in ancient 
China. All the way back to 500 B.C, Confucius already advocated the importance of harmony to 
the ruling class as well as the entire nation: “Let the states of equilibrium and harmony exist in 
perfection, and a happy order will prevail throughout heaven and earth, and all things will be 
nourished and flourish” (Confucius, 500 B.C.). Recent communication ethics accounts also value 
harmony in international communication, for its transnational nature as “the web of life as a 
whole” (Christians, 2010). Keeping in mind our common goal of the "Harmonious World," 
“China will advance unswervingly along the path of peaceful development, and dedicate itself to 
promoting development in an open, cooperative, and mutually beneficial manner” (He, 2014). 
Below (Figure 2.4) is one of the initial posters of China Dream, one year earlier than Xi 
officially brought the term into public attention in March 2013. With the praying mother-
daughter harmony against the fresh green grass, it is the most tranquil and peaceful visual 
representation of the Dream and China itself in the softest lighting and color combination—a 
stark contrast with the stereotypical propaganda visuals of China in the Western mind (discussed 






Figure 2.4 The China Dream Initiative with an emphasis on low-carbon life and environmental 
sustainability. 
 
2. China had been a historic victim of wars and aggression, and therefore the Chinese people 
cherish hard-earned peace. 
The China Dream campaign argues that the pursuit of peace is deeply rooted in Chinese 
tradition and culture and suggests that its people do not want military expansion. As early as 
1955, Chinese former Primer Zhou Enlai initiated the “The Five Principles of Peaceful Co-
existence” (1. mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, 2. mutual non-aggression, 
3. non-interference in each other's internal affairs, 4. equality and mutual benefit, and 5. peaceful 
coexistence), which have been the fundamental principles for Chinese diplomacy ever since. On 
the relations between the China Dream and China's neighbors and the outside world, Fu (2013) 




'Chinese dream' will add to peace and prosperity of the region and the world" (Fu, China Daily 
USA). There were, of course, a good number of seasoned diplomats confirming that their 
countries have greatly benefited from a peaceful and cooperative environment and China's 
regional policy of peace; its domestic stability and prosperity are important contributors to the 
region.  
 
3. China would like to appeal to the world with its soft (cultural) power, not hard (military) 
power.  
As was discussed in previous chapters, domestic cultural revitalization has always been a 
central feature in the (re)branding of China’s global image. It is because culture stands as the 
main source of Chinese soft power projection and is more likely to promote a de-politicized, 
benign image of the peaceful rise of China, and create the least amount of tension between 
classes and different social groups. Take the China Unveils video again for example: for one 
whole month, the visually stunning video ran 300 times a day across six giant screens in Times 
Square in New York City. It quickly flashed through a series of themes including athletics, 
wealth, design, space travel, art, supermodels, agriculture, and award-winning talents—all 






Figure 2.5 Screenshot of the Times Square China Unveils video (2011) highlighting China’s 
non-aggressive beauty, art and culture 
 
As shown in Figure 2.5, the “stunning Chinese beauty” chapter of the video features five female 
Chinese film stars, dressed in a delicate mixture of traditional Chinese and modern Western 
styles, i.e., Fan Bingbing’s Western-style strapless gown printed with the blue-and-white 
porcelain, a classic Chinese pattern in historic design. The background is a traditional Chinese 
watercolor of peach blossoms, with the calligraphy on the left corner reading “the fragrance 
caressed by the green leaves” (fragrance usually symbolizes beautiful women in ancient Chinese 
language).  Gender, as Butler argued, is not a noun but rather is “performative” (Butler, 1990), 
and the body has long been understood as a cultural medium and a means of modern social 
control (Jaggar and Bordo, 1992). These female bodies, with their professionally feminine poses 
and celebrity smiles, represents China in a gendered, glamorous, and (peacefully) inviting way. 




content and promotion has become increasingly the norm, the manufacture and trade in celebrity 
has become a commercial strategy for media organizations of all kinds” (Turner in Projansky, 
2014, p. 6). With the co-play of gender and beauty, such representation of China also downplays 
any political characteristics or concerns. At the other end of the line, this hyper-cultural and de-
political trend of promoting China also seamlessly coincides with the contemporary “soft news” 
(McChesney, 2001) trend in the West, and thus enjoys the potential of easy acceptation and 
appreciation.  
 
Paradoxes behind the peace talk 
 
Despite the high-profile campaign of the Harmonious Society, former President Hu’s era 
already witnessed a striking rise of tensions at all levels, including ethnic tensions between Han 
Chinese and minorities in Tibet and Xinjiang, and worsening relations with Asian neighbors over 
territorial disputes. Similarly, despite the peace flag in hand, the new President Xi appears 
anxious to secure the support of nationalists, particularly within the armed forces. And as part of 
the Dream-talk, a “strong-nation dream of a great revival of the Chinese people” was in effect as 
a “strong army dream,” according to Senior Colonel Liu (2012), professor at China Defense 
University, arguing that China should regain its position as the most powerful nation in the 
world, a position it had held for a thousand years before humiliation. So, the argument Liu makes 
is that China Dream should not be considered aggressive, because it only aims to return to its 
past (glorious) status. Confucius’s answers to the chaos of his era was the “Way” of the just and 




the verge of being lost. Spiritual fulfillment was a task not so much of revelation or liberation but 
patient recovery of forgotten principles of self-restraint. The goal was rectification, not progress 
(Confucius, in Kissinger, 2012).  
Special wording is also one of the strategies used in the non-violence discourse. China 
Dream is explained to the internal and external audience as the “great rejuvenation of the 
Chinese Nation.” This term first appeared in 1997, introduced at the 15th People’s Congress 
meeting as a new goal for the Chinese government (Jiang, 1997). In 2002, former President Hu 
Jintao reviewed the rejuvenation idea at the Sixteenth People’s Congress meeting, and in 2012, 
President Xi further advanced the idea to lay the foundation for China Dream. The use of the 
word “rejuvenation” instead of “rise” illustrates that the China’s rise is not going to be something 
new and unpredictable. Many Chinese see this rejuvenation as regaining of China’s lost 
international status and power rather than obtaining something entirely new. At the same time, 
the Chinese consider the process of rejuvenation as a “restoration of fairness” instead of a gain of 
advantages over others. If we use the South China Sea and Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands as examples, 
the recent Chinese actions are considered aggressive by many outside observers; whereas, the 
Chinese see their actions as simply protecting territory and rights left by their ancestors. So the 
Chinese claims to both areas are largely based on historical activities and documents. They 
consider their own actions as defensive rather than offensive. Many Chinese even criticize the 
government for being too soft on this issue (Wang, 2014), although this value is highly cultural 
and historically specific, and thus likely be a hard sell to a Western audience.  
Secondly, although China Dream claims to be global in its values, it still bears limitations 
of its own cultural, historical, and political positioning. For example, in the understanding and 




existence” and values “non-interference in each other's internal affairs.” So, the Chinese 
philosophy of being peacefully responsible means to refrain from action. With this culturally 
restrained concept of responsibility, China’s understanding of itself as a peacemaker is limited to 
“minding its own business and not trying to be the ‘world cop’” (clearly hinting the United 
States)—Exactly, the “refraining from action” may have contributed to China’s general 
indifference towards world’s conflicts, such as the Darfur situation, where China has billions of 
investments while mostly kept its silence in pressuring Sudan government to cooperate with the 
international community to save thousands of people (Foreign Policy, 2007). A counter 
argument would be a new world power could have done more to promote and nurture world 
peace than just “peacefully” staying away.  
Thirdly, and most importantly, China Dream advocates a very narrow and culturally 
biased version of non-violence. Indeed, being a victim of colonization would logically imply that 
China would not, itself, become a colonial oppressor of other countries. However, the definition 
of violence stretches far beyond the military realm—information, mediation, and language alone 
can be violent, too. As Toni Morrison gracefully put in her Nobel Lecture in 1993: “Oppressive 
language does more than represent violence; it is violence; does more than represent the limits of 
knowledge; it limits knowledge” (Morrison,1994). The international community (especially in 
the West) will not embrace China as a peaceful, non-violent, harmonious, and responsible world 
power as long as journalists and political dissidents are muffled or threatened (d’Hooghe, 2011). 
Few Chinese would make the link between language or communication at large, with the debate 
of violence or non-violence. Thus, again, it is problematic to use concepts that originate in one 
culture to describe and assess realities in another, and hence the timely need for a “universal 




policies, China’s leaders will learn and gradually adapt to some of the universal language of 
justice that were hitherto unfamiliar, and someday to internalize them (d’Hooghe, 2011) to make 




China Dream does give an expression to universal values of international communication, 
such as truth, human dignity, and non-violence. This is a big leap from the closed-minded, state-
led propaganda China used to use during and after Mao’s era. By examining all aspects of China 
Dream discourse, however, it is also evident that advocating alone, however sophisticated the 
message is, is not enough to convince a global audience. For example, research shows that the 
exquisitely designed public relations campaign surrounding the Olympics actually widened the 
cultural divide between China and the Western world (Cheng et al, 2010). In order to 
strategically win hearts and minds, and the current overreliance on hard power alone is not a 
sufficient path to success in gaining international reputation. Smart and sustainable public 
diplomacy requires an understanding of the role of credibility, self-criticism, and the role of civil 
society in national decision making. International communication that degenerates into 
propaganda not only fails to convince, but can undercut soft power (Nye, 2004), as the Chinese 
saying goes, “群众的眼睛是雪亮的” (the masses have sharp eyes bright as the snow), and a lack 
of earnestness in state advocacy is easily detected by the people. It is, however, an 
oversimplification to view “the great rejuvenation of China” narrative as solely a propagandistic 




cultural history and collective memory, and thus this government's campaign parallels the shared 
desire of Chinese who want their country to be strong, prosperous, and free of foreign invasions, 
as was previously discussed. National rejuvenation is a concept essential for the construction of 
China’s national identity, having embedded itself in China’s education, popular culture, and 
social narratives (Wang, 2014). 
Conducting an initial critical analysis on the very new China Dream discourse may 
generate more questions than answers, but this effort is meaningful and worthwhile, since this 
research aims not to establish or evaluate China Dream as the global elixir, but to promote a 
global discussion on this particular issue. As Christians (2010) argues, “Conflicts among people, 
communities, and nations need principle other than their own for their resolution. A credible 
ethics, as a minimum, must be fundamentally transnational in character. […] Timeless moral 
truths are rooted in human nature and independent of the conventions of particular societies” (p. 
6). China's dream narrative is still in its early stages, so as its role in the branding of 
contemporary China. China Dream in many ways seeks to address the needs internally and 
externally of Chinese people and international citizens, but it fails on several levels, in part 
because of a lack of symmetry between what is said and what is done (so far). This obstacle will 
remain a problem in the West's perception of China Dream until this contradiction is alleviated. 
Consequently, Xi and the Party should put forth new contents and practical actions matching this 
narrative. The international responses to this narrative will also play a role to Beijing’s further 
construction of the narrative, which we shall witness soon in the future. After all, if China’s 
political policies and internal reforms fail to match the advocacy, the rosy China Dream will 







ANCIENTIZING THE MODERN CITY: BRANDING CHINA THROUGH 




“Cultural heritage,” as defined by the 1972 UNESCO Convention on the Protection of the 
World’s Cultural and Natural Heritage, is the “complex of monuments, buildings and 
archeological sites of outstanding universal value from the point of view of history, art or 
science” (UNESCO, 1975).  China currently boasts 48 world heritage sites, ranking second in the 
world in the number of such sites, closely following Italy (with 51 heritage sites), leaving similar 
ancient civilizations such as India (25 sites) and Egypt (7 sites) far behind. It is worth noting, 
however, that only ten of the 48 of China's sites were inaugurated before the 1990s, such as the 
Great Wall, the Forbidden City, the Terra-Cotta Soldiers, etc. The additional heritage sites were 
listed in the last two decades, which leads to an important question central to this chapter: how 
many of these world heritages were recently “discovered,” and how many were efficiently 
“built” in the short amount of time since China started promoting cultural tourism in the late 
1990s?  
Contributing to current debates about the global city, branding, and the mediation of 




state, where more and more of its modern cities have been re-designed to look and feel as they 
did in antiquity. With the collaboration of the different levels of government and the private 
sector, such “ancient towns” (with their special Chinese name 古镇 gu zhen) were constructed in 
order to generate domestic and international fascination, from individual tourists to UNESCO 
committees. Policies, such as “Returning the cities to their original glamour” and “Not ‘back to 
the future’ but forwarding to the past” (Cultural Bureau of China, 2005), have become 
fashionable for municipal governments in well-developed modern cities in eastern China, with 
active technical and financial support from private urban planning, tourism, and advertising 
companies. China is an immensely interesting and informative site for the study of de-
modernization in city planning, since the proud echo of “modernizing the cities for a better life,” 
a slogan known to all about 20 years ago, still lingers in people’s ears. Now, with many cities 
highly developed and modernized, the new “gu zhen jian she (constructing the ancient)” policy is 
burgeoning in many Chinese cities, reversing (part of) the modern cities to their ancient selves, a 
de-modernizing process I will call, “ancientizing,” in this chapter.  
As the third case study of China's contemporary branding practices, this chapter unveils 
an alternative way to brand China, different from the powerful and deliberate official venues 
discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter focuses on reconstruction of the nation at the city 
level. It investigates the connection between city rebranding and tourism. In this case, China is 
using architecture to brand itself, as part of its PR and marketing strategy. Thus, architecture here 
is highly rhetorical and communicative and can be part of an overarching national strategy, 
which is why other kinds of analyses (textual) are inadequate for understanding nation branding. 
Mere textual analysis of speeches and words, alone, would be insufficient to understanding the 




glimpses of this overal remake, this particular example of ancientizing vividly illustrates the 
diversity of approaches and comprehensiveness of China's overall branding project. This chapter 
also interrogates the move by China as a nation to counteract the fading of differences in global 
cultural production and circulation through its city rebranding practices. With the fear of a 
homogenized McWorld overtaking China, as it has done in so many parts of the world, the call 
for the “local and authentic” in China grows louder every day (CCTV, 2010). Increasing attention 
to claims of heritage and authenticity encourage China and many other nations to reach back into 
their histories and generate narratives that both claim an “authentic” past and perform a 
commodifiable identity--one that can be easily packaged and sold. Drawing upon Umberto Eco’s 
theory of semiotics and the materiality of architecture, and Hannigan’s “fantasy city,” this 
chapter situates constructed visual space as key to the exploration of cultural flows that continue 
to alter the classic markers of human identity such as nation, culture, and modernity, advancing 
the role of the consumerist-powered resistance to the importation of Euro-American modernities.  
As part of the larger project of nation branding in China, this chapter first reviews the 
following concepts: cultural diplomacy, cultural tourism, and cultural policy. It then examines 
ancient towns embodying both difference and globalization, asking: how difference counters 
globalization, and how difference is at the same time maintained and protected conservatively 
through globalization processes. Theoretically, this chapter uses the ancientized city example to 
argue that space, with all its materiality, is not non-representational and, indeed, can be 
understood through the lens of communication to be part of a larger process of nation branding 
and positioning within a vast web of global power. Last but not least, this chapter interrogates the 
impact global tourism can have on local communities, in terms of economy, culture, identity, 




the new ancient city. All in all, the understanding of a landscape, which scholars label “urban 
materialities” (Bridge & Watson, 2011), bring into play complex layers that involve experiences 
of space, different aesthetic sensibilities, memory, discourses, and ideologies that connect 
powerfully to our understandings of the public realm. This research will examine these makeover 
cities as such materialities that construct, or re-construct, citizens' identity as well as the nation’s 




As was discussed in the previous chapter, China's branding of itself is a fluid process that 
strikes a delicate balance between the two opposing forces: on the one hand, China’s national 
image is constrained by its questionable political credibility at the global level, reviving popular 
nationalism and making foreign policy missteps, which then are regarded dubiously by other 
nations. On the other hand, China’s national image benefits greatly from its strong, unflagging 
commitment to cultural diplomacy, depending on the audience-friendly “non-political politics”: a 
diplomacy that highlights China’s cultural attractiveness and historic charm in the most de-
political manner to avoid controversies.  
In addition to the various cultural initiatives in Beijing and various Chinese cultural 
events/campaigns throughout the world, China has commanded one of the world’s highest 
growth rates as a tourist destination during the last two decades (Ding, 2011). From 1980 to 
2007, the total number of inbound tourists increased by an astonishing 23 fold – from 5.7 million 




cultural resources and booming economy, aside from short-term visitors and international 
students, China also attracted increasing numbers of longer-term foreign visitors (ibid). Since 
2007, China has become the fourth largest host country for international tourists and the largest 
source market for tourists in the Asian region (CNTA, 2008, qtd in Ding, 2011).  
Figure 3.1 shows two charts from the 2013 China National Image Global Survey, a joint 
report conducted by the Center for International Communication Studies, The Charhar Institute, 
and Millward Brown – ACSR. It is the most comprehensive report specifically targeted on 
China’s national image perceived by a global audience. Evidently, from the charts the most 
prominent impression China has made globally is as “an ancient civilization,” and it is described 
commonly as having had a “long history.”  
One of the key findings of this report confirms that China is a highly attractive tourism 
destination, and that those who have visited China before are more positive about China 
(CNIGS, 2013). According to the report, 88% of the people in the world have never visited 
China before, but 60% of foreign respondents expressed a desire to visit China, and 50% percent 
of those say they are already planning to visit China as tourists. Foreign respondents who have 
visited China before are at least twice as informed as those who have not about China's culture, 
history, politics, diplomacy, military, science, technology, and media. When asked to grade 
China's	overall image, people who have visited China in person give an average score of 6.16 
points out of 10, while the score given by those with no such experience is only 5.47 points. In 
addition, the proportion of respondents who believe China is a responsible and peace-loving 
country in international affairs and a country enjoying social stability is 10% higher for those 
with the experience of having visited China than those with no such experience (ibid). Such 




positive, or at least more visible, image of China. And non-mediated encounters with China 
(through tourism) 
 
Figure 3.1 The 2013 China National Image Global Survey 
proves to have a much more promising effect than media encounters, such as through screens, 
newspapers, or websites. Thus, this report illustrates the possible strategic role cultural tourism 
may play in cultural diplomacy in producing information about China and, thereby, enhancing 





Cultural tourism  
 
It has not been that long since “tourism” was understood simply as an economic activity. 
Modern conceptions of tourism within government include recognition of the central role it plays 
of informing people and providing them with leisure, fashion, taste, a way of life, and other 
markers of culture. Geographers like John Urry (1995) suggest that tourism is simply cultural, 
with its structures, practices, and events very much an extension of the normative cultural 
framing from which it emerges. Culture, in its widest sense, provides a set of material and 
symbolic resources that are abundant in supply (arguably infinite), and highly mobile. Raymond 
Williams (1958), the definer of culture for cultural studies, defined culture as "ordinary," leading 
the study to see culture as everyday practices by ordinary people. Tourism and culture overlap, 
because “tourism is a cultural practice and set of objects [that are] highly significant or 
emblematic within contemporary ‘Western’ societies organized around mass mobility” (Rojek & 
Urry, 1997).   
In work on tourism following Urry, Smith and Robinson (2005) also emphasize the 
intricate relationship between tourism and culture, adding a direct connection to the nation: “each 
nation, no matter what their position in any notional global political league table, promotes 
tourism as an actual and potential source of external revenue, a marker of political status that 
draws upon cultural capital” (2005). These scholars also articulate culture as resource as well as 
the resourcefulness of culture:  The most distinguishing feature of mature capitalist systems over 




The relatively newer “cultural tourism” came into use by cultural studies scholars in 
geography and ethnography. They stressed the inseparable relationship between tourism and 
culture. This is the case for both the development of tourism products as expressions of culture, 
and in the way that culture is consumed by tourists. Moreover, it invites us to read cultural 
tourism as a political process, or at least a set of economic transactions that have political 
impacts. (Robinson and Smith, 2005). A cultural approach to tourism recognizes that tourism is a 
socially constructed activity and has no preordained, essential, or simplistic meaning. The way 
we view tourism is an effect of the cultural values we associate with tourism and not some 
preternatural activity.  
According to Kaufman (1996), the cultural tourist, as an essential part of the market of 
cultural tourism, is largely comprised of well educated, largely white, high-spending, middle-
class tourists who seek more than mere tourist pleasures, such as pure relaxation, warm weather, 
and various forms of hedonistic activity. The cultural capital involved in the ancient towns are 
largely cultural resources that can be employed in order to give cultural tourists an advantage 
beyond the shallow satisfaction of having “been there, done that, got the T-shirt” (Kaufman, 
1996).  What is the advantage of touring the much more refined sounding ancient heritage over 
touring a regular hyper-commercialized fantasy city? For the Western tourist, having toured, and 
lived, the exotic ancient civilization in the mysterious Middle Kingdom does seem a lot more 
sophisticated and privileged than a night gambling in Vegas, or a 4-day binge-drinking cruise to 
the Bahamas— especially if one has a museum-like artifact, footage of the ancient architectures, 
and a few legends of the mysterious past to show for this experience. However, few would 
question that touring the ancientized towns in China is a typical case of “the riskless risk” 




other words, the “recurrence of reassurance,” which will be discussed further in a later section of 
this chapter.  
 As Rojek and Urry (1997) remind us, “Not all those in the boat are fishermen,” not all 
cultural tourists are vacationers indulging in the exotic. Some of them could in a blink of the eye 
drop off their leisure outfits and appear in three-piece suit—they could be a political/economical 
delegate, conference hopper, or well-funded investor. As shown in the global survey charts, first-
hand encounters prove far more powerful than second/third hand information, thus these special 
tourists are very likely to rely on their Chinese experience to make diplomatic and economic 
decisions. Experience with the Illinois state government delegation to China in 2013 confirms 
the above hypothesis. Consequently, branding China through the promotion of cultural tourism 
in its ancient cities testifies to the political roles of culture as representing and enforcing national 
ideologies and particular hierarchies of power, together with tourism’s social roles as 
entertainment and as a form of communal intellectual glue. The following sections will showcase 
some government’s intent and efforts in building the ancient towns through cultural showcasing, 
and it will also explore how the role of cultural tourism has simultaneously been overtaken by 
the centrality of tourism in economic life (Smith and Robinson, 2005).  
 
Ancientizing: “protecting” the past via “(re)producing” the past 
 
             Modernization in Chinese cities, with garish high-rise office buildings, luxury 
apartments, Hong Kong-style malls, and five-star hotels, promises material comfort and security, 




bars, and hotels, in all their fanciness, make these Chinese cities “anywhere and nowhere” at 
once (Friedmann 2007, p. 271). Based on my 2014 interview with the Wuxi Municipal Bureau of 
Culture, the loss of uniqueness under the mighty tide of globalization alarmed the government 
officials as it did the local residents. Hence, the ancientizing projects — an active construction of 
historical space, with all its proud markings of difference — promises to govern, as well as to 
produce, China’s essential past.  
 The so-called “new ancient towns” in this chapter refers to the phenomenon that 
considerable parts of modern cities in mature, developed parts of China have been reconstructed 
back into its ancient ones. This powerful trend of reconstruction started around the early 2000s, 
and is recently growing faster than ever before, under a new set of cultural policies, 
entrepreneurial management practices, and a tourist gaze. These new ancient towns represent and 
embody an interplay of economy and culture, the public and the private, production and 
consumption, and the global and the local.  And, while they are "ancientizing," they could as 






Figure 3.2 World Culture Heritage Lijiang ancient town, with its original thousand-year-old 
buildings, unique language, exotic custom, and an intricate ancient water conservancy system 
still in functional use today, hosts roughly 12 million world’s tourists yearly. The Calligraphy on 
the upper right wall reads “World Cultural Heritge: Lijiang Ancient Town,” hand-written by 
former China President Jiang Zemin.  
 
           Most of the recently renovated ancient towns in east China follow the model of Lijiang 
Ancient Town, according to the Wuxi municipal bureau of culture. Lijiang, tucked back in the 
southwest corner of China, is the first city in China that has acquired “World Cultural Heritage” 
(1997) status as the entire city (not just a particular piece of architecture or artifact, such as the 
Great Wall or the Terracotta soldiers). Such an honor granted by UNESCO in 1987 is rarely 
received outside of Venice, Italy. After receiving World Cultural Heritage status, Lijiang, once a 
quiet, forgotten town in the under-developed west of China, rocketed to the top of the most 
popular cities in China, with a soaring GDP brought by global tourism to the site (Xinhua News, 




efforts among the state, private enterprises, and local forces, wherein heterogeneous discourses 
are effectively integrated into the maximization of tourism profits (Su and Teo, 2008). According 
to the bureau of culture (2013), delegations and study teams from the newly emerged ancient 
towns in the more developed east China are sent to Lijiang and Italy annually to learn from their 
“sophisticated and successful” models of ancient heritage tourist branding.  
 
Figure 3.3 Wuxi new ancient town (east China) imitating the Lijiang model 
            While LiJiang ancient town, boasting a history of over 2000 years, has dedicated all its 
efforts to protecting its past, the new ancient towns (located in the economically more developed 
and \ modernized east China), were built, or, “recovered” in modern cities, where skyscrapers 
standing beside the highways and Louis Vuitton stores' neon signs shine in shopping malls. The 
ancientizing project is actually an extensive, nation-wide project, although the progress and 
outcome are more prominent in east China, which has a denser population and a bigger market, 
as well as a more solid economic foundation than other parts of China. In the past decade, my 
field trips to east China revealed the fast progress of the ancientizing project in key east coast 




provided detailed blue prints of such ancientizing plans, as shown in figure 3.1. Ancientizing 
construction projects are to be completed under a strict construction timeline. Banks, business 
buildings and Western style shopping malls (shown on the left side of figure 3.1) are being torn 
down one after another, making room for the historic scenes (shown on the right side of figure 
3.1) to be re-born, re-viewed, and re-lived. These modern ancient towns, being built with the 
ambition of applying for World Cultural Heritage status from the UNESCO or at least achieving 
some version of LiJiang-like success, are becoming interesting sites where contemporary global 
culture coexists with distinctive traditional Chinese heritage. Thus, heritage can be manufactured 
like other commodities; likewise, despite its multiple definitions over the ages, “culture” as a 
whole is newly commodified and marketed.  
 
The ancient as the “difference” countering globalization  
 
The rise of global capitalism has been associated with an experience of an increasing loss 
of difference in cultural production. McDonaldization, for instance, in part has come to refer to 
the similarity of products produced, as well as the establishments where those products can be 
purchased, regardless of time and space. As a central issue in global interconnectivity, the key 
tension between homogenization and heterogenization has generated interest and apprehension 
over the preservation and disappearance of difference across cultures. Such interest is 
increasingly noted and utilized in fast growing nation branding campaigns . As Morgan et al 
(2002) point out, a further incentive for countries to embrace branding lies in the capacity of 




create tourist destinations with uniqueness,, to find a national niche so that they can differentiate 
their nation's identity from competitor nations, is more critical than ever, in order to become 
desired, marketable products themselves.  
A competitive identity emphasizing “difference” has become one rationale for a long-
term strategic branding campaign for China. And well-known cities as active “cells” that form 
the nation as an organism, are using the same strategy to brand themselves, since city image will 
directly or indirectly translate into national image—a national brand, after all, is understood as a 
meta-brand that is loosely contingent on local productions. According to Dinnie (2008), national 
brand identity is built upon a limited range of all the constituent parts of national identity, as it 
would be impossible to develop a national brand identity that draws upon every strand of a 
country’s national identity effectively. External audiences – potential tourists, investors, 
immigrants, students, diplomats, etc. need information about a country’s history, culture, and 
people. Therefore, a key task of those engaged in constructing a national brand identity is to be 
selective in identifying which elements of national identity can usefully serve the stated 
objectives of the nation-branding campaign (Dinnie, 2008). China is trying to be seen 
simultaneously as modern and ancient, but the more ancient characteristics of China are 
becoming an even more relevant element to its national identity than in the past, as China's 
association with modernity and wealth is increasing and, because of globalized homogeneity, is 
becoming less attractive and distinctive.  
The “modern,” however, depends on establishing a difference through the display of the 
“ancient”—that is, that which is understood to be “pre-modern.” Within processes of 
globalization that homogenize local identities and places, cities are also looking to a (re)assertion 




Sometimes such local difference is packaged to be as eye-catching as possible—for instance, in 
many parts of Asia and Africa, even the colonial past is celebrated as a brand and marketed to 
sell, such as the Oriental Hotel in Thailand, the Oriental Express in Singapore, and the Gold 
Rush Trail in Mpumalanga. The ancientized towns in China, however, boast something more 
profound than that—a mysteriously loaded culture brewed in her five-thousand-year history. 
Dinnie (2008) writes, “Nation-brands are rooted in the reality of the nation’s culture, which is 
perhaps the truest, most authentic differentiator that any brand could wish to have” (p.114). In 
other words, China has an advantage over other nations because of its long history, given how 
important history plays in establishing its distinction. The Chinese Government chooses to 
harness and highlight the profound cultural aspect of Chinese national identity embedded in 
various local projects, in order to create a different and more sophisticated national image that 
goes beyond ordinary tourism staples of resort hotels, beaches, casinos, wine, exotic fruits and 
cuisine, sex, glitz, and glamor.  
 Such sophistication, however, cannot just to be silently cherished—it needs to be 
visualized and advertised. In the ancientized areas of the modern city, paths are built with natural 
stones and pebbles, and transportation is reduced either to foot or tiny wooden boats that float 
among the wooden houses along the narrow, recovered ancient waterways. On the one hand, 
these “cultural theme parks” attempt to revive elements of traditional culture for the purpose of 
tourist gazing, especially for international pleasure-seekers. On the other hand, the “go global, 
stay local” strategies valuing culture-led regeneration and the celebration of diversity, cultural 
monuments, heritage, and traditions can reinforce citizen identity and distinctiveness (Evans, 
2003). These heritage assets are not a single element such as a historical building or an ancient 




residential streets, ancestral halls, ancient open-air markets, stages, temples, and shrines, 
representing the uniqueness of the traditional Chinese heritage in these globalized cities within 
the surrounding hyper-modern skylines. With the materiality (Eco, 1996) of ancient cities 
surrounded by the materiality of modernity surrounding it, the massive ancientizing project (an 
estimate of 88 cities in East China are doing similar projects, according to Sina Tourism, 2016) 
claims to encourage the preservation of Chinese and traditional values, and urges the recovery 
and maintenance of local cultural identity and heritage against the powerful tide of globalization. 
De-urbanization, a social process whereby people move from urban areas to rural areas is 
a long established phenomenon in the developed, Western world. While in rapidly developing 
China, the phenomenon of subtle de-urbanization starts to emerge very recently, especially in the 
well-developed, (almost) post-capitalist east coast (Xinhua Net, 2013). The construction of 
ancient towns echoes this trend interestingly but harmoniously. As Evans (2003) finds out, “the 
designation of the cultural city and the use of the arts and entertainment as tools in urban 
regeneration is now a universal phenomenon which has accelerated in the era of city renewal, 
which can be applied to cities old and new, large and small, urban and provincial. In line with 
de-urbanization, such urban regeneration regimes operating in post-industrial cities in North 
America and Europe, and more recently in developing countries and emerging world cities 
(Evans, 2001). The newly built ancient towns in China fulfill the “renewal” role by counteracting 
the boring, bourgeois, isolated, and stark profit-chasing capitalist city life. In a sense, the ancient 
town is a form of the “fantasization” (Hannigan, 1998) of the everyday with Chinese 
characteristics. 
Going back to the characteristics of a cultural tourist discussed in the earlier sections, 




Rojek (1997), signals the attempt to escape from the mundane everyday world. The most general 
form of adventure is dropping-out of the continuity of life in order to encounter something alien, 
untouchable, out of the ordinary, dazzling with freedom & fashionability. As Rojek and Urry 
describe it, 
       Upper classes mainly sought to gaze upon the “other,” i.e., standing on their balconies 
overlooking the other, young sons running to crimogenic/twilight neighborhoods in 
order to gaze at the lowlife, writing novels and taking photographs also made the 
grotesque visible while keeping it at a safe distance. […] Tourism allow us to stretch 
conventional shared meanings and disrupt our consciousness of order. This is a source 
of pleasure. Difference—even if it is artificially constructed, is an immediate source of 
curiosity. But few of us “go native” and exchange our domain-cultural attributes for 
newly encountered forms. Instead we drift back to our domain routines and habitual 
life-orders. (Rojek and Urry, 1997) 
 
In order to satisfy the above delicate balance of adventure, other, distance, and domain routines, 
the ancient towns with their re-constructed identities, counter globalization while also preserving 
intimacy. The next section will elaborate on how the ancient and unique locality is actually 
governed within the bigger umbrella of globalization.  
 
The ancient as a difference governed by globalization 
 
           The ancientized modern cities are fantasy cities with Chinese characteristics, but within a 




new phase of entertaining consumption, an infrastructure of casinos, megaplex cinemas, themed 
restaurants, simulation theatres, interactive theme rides and virtual reality arcades which 
collectively promise to change the face of leisure in the postmodern metropolis” (p. 1). The basis 
of such commercialization of leisure is advanced technology, rising income, more leisure time 
for workers, and the emergence of new sources of capital (ibid). The well-developed cities in 
East China meet all of the above criteria, and thus become the cradles of the ancientized fantasy 
city. Distinguished from the typical attractions of fantasy cities in the West, such as casinos and 
theme park rides, the Chinese ancient town features a more unique, or aggressive, means of the 
“Disneyesque principle of ‘time-space’ compression, in which time and space become both 
condensed and confused” (ibid). The modern part of the city is no less than that of a typical 
Western metropolis, while the ancientized part of it could date back a dozen centuries. In 
addition to viewing and admiring heritages (usually architectural) brought back to life, parts of 
the ancientized cities are transformed into “film towns,” where the ancientness, and Chineseness, 
are not merely to be viewed, but also to be lived. 
China as the ancient and pre-modern is fascinating, because it is tailored for the West’s 
longing for an historical and pre-modern image of China—China as a relic, China as a great 
ancient civilization—as well as more and more Chinese patrons ranked among the higher-middle 
class after China’s market economic reform. Such longing is rooted in an “imperialist nostalgia,” 
defined by Renato Rosaldo (1993), as “a nostalgia, often found under imperialism, where people 
mourn the passing of what they themselves have transformed” and as “a process of yearning for 
what one has destroyed that is a form of mystification” (Rosaldo, 1993). For China, in order to 
promote its ancientness successfully, it needs the global economy to be its safety net—since the 




quo” (Hooks, 1992). In other words, through the potent expression of longing for the ancient and 
exotic, one merely desires “a bit of the Other to enhance the blank landscape of whiteness” 
(ibid). The necessity of globalization as the protection net for celebrating difference has two 
layers. First, on the China side, “traditional forms of culture may play a critical role in terms of 
external recognition of the nation, but these must not be allowed to position the country as 
backward-looking as this would act counter to attempts to portray the country as a vibrant 
modern economy” (Dinnie, 2008). So, modernity and ancientizing are both contradictory and 
mutually reinforcing, and are enacting components of China's contemporary branding phase. 
This is a similar case with branding many other developing countries, such as Bolivia, Nepal, 
Brazil, etc., highlighting the historical in terms of architecture, folklore, clothing, food, and all 
the ancestral traditions of native origins, but not poverty, weapons, lifestyle, and isolation. What 
makes China's ancientizing branding unique is simply the scale and magnitude of tourism 
branding, as well as the idea that China is strategizing to ancientize cities as part of a national 
branding process. The third part that makes it unique is that this ancientizing is made possible, 
and becoming part of, China’s modernity, instead of what it portends to be about: the premodern. 
Here is the mediated tension between the universal and the particular in the identity industry: 
those who seek to brand their otherness, to profit from what makes them different, find 
themselves having to do so in a universally recognizable terms (Dinnie, 2008) in which 
difference is represented, merchandised, and rendered negotiable (and enjoyable) by means of 
the global market. As Xie (2003, 6) writes, authenticity “is not a fixed property of an object or a 
situation but is a negotiated attribute.” In the course of their negotiations, those exotic lifeways 




 Second, on the external/international side, one demands the appreciation of the unfamiliar 
ancient situated in a familiar, secure, and globally acceptable way—again, “the riskless risk.” 
Contemporary leisure and tourist attractions are calculated so as to package our fantasy 
experiences within a safe, reassuring, and predictable environment (Hannigan, 1998). It is similar 
to the joy of riding a roller-coaster, tasting the thrill within the protection of mature and 
controllable technology, a team of professionals to monitor and maintain it, and safety nets. 
While Hannigan did not cover the non-Western trend of fantasy cities, this dissertation, which 
comes 15 years after Hannigan's work,, adds a lively element of it, since the past 15 years is a 
critical time period when the fantasizing process of Chinese cities started and thrived. Living in 
the ancient section of the mysterious Middle Kingdom, yet within walking distance of a subway 
station, with Starbucks and Pradas looming behind the ancient terracotta roofs and wooden walls, 
global tourists are invited to experience the ancient and the exotic under the protection of 
modernity and globalization. 
 




          As shown in the image, right after the reconstruction, the ancient towns were converted 
into Westernized boutiques, bars, and franchised and luxury outlets comparable to the most 
expensive ones in well-established global cities such as Paris, New York, London, and Hong 
Kong. Places like this, however, are not an ordinary space of shopping or eateries – they want to 
assume new identities for a particular class. For example, Xintiandi (translated as “The New 
World”) is also a reconstructed ancient town, although Shanghai as a port city does not have a 
history long enough to qualify as ancient by Chinese standards. So, the New World is 
constructed and renovated to embrace a recent past – the colonial days in Shanghai of late 19th–
early 20th century, during which the city was occupied by a handful of Western colonial powers, 
such as France, Germany, and England. Beyond branding a sophisticated memory filled with 
bitter and sweet stories, the space is engineered and grafted as Shanghai’s “upper corner” from 
the colonial era (Pan, 2005). All the pebbled streets, the café under stone arches, and the terraced 
housing style convey a type of “Shanghai nostalgia,” which romanticizes her colonial days. In 
this way, China's branding can be understood as a resistance to the previous era of colonization. 
Preserving China's colonial past for the pleasure of contemporary Chinese is, arguably, a way of 
taking back the pleasure of China for Chinese—a pleasure that Western colonizers kept for and 
to themselves historically. Shopping is the foremost means of materialize such pleasure: 
throughout the New World, the exquisite products with astronomical price tags in the unique 
boutique stores represent a new taste, distinguishing themselves from standard goods of mass 






Figure 3.5 The New World colonial town in the heart of Shanghai, stealing a touch of tranquility 
from the downtown uproariousness, reserving an exclusive space for upper class shoppers. 
 
           Despite the dominance of the bourgeois values, the construction and promotion of the 
ancient towns arguably encouraged differences in its own way, and nurtured imagined 
communities (Anderson, 2006) of various kinds, in terms of both residents and shoppers. Place-
branding through reversing the pace of modernization/Westernization and through securing the 
ancient in a time capsule not only satisfies the Western desire for the exotic other, but also a 
domestic desire for the unique self, activating a market for numerous by-products among cultural 
consumers on both sides—a win-win strategy for multiple parties. After all, the questioning and 
critique of the dominance does not stop the ancient towns from becoming an icon and magnet for 
post-industrial urbanity, with its difference honorably standing out, and secured, under the 





Space as non-representational mass communication 
 
“All in full public view” is the key objective of branding the heritage cities, revealed by 
the officials in the municipal bureau of culture, a branch within the city government, “to achieve 
the smart and glorious transition from selling our labor to selling our culture in China” 
(interview, 2012). Visual signs and symbols have long been an active part of the manifestation of 
almost any brands, and are especially crucial branding cultural, national, and religious identities.  
In terms of visual communication, this chapter deals with the physical and material construction 
of these identities through the large-scale renovations and the simulations of pre-modern 
structures and environments such as the cases visualized and discussed in the previous section. 
These cases argue that visual communication, identity, and branding do not simply occur through 
screen images (though video screens are part of these ancientizing projects) and that analyzing 
the material construction—and reconstruction—of the physical environment also offers useful 





Figure 3.6 Impression: Songs of Sister Liu, a massive folklore musical using the physical river 
and mountains as its “all-natural” stage in Guilin ancient town, China. 
 
With some 2000 performers singing and sailing hundreds of fishing boats on the famous 
Lijiang River of China, the daily Impression LiuSanjie musical sets a new trend of delivering a 
visual feast for both domestic and international tourists. Giant mountains and waters where the 
real folklore took place in history, are miraculously lit up to serve as the “most real” stage one 
can possibly find, performing the most real story to the amazed audience (Zhang, 2007). This 
example, directed by Hollywood visual master Zhang Yimou (choreographer of the Beijing 
Olympics display), further blurs the threshold between the (screen-based) representational and 




that these massive projects can be understood, in their materiality, as forms of mass 
communication, while I also argue that ancientizing is the building of a new visual field of 
retrospection comprised of objects and things with brick and mortar. 
A tourist sight may be defined as a special location distinguished from everyday life by 
natural, historical, or cultural extraordinariness, distant from originary locales and from the 
monotony and unspecial commoditized parts of modern life. And, the remoteness of sight 
requires abandoning our everyday life routines and social places and physically entering new 
areas (Rojek, 1997), with all their promised fantasies. The host country/cities then would try 
their best to support these fantasies with factual or/and fictional elements, in fear of the 
“hyperrealism” which is widely associated with the tourist gaze: standing before the Sphinx of 
Cairo, the forbidden city, or the Eiffel Tower, “one may feel that the sight is not as breathtaking 
as one had been led to believe through numerous mediated images […] The sky is not the right 
color, or the buildings look more weathered” (Rojek, 1997) than in postcards or on screens. For 
instance, film tourism featuring the actual plot of The Lord of the Rings in New Zealand 
frequently meets with complaints and dissatisfactions, as the actual scenery appears to be far less 
striking as in the films. This is a classic case of mediated events being dragged onto the physical 
landscape, and the physical landscape is then reinterpreted in terms of mediated events. The 
tourists usually end up with disappointment, simply because they generally have little resistance 
to the highly mediated version of “reality” (ibid), and then tend to use the mediated version of 
reality against which to judge real, physical realities. Consequently, China strives to reconstruct 
the non-representational to match up with the representational, despite the fact that the 





Figure 3.7 Ancientizing in action, Wuxi, China.  
           Figure 3.7 is a photo I took on my field trip to my hometown Wuxi, where the familiar 
modern streets and line of buildings were taken down, and ancient houses and temples are being 
built in their place. This photo captures how the ancient is built upon the modern, with the 
remaining skyscrapers in the distance and the ancientizing activity in progress—to makeover the 
ordinary city to match up with the advertised and mediated extraordinary past. After the whole 
cluster of ancient towns are built, a specialized “做旧” (ancientizing) team, with all their fancy 
tools and technologies, will apply the final touch to make the ancient town “real” – by brushing a 
specially designed corrosive liquid formula on the surface of all the newly built walls and pillars, 
simulating the “brush of time” of over hundreds or thousands of years by creating the exact same 
visual effects. There are generally three strategies for a successful ancientizing project: (1) 
Flattened skyline, as a heritage city would need the “open space to breathe.” Like in traditional 




space for imagination and aura. (2) Water always adds a splash of charm. Figure 3.8 is also taken 
from Wuxi, where part of an ancient canal is used to create a “scenic waterway” through the 
heart of the modern city, with wood-and-stone houses built/recovered, with the reference from an 
antique watercolor picture of the region from dynasties ago. (3) The locals are the moving parts 
who bring the watercolor to life. Local residents are encouraged to move back after the 
ancientizing project is done, and start a new life adapted to the tourism theme—many become 
antique shop owners, waterside bar owners, open-air performers and craftsmen. As will be 
discussed more in a later section, most of the local residents are willingly, if not happily, 
accepting of change, as it is a promise for a “better life,” with considerable profits accompanied 
by a more unique, “authentic” identity.  
Umberto Eco reminds us that “All cultural phenomena are, in reality, systems of signs, or 
that culture can be understood as communication” (Eco 1996). The newly constructed ancient 
towns are a prevailing cultural phenomenon in modern China, and thus are a powerful means of 
communication. Mostly architectural objects that “do not communicate (and are not designed to 
communicate), but function […] we commonly do experience architecture as communication, 
even while recognizing its functionality” (ibid). Different from regular forms of streets and 
architectures, the ancient towns as a tourist destination would, and should, carry the mass appeal 
for the tourist gaze: the concrete-free clay walls, engine-free pebble roads, and pollution-free 
waterways communicates their function to be fulfilled: they are to be observed, protected, 
wowed at, and taken pictures with. The use of architecture in the creation of national identity is 
also prominent in other countries, as Hess (2000) describes. For example, the architecture and 
spatial organization of Accra, Ghana, reflects an identification between architecture and a 






Figure 3.8 bringing fantasy to life by materializing the ancient painting (An antique watercolor 
showing the same region’s “authentic past 
Under the instruction and generous funding of the new cultural policy of China, the 
architects have decided to restructure the urban fabric of a city (or the shape of landscape in a 
certain area) from the point of view of the perceptibility of its “image” (Eco, 1996): Is the 
cultural attractiveness self-evident? Is the ancientness of the ancient town patent enough? Is this 
pre-modern experience mild (domesticated) enough to be accepted by all? The modern ancient 




foreign star architects in order to collaborate on a so-called “designer heritage city” of China. In 
this way, architectures of function which had previously dominated the city are quickly being 
replaced by what David Harvey (1991) called “architecture of play and pleasure,” meaning 
architectures of spectacle and commodification, emphasizing fiction and fantasy. This is also a 
kind of Disnefication of China, which will be elaborated in the final chapter.  
The ancient town tourism that communicates cultures through space is in fact far from an 
exclusive Chinese phenomena, the Little India in Singapore, Little Italy in New York City, and 
China towns all over the world are all “representational spaces” (Lefebvre, 1991), which allow 
an interplay between the state, locals, and tourists as they influence and are influenced by each 
other in a common space of interaction (Su and Teo, 2008). Such space is usually visibly or 
invisibly designed into the Disney World (theme park) style, creating a carnival-like atmosphere 
with merry-making going on well into the night, where both the dominant and the subordinate 
groups re-creating cultural meaning in this highly touristified space in their own terms (ibid), for 
their common pursuit of benefits and profits.  
 
Co-work the fantasy: Public-private partnership 
 
Collaboration and governmentality  
          “You (the government) build the stage and I (private companies) direct the show”  – Yao 
(2014), a consultant at Bureau of Culture and Events of Wuxi, China, tells an insiders’ jungle 
about the informative partnership between the public and the private in their collaborated 




project of all levels of labor: the government, private institutions, and local people. Gramsci 
(1971) argues that hegemony is not as simple as ideas and meanings imposed from above. 
Instead, there is consensus building within the subordinate classes to accept the dominant class’s 
moral, political, and cultural values as the “natural” order, or a “common sense,” or, as relates to 
this dissertation, with the visual branding in cities, the normalization of a landscape. Such 
commonsense is seamlessly woven into the finest social fabric of China, with economic profits 
brought about by heritage tourism securing agreement and cooperation from the masses. For 
instance, the economic miracle secured the local residents of the ancient towns to compromise 
their habitat as well as the authenticity of their traditional culture, and willingly accept the fact 
that many, if not all, of their local elements have been packaged for sale (Su and Teo, 2008). 
Similar harmony can be found between the government and the private 
tourism/advertising/urban construction companies—in essence, the ancientization of cities is 
manufactured by government to generate profits. “If you build it, they will come” (Hannigan, 
1998): this is exactly how the Party leaders and government officials of China join forces with 
their corporate partners in order to build landmark projects which will promise an economic 
miracle. In order to build the ancient architecture and ancient cities, the government is involved 
in justifying this based on an ancient logic and sayings such as “returning to the tranquil purity 
and simplicity” (Taoism).  But in addition, such public-private partnerships support a growth-
oriented strategy of producing traditional wisdom in both China and the West: “a rising tide lifts 
all ships,” promising such partnership are in the best interest of the community (Hannigan1998), 





A means of problem solving 
Aronczyk (2013) explains how nation branding has become a solution to perceived 
contemporary problems affecting the space of the nation-state: problems of economic 
development, democratic communication, and especially national visibility and legitimacy amid 
the multiple global flows of late modernity (2013). Such a problem-solving function is especially 
prominent and convenient for societies undergoing social and political transformation, such as 
post-communist China. Coincident with the dissolution of a socialist utopia after the failure of 
the “Great Proletarian Revolution,” which had powered two generations of Chinese people to 
unite and work hard toward a common goal, a new “dystopia” has developed. People still work 
hard, but gradually forget the empty promise of socialism, which was once their common 
spiritual goal. In addition to no longer being committed to a unified socialist mission, globalized 
market-oriented reforms have brought about new freedoms for middle-class Chinese consumers, 
which has enabled and encouraged individuals to escape the public realm and search for a new, 
individualized, good lives of their own (Wu, 2011). This dystopia and self-centered mentality 
have significantly made the people less “governable,” a potential concern for social stability. 
In response to increasing social complexity reducing stability, the state strives to maintain 
a governable society by rationalizing and passing down administrative tasks to the community 
(Wu, 2011). The community will then take the responsibility if there is a mega project to 
collaborate with the government, to achieve a mutually beneficial goal. In other words, the 
government thinks up something it wants done and then mobilizes the community to carry out 
parts of the work of the project as part of a collaborative relationship. Such a public-private 
partnership is also used in many of the significant nation branding projects discussed in the 




city renovation projects to some extent trigger even more motivation, as the city is much closer 
to individual’s everyday life, such as income, living condition, natural/cultural environment, and 
ultimately identity. “Returning our city to her original beauty” (Wuxi Daily, 2006) is the slogan 
for the mass reconstruction of the ancient, with the promise of spurring economic growth by 
capitalizing on all potential traditional assets. Such complex ancientizing progress draws on a 
complex team of people, such as architects, historians, sociologists, marketing specialists, an 
anthropologist, various investors, and ultimately, thousands of construction worker. The 
ancientizing projects rely on the Magnificent Seven style of teamwork - that is, on having experts 
in the various fields working together toward a common goal which, in turn, unites them— 
tourists, sources of income, employment for the local community, the promising further 
development and management of the cultural monument, and, eventually, a wider recognition 
and complement of who they are.  
This chapter on ancientizing in China adds a unique contribution to political and cultural 
theory, since ancientizing is a novel version of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2005) with Chinese 
characteristics, adding to Foucault’s (1991) governmentality, that the State governs through 
private and civil society, or the new private-public partnerships. The dystopia for which citizens 
are efficiently mobilized no longer concerns the glorious dream of Great Proletarian Revolution, 
but a plain and solid promise of a good middle-class life, or in government’s words, 
“collaborating on a well-off society” (Hu Jintao, 2003). With such interesting, yet harmonious, 
collaboration between the authoritarian party state, private companies, and people, the 
boundaries between the public and private are blurred, along with the blurring boundaries of the 
modern and the ancient, the artificial and the authentic. The critical and cultural approach to the 




With this study, I realize more than ever that, the Marxist classes taught to me in school is in fact 
not merely dialectic between bourgeoisie and proletariat, but dialectics in every aspect of the 
world. A brand new theory to explain contemporary China is unveiling, one that does not 
promise freedom through the old authoritarian communism, but rather promises freedom through 
ordinary access to middle class life produced by a plan for economic growth and enhanced 
global imagery that floats all ships: making it possible for all Chinese people top rise through 
increased standard of living. This research offers a very different version (and vision) of China, 
one that participates and harmonizes with globalized capital, and one with a smiling, peaceful, 
and comforting Chinese "face." Few scholars have examined China in this way, whereas this 
dissertation brings this global capital-based, new harmony of China to light by studying China's 
national branding campaign.  
 
Afterthoughts: About the local community 
 
          According to my interviews with the city officials in China, there are two general methods 
to settle the local community originally living in the ancient towns. The first method is to remove 
the entire local community, mostly farmers and self-sustained home industry workers, to a 
government-funded Xin Tsun (translated as “New Community Village”), where they move into 
standardized communities with high-rise apartments close to the city centers. This enables the 
municipal administrative bureau to take over the empty ancient towns with their experienced 
teams of tourism and construction professionals, efficiently turning the area into fully equipped, 




However, this method, mostly used in the late 1990s and early 2000s, quickly received national 
and international criticism, as a “blunt and crude way” (China Bureau of Culture, 2000) to 
pursue tourist profit and the cost of chasing away the “souls” of these ancient towns.  
 In the mid 2000s, an argument about "living heritage" (heritage sites where the original 
people who lived in those sites still reside there) over “dead heritage” (empty heritage sites 
whose original residents have all all relocated) became heated. With support from the National 
Bureau of Culture, Bureau of Heritage Projection, and many college academics, it is argued that 
a heritage site without its people is reduced to a set of hollow bricks and walls, a “soulless” place 
rather than a lively habitat. Not surprisingly, these “dead” heritage sites had no luck being 
awareded UNESCO heritage status, either. The government and private sectors learned their 
lesson quickly, however, by deploying a second strategy for working with the local community: 
letting them stay to keep their heritage “alive,” while funding and encouraging them to “run” the 
ancient town in order to meet tourist and government needs. The host community, identifying 
their goals and desires for tourism, is believed to have the capacity to absorb tourism (Cole 2005) 
as well. 
 Encouraged to stay in their original habitat with the promise of added wealth resulting 
from their participation in ancientizing their own city, the local people bore the overall burden of 
adjustment. Taking the original residents in the World Cultural Heritage Lijiang ancient town for 
example, “their homes became converted into guesthouses, souvenir shops and other facilities for 
tourist consumption” (Su and Teo, 2008). Such adjustments are becoming more challenging, as 
the media designers from private media companies in Beijing and Hong Kong try to incorporate 
large scale Broadway-style performance into their ethnic dance with the belief that this would 




serious questions from Chinese and other intellectuals. The adjustment at the cost of the loss of 
authenticity is critically questioned by multiple historians and ethnographers from home and 
abroad, because it transforms the meaning of a place from its original and genuine version to a 
commercial construction which tells a different story altogether (Hannigan1998). Ironically, 
however, in the Lijiang case, tourism has “led to an appreciation of the benefits that tourism 
brings and some, in fact, participate actively in tourism development” (Su and Teo, 2008). The 
Party, corporations, tourists, and local residents’ active collaboration and participation seems to 
all having a blast in this rising tide lifts all ships (Chinese idiom) scenario.  
 
                   
 





Despite its multiple definitions, culture as a whole is subject to commodification: The 
most distinguishing feature of mature capitalist systems over recent decades has been the re-
creation of economies around the symbolic value of cultures (Robinson and Smith, 2005). In his 
Figure 3.9 A Tibetan 
mother dresses her 
daughter up in traditional 
festive clothing to attract 
visitors to take photos for a 
fee (in an ancient town in 
West China featuring its 




book Competitive Identity, Anholt (2007) also examines how culture becomes competitive – by 
bringing commerce and culture together as a potent force for creating prosperity. 
Throughout this chapter, I have discussed the commodification of local culture with 
suspicion, followed by criticism. However, there is an alternative scholarly voice who argues 
otherwise: As a result of its influence on levels of cultural consumption and community 
empowerment, cultural tourism has been seen as a means of supporting culture itself 
(Marciszewska, 2005). People can use cultural commodification as a way to affirm their 
identities, of telling their own stories, and of establishing the significance of local experiences 
(McDonald, 1997). In other words, even as the economic and political work to rework these 
towns and enlist communities in their own self-re-making, the effects of this, while unwitting 
and unanticipated, may in fact have positive outcomes, as well, for culture is never always one 
way in its effects. 
The claim of tourism fostering economic rejuvenation and local “empowerment” is well 
argued by Cole (2005): Empowerment is the capacity of individuals or groups to determine their 
own affairs. It is a process to help people to exert control over factors that affect their lives. 
Tourism can empower the locals by increasing a community’s access to information and external 
contacts, as well as new language skills and globalised media (Williams, 1998), giving 
individuals and communities confidence and strengthening their identities (Johnston, 1992; 
Swain, 1990). Grunewald (2005) uses an indigenous Brazilian case to argue how their cultural 
identity can be enhanced and nurtured through tourism. In the late twentieth century, the natives 
of Cora Vermelha no longer had Indian names; neither did they speak a Pataxo language any 
more. However, curious questions from numerous tourists revealed the relevance of them 




visitors while selling their crafts. Then, the success led them to create/ revive more traditions to 
please visitors, and eventually such cultural construction led to a conscious identity production, 
acquiring updated significance for the construction of the very identity of the group (Grunewald, 
2005). Lijiang ancient town of China is a very similar case: the revival of the Dongba language, 
the world’s last and only full-system hieroglyph, is still in use today. Founded in Tibet and still 
widely used in Song Dynasty (10th century B.C.), this unique language shaped the entire culture 
of Naxi, the most populous ethnic minority group residing in Lijiang ancient town. After the 
1949 Communist Revolution in China, however, the usage of Dongba language was discouraged, 
and has been ever since slowly, which means it is a dying language due to disuse. The grand 
opening of Lijiang ancient town in the late 1990s powerfully revived this near-extinct ancient 
language, the living fossil. With the help of a recent cultural policy, Dongba language has been 
officially included in local public school’s textbooks, all road signs throughout the ancient town, 
and on buses and bus tickets, souvenir packages, as well as on the packaging of most daily 
necessities in local grocery stores.  
 
Figure 3.10 The hieroglyph (with accompanying translation into modern Chinese) painted on the 




Whatever is offered to tourists’ eyes as images of the dominant culture is what local 
population groups should also look at and consider as the mirror image of who they are 
(Grunewald, 2005), as Urry (1997) puts it more bluntly: “you are what you sell.” 
Commodification of a culture has the potential of helping revive a dying tradition or identity—
tourism is then turned into a relevant means through which the sense of shared aesthetics and 
collective identity emerge, or what Anderson (1989) has referred to as imagined community. 
Traditions enhanced by tourism are authentic, legitimate, positive and connotative of their 
inherent cultural creativity, as Duggan (1997: 31, qtd by Grunewald) has argued: “An authentic 
culture is not one that remains unchanged, which seems impossible under any condition, but one 
that retains the ability to determine the appropriateness of its adaptations” (p. 31). 
The ancient hieroglyph case in Lijiang sheds light on the convenience of having an 
ancient culture to market, after letting it virtually die because of minority disuse. However, the 
paternalistic approach to resuscitating the language and culture leaves us wonder who this 
resuscitation is really for: the people whose culture is being appropriated, the marketplace, the 
tourists? The answer to this question remain complex and incomplete. The appropriation of 
culture through representation of a marginalized group usually nevertheless reproduces the 
group's marginality, even if celebrated. But the evidences above suggest that this kind of 
resuscitation may do double work and may bear beneficial effects to the forgotten/marginalized 







           By successfully hosting the 2008 Olympics, 2010 Shanghai Expo (World’s Fair), and 
gaining over 30 World Cultural Heritage Nominations from the UN, the first decade of the 
twenty-first century marked a historical peak for the massive project of branding China. 
“Culture” has always been a central feature of both the hosting rights campaign for mega world 
events as well as for tourism campaigns, as a large number of Chinese scholars (Wang, Su and 
Teo, Wu, ect.) stress domestic cultural revitalisation as a key part of the branding of China, 
because culture stands as the main source of Chinese soft power, which is more likely to promote 
a de-politicized, benign image of the “peaceful rise of China” and thereby create the least amount 
of tension between classes and different social groups. Visual communication was highly used in 
all of the branding aspects listed above, such as the promotion of the China Dream, Olympics, 
and the World Fair, but the ancientizing project distinguishes itself by using a mainly non-
representative means of visual communication based on the symbolic significance of space.  
This chapter studies how a national identity can be physically built through the production of 
cities and space, and visually communicated globally. This research complicates our 
understanding of the global, national, and urban nexi; which are seen as much more complex 
than are typical in both older and more recent accounts of the role of media in globalization. 
China's representation is often of it being an ancient civilization, of being backward and 
primitive, and of being interesting because of its past (not present) culture. It is somewhat ironic 
that China is not trying to fix that perception by the West, but to feed it. It is not dispelling that 
colonial representation, but strengthening it. But, China is doing so within and under the 
protection of its modernity. People realize the ancientized settings and scenes are not truly 
ancient; they are not authentically past. Rather, they are scrupulously produced pasts in the 




historical reconstruction. The dialectic relationship between globalization and difference also 
provides an alternative to arguments about media/cultural imperialism typical of international 
communication during the second half of the twentieth century. Does the ancientizing model of 
urban tourism development reduce or encourage the powerful tide of globalization as a 
homogenizing force for the world’s cultures? There is no easy black and white answer; 
ultimately, there are many, many shades of gray in between. The process of cultural 
commodification, and the incorporation of identity in which it is imbricated, is less linear, less 
teleological, more capricious than either classical economics or critical theory might suggest. 
Neither for consumers nor for producers does the aura of ethno-commodities simply disappear as 
they enter into the market; sometimes, as we have seen, it may be rediscovered, reanimated, 
regained (Myers 2002:316, qtd. Comaroff, 2009). 
There is no universal template for nation-branding strategy, and neither branding the 
nation through its cities. This is because nations have only relatively recently engaged in nation 
branding and are exploring different strategies for achieving their nation-brand goals. Who has 
the right to identify such values and then decide which values will be used as foundations of the 
branding strategy? This case study can yield but one modest claim: Identity is constructed rather 
than given, underpinning the nation-branding paradigm. I invented “ancientizing” as a novel term 
to describe this strategy for identity construction, a unique coordination of space and time to fit 
the rise of global capital, and a historic makeover only critical cultural analysis can make sense 
of. Here the dialectical relationship between globalization and difference can be assembled in a 
limitless number of combinations—in a new era of “complex globalization,” where we find 
“hybridity all the way down” (Morley, 2006). In order to understand globalization, first we need 




simply focusing on representation and signification. This chapter serves as a modest attempt to 
show the historically and geographically specific ways that the relation of the modern and the 
ancient are being fashioned, and governmentalized, with the brand new partnership between 
global business and the Chinese state, which disturbs the thresholds between globalization and 
difference more fiercely than ever before. 
Although we cannot reduce the complexity of ancient towns into a binary situation of 
either good or bad, i.e. modernity versus primitivity, authenticity versus artificiality, public 
versus private, etc., there is one thing that is patently clear: the remodeling of contemporary 
cities into ancient towns is a version of nation/identity branding rooted in the unifying spirits of 
benign commercial “interests,” rather than in the potential divisions between political “passions” 
(Aronczyk, 2013). And this interest is the thread that connects all the chapters, with seemingly 
different campaigns on different levels and scales that brand contemporary China, a newly 






CONTINUITIES AND RUPTURES: RE-NEGOTIATNG THE IMAGE OF 
CHINA IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
Introduction  
              In the middle of the 1980s Baudrillard hit the road. His travelogue America (1986) 
describes the “simulacrum” of the America he traveled across. It illustrates the violence of the 
Wild West, jazz, the neon lights of motels at night, tribal warfare between gangs in New York 
City, and much more. Baudrillard saw America as a glittering emptiness, a savage, empty non-
culture… in short, as the purest symbol of the hyperreal culture of the postmodern age. 
Originally meaning “similarity and likeliness,” simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1981) invites us to 
ponder how our current society has replaced all reality and meaning with symbols and signs, and 
how we live in a simulation of reality formed by all kinds of mediations. The previous chapters 
elaborated on how China has carried out a multi-phased nation branding project, competing for 
economic and cultural capital in the globalized marketplace. These branding efforts, specifically, 
range from the transition from government-induced propaganda to commercial-powered 
publicity, to the transnational China Dream campaign, and last but not least, to global tourism 
promotion by re-designing its cities as “authentically” historical unique tourist or investment 
destinations. These campaigns, with the government and private forces combined, work together 




Joshua Ramo (2001) observes that “For one of the few times in its history, this famously 
inward-looking nation is vulnerable to how it is seen abroad. How China is perceived by other 
nations—and the underlying reality that perception reflects—will determine the future of 
Chinese development and reform.” Since the twenty-first century, the challenge of how China is 
perceived abroad was emphasized multiple times in China People’s Congress, pointing out that 
“China’s greatest strategic threat today is its national image” (2001, 2003, and 2007). 
Consequently, as discussed in previous chapters, China has been striving to launch an image 
makeover to create an internationally favorable image of China— a peacefully rising super 
power full of cultural and historical charm. An intriguing question would be, with the on-going 
branding efforts happening in China, how is China represented abroad? The last chapter of this 
dissertation analyzed the overall status of China’s image makeover. Following that, this chapter 
will examine how China’s image is represented by U.S. media, as well as the continuities and 
discontinuities of how the image of China has been portrayed in the United States over time. 
Being a general gloss instead of a controlled study, this chapter will compare and contrast two 
groups of Time magazine covers that feature China, one from the 1960s, and the other from the 
2000s. The selection of these two time periods echoes the two time periods I chose to analyze in 
Chapter 1, with the first time period of China being dominated by state-led propaganda and the 
second time period transitioning to a commercial-led management of China’s publicity.   
“When you haven’t got time to read a book, you judge it by its cover” (Anholt, 2007). I 
chose to study the cover pictures of China, since these are easy ways for an inattentive audience 
(who neither have any first-hand information about China nor have any particular interest about 
the country) to receive a general impression of China. It is worth noting, however, these cover-




thus should not be understood as the reception of China’s image makeover. But, these 
representations are intriguing and valuable because they imagine China contemporarily (parallel 
or not parallel with the branding campaign), which helps us understand China in its identity 
configuration in the United States. and helps us understand what China is up against in building 
its complex and multifaceted national identity campaign, especially with regard to those viewing 
China externally. This chapter adds depth and complexity to the previous three chapters from a 
different angle, as the prior focus on the images China is seeking to represent; whereas, this 
chapter sheds some light on how China is being represented in the United States. And, these 
representations are packed with timely similarities with the image makeover China is currently 
undergoing, as well as deep-rooted differences based on the differing historical, political, and 
ideological contexts of both countries. 
 
Historicizing the Visual Representation of China in American News Media: A Case Study 
on Time Magazine Cover Pictures of China 
 
Journalism, as it is often said, is the first draft of history (Graham, 1963). But very few 
verbal descriptions of major news events survive the fading of newspaper or magazine pages. 
Pictures, however, can function mnemonically, whether as icons and/or in the stream of familiar 
“pictures of the past” (Perlmutter, 2007). The red star, the tank man, the communist army 
marching in uniforms … the visual portrayal of China in the American news media, like every 
representation, is culturally produced. There is an ongoing media discourse in the United States 
that evolves and changes over time, providing a stream of official materials by which audiences 




photographs reinforce belief by providing photographic evidence: “To photograph is to 
appropriate the thing photographed. It means putting oneself into certain relations to the world 
that feels like knowledge—and, therefore, like power” (p. 4). Semiotically, photographs function 
connotatively as special kinds of signifiers that “have a close communication with culture, 
knowledge, history,” and thus are “the fragments of ideology” (Barthes, 1972). Based on this, the 
evolving cover images of China, intertwined with power and ideology, can reveal and rationalize 
how the current national image of China in U.S. media has been refined due to the shifting global 
power structure, coincident with or not so coincident with the ongoing nation branding efforts on 
the China end. Later in this chapter, I will also draw on Hall et al’s (1978) Policing the Crisis, 
reflecting an analysis of the signifying practices of the media from the perspective of Marxist 
culturalist theory, inflected through Gramsci's theory of hegemony, and suggesting that the 
media do tend to reproduce interpretations that serve the interests of the ruling class. News 
performs a crucial role in defining events and international relationships among the public; the 
meaning-making process of editorial photography is a good example of how an impression of 
China is shaped in form of “symbolic vehicles” (Hall, 1996) of visual news coverage.  
Ownership and control of media have rightly been a very important element of critical 
media research. In this chapter, I selected Time magazine covers as one representation of China, 
since it represents a major media corporation that produces highly consumed and consumable 
cover images, some of which have been referred to as historically significant to the nation (for 
instance, Donald Trump has a faux image of himself on a Time magazine cover posted on a wall 
in one of his golf rooms. Since his picture has never graced the cover of time, this compensatory 
move to imagine himself on the cover by making a faux cover suggests the importance for him of 




owns, among many other businesses, book publishers (e.g. Little Brown & Co.), cable 
companies (e.g. CNN), film/distribution companies (e.g. Warner Brothers), as well as 
newsmagazines (including Time, Time Asia, Time Atlantic, Time Latin America, etc.). Due to the 
ever-concentrated ownership and control of such big companies, perspectives on social issues 
expressed by the major media outlets are likely to be transmitted as well by their associated 
companies, reaching wider and more varied audiences, both domestic and international. This 
provides a basis for an international public opinion that bears, to a marked degree, the imprint of 
pace-setter media conglomerates. Americanization in the flow of international communication 
dominates how China is perceived in the West: as the political other and economic ally.  
 




 In the chart above, the Western world (led by the US, UK and Canada) shares a very 
similar perception of China (36%, 38%, and 35% positive respectively), compared with the 
developing, non-Western world. The agenda-setting function of the American news media is 
more than implicit. For most audiences, “knowledge of foreign affairs (globally) depends almost 
completely on mass media coverage of distant places and opaque cultures” (Hariman and 
Lucaites, 2007, p. 208). I do not, however, wish to assert the hypodermic needle model 
(Lazarsfeld et al, 1968) of the media; rather, I claim no more than the agenda-setting function of 
news media: it cannot tell us what to think, but rather what to think about. Discourse in the form 
of English language news sources maintains a global linguistic hegemony (Hall, 1991), 
combined with the leading role of American media, jointly contributing to the fact that a country 
like China does not have the luxury of communication dominance internationally. That is, 
despite the rise of China economically, the global media power of China is far from ranking even 
second, the way China’s GNP does. National image differs from national identity, as the former 
is the internal national identity externalized, or branded, by media domestic and abroad. The 
image does not have to be the truth, or any honest/objective reflection of the nation; rather, like 
Monet’s Water Lilies, national image claims no more than being but a general impression. The 
following examples will demonstrate how China is visually represented on Time magazine 
covers, with the first image cluster from the 1960s, and the second image cluster from the 2000s. 
 





 Ever since anticommunism provided the rationalization for U.S. foreign policy, U.S. 
news media became the international vehicle for the official dissemination of that message. In 
their book, Manufacturing Consent: The political Economy of Mass Media, Chomsky and 
Herman (1989) open up a critique of American media, which they argue tend to marginalize 
dissent and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their message across after 
the public means of “five filters,”19 in which anticommunism played an important role.  Maoist 
China is the target of the traditional anti-communist news framing (verbal and visual). In the 
1960s, when China was developing its nuclear weapons program, it viewed U.S.’ agreements 
with the Soviet Union on nuclear arms control with suspicion. Once American forces were 
committed to the conflict in Vietnam (later known as the Vietnam War), China came to the aid of 
the North Vietnamese with personnel and equipment to help thwart the U.S.’ mission of 
preventing the spread of communism. These actions by the two countries were symptomatic of a 
larger, looming distrust of one another during some of the most uncertain years of the Cold War.  
																																								 																				







The images in Figure 4.2 are drawn from 1965-1975, retrieved from Time magazine's 
official website with a specific search engine for its historical covers with the keyword “China.” 
China in these ten years (1965-1975), as discussed in Chapter 1, witnessed Mao’s War and 




As illustrated in Figure 4.2, China then was visually represented through the portraitures of the 
country’s leaders (Chairman, foreign minister, prime minister, defense minister), with a 
melancholy frown, an evil gaze, or a toothy grin. The backgrounds are bloody scarlet on top of a 
ghastly monster, desert yellow or Halloween-like orange and black. All of the four covers bear 
verbal labels, reading “The enemy in Asia,” “The Chinese nightmare,” “The Chinese are 
coming,” and “Let China sleep; when she awakens the world will be sorry” respectively. 
According to Berger (1977), whenever verbal labeling is imposed with the image, the image will 
then illustrate the sentence and confirm verbal authority. Roland Barthes (1990), with his 
research on the effect of captions on clothing, insightfully argues that verbal captures of the 
forms, fabrics, and colors of the clothing are in fact telling us the “situation, occupation, and 
moods” (p. 20) of the purchase. This further more unveils the interlaminating relationship 
between visual images and texts when placed proximate to each other. During the most intense 
days of the anti-communist war, when these images were published, it was obviously not enough 
for the hostile pictures themselves to represent China as the threatening foe of the United States. 
Verbal labeling thus is imposed to promote the “dominant reading” (Hall, 1980) of the China 
image: an evil dictatorship snarling at the world, while plagued by its own countless domestic 
crises (represented by the bony citizens in the background). Aside from the solitary faces 
(photograph and drawings) of the Chinese leaders, only two other elements are included in the 
stark backgrounds: one is an ancient copper sculpture of an imaginary monster, with dreadful 
stare and over-sized sharp teeth protruding from its cheeks. The other included what is meant to 
be the Chinese people, in the shape of two bare-chested coolies carrying a weighty burden which 
is crushing their shoulders. Their expression and stance make them appear like slave, or "stoop," 




as "coolies." The implication is that they are struggling under the remorseless oppression and 
torment of the Chinese leadership.  
It is also noteworthy that the Chinese leaders in Figure 4.2 are all portrayed in an angle 
that their eyes stray from the camera, or the audience, which implies the leaders’ unwillingness 
to have a dialogue with the United States. Looking askance can also imply untrustworthiness in 
U.S. culture. There are few exceptions to this gazing pattern, as seen in Figure 4.3, picturing 
Zhou Enlai, former Premier of China, who does look directly at the audience. However, behind 
the bamboo bars is a frightening dragon with flaring nostrils and sharp claws, which is about to 
wrench open the fence to escape and charge—toward the onlooker. The underlying message here 
is that the terrifying creature is the true China, and it threatens to pounce or otherwise attack, 
while the friendly-looking prime minister is but a smiling mask, who is, as again verbally labeled 
at the bottom of the cover, “Red China’s Chou Enlai: Waging war and talking peace.”        





These hostile images of China in the 1960s and 1970s in the United States go hand in 
hand with the aggressive anti-capitalist propaganda in China during the same historical time 
period, as was elaborated in chapter 1. The United States as the major representative of the 
“imperialist West” was considered by the Chinese leadership as the nation’s number one enemy, 
and was excluded from China’s already-limited diplomatic conversations with the outside world 
until Kissinger’s visit. Thus, these negative portrayals of China in the American media were 
likely neglected by the Chinese government as well as by the general public, which was busy 
carrying out and participating in the Cultural Revolution, with passionate pursuit of the “true 
socialist ideology” and zealous admiration for Chairman Mao.  
 
The 2000s: China as “Strategic Partner” 
 
“The U.S.-China relations can never be wonderful, but they really can't afford to collapse.” 
                                                                        ----Wen, JiaBao, former Premier of China, 2009.  
 
              The top two of the major economic engines that have powered the world since the 
twenty-first century have been the United States and China. The past half century witnessed 
fundamental changes in US-China relations, as China is becoming less of a Communist enemy of 
the United States, to its most important economic and political “strategic partner.”20 Such a 
strategic relationship between the two countries is based on the constant pursuit of profit and 
																																								 																				
20 “The strategic partnership between the United States and China” was officially stated during former 




efficiency in the new global economic status quo. This section examines the characteristics of the 
official branding of this strategic partnership in the US news media, underscoring not only how 
the partnership is predicated on branding (representing through marketing strategies) but also 
how that partnership is highly tentative and fraught with ambiguities, ambivalences, and 
contradictions. On this latter point, this section finds the discontinuity of the isolation (rooted in 
the old time capitalist-communist hatred), and the continuity of the manageable but not 
resolvable tension in the induced stability of US-China relations.  
 
Discontinuities in representing the image of China 
 
The last 10 years (2000-2010) witnessed an intensified strategic partnership between the 
United States and China. Economic profits that are mutually created by the United States and 
China have pushed the half-century grudge (from 1949 to the end of Cold War) out of the way, 
despite of the remaining disputes over the islands in the Pacific, support of North Korea, 
espionage, etc., which still are the worry spots in American-China foreign policy. In general, 
China is gradually stepping away from the most hated enemy list in the American news media. 
With the fall of communist regimes in the early 1990s and the post 9/11 war on terror, the 
traditional anti-communist frame has been further weakened. The stereotypical negative labels 
attached to China before, such as “red China” or “dictatorship,” are largely absent. Instead, 
China as the world’s second largest economy, threatening to become the first, attracts a growing 
positive/neutral attention and coverage in contemporary U.S. news media. As global trade and 




success. On issues from global economic growth to global security, the US and China share 
growing common interests, challenges, and responsibilities, and thus have stronger than ever 
incentives to work together (Brookings, 2010). Consequently, consecutive American 
administrations have striven to put the US-China relationship on stable footing, despite the half-
century of bad blood between capitalism and communism.  
The 2007 Time cover, “China, Dawn of a new dynasty” (figure 4.4, left), features a bright 
rising star (a symbol from the Chinese flag) resembling the rising sun, sending the eye-catching 
message that the world acknowledges the great hope and opportunities brought by rising China: 
“With the U.S. tied down in Iraq, a new superpower has arrived. Here is how to deal with it.” 
The cover story then advocates for steering US-China relations in an increasingly strategic and 
collaborative direction. The 2006 Newsweek image, likewise, promotes China with cheer and 
beauty (figure 4.4, right). The background is a dynamic mix of the Great Wall in a historic 
golden hue, combined with the modern blue, neon-lit Oriental Tower against the metropolitan 
skyline of Shanghai. The superimposition of the Chinese film star Zhang Ziyi, dressed in a mix 
and match style of traditional Chinese qipao top and American style blue jeans. With a charming 
grin across her face, China is represented here as a world’s superstar, boasting both historical and 
modern charm. The oversized label “China’s Century” brands China with triumph and 
celebration, and the overall contrasting and vibrant colors makes the image look busy but 






Overall, the current representations of China on Time magazine covers have become far 
more diverse and de-politicized than the first cluster of pictures from Mao’s years, when China 
was represented almost exclusively by the headshots of threatening Chinese political leaders. 
The topics covered also shift from purely political to a de-politicized, much wider range: from 
economy, education, and popular culture. Chinese stars from the entertainment industry have 
become frequent guests of honor on the recent covers of major American news magazines. 
Represented by the charming faces from Chinese blockbusters instead of scary political leaders, 
U.S. audiences are invited to join the “carefree” entertainment and consumption. The celebrity 
trend of Chinese cover pictures also goes hand in hand with the decline of hard news 
(McChensey, 1999) and the blurring line between news collection and entertainment in 




There are, nonetheless, still a small percentage of headshots of the Party leaders, but with 
dramatically different pictorial expressive content. Figure 4.5 shows two drastically different 
visual representations of two former Premiers of China from 1969 (Premier Zhou Enlai) and 
from 2009 (Premier Wen Jiabao), respectively. The placid, disarming face of Wen passes for the 
mildest looking of world leaders in their most humanized light, with the cover text reading, “In 
an exclusive interview, China’s Premier reveals his confidence about both his country—and the 
U.S.” The contrast with the 1960s picture is striking; the current China, represented by the 




These changes in the visual portrayal of China reveal that fundamental changes have 
taken place as China has gained economic and political power in the new century, and that the 




and the transforming new power structure. Former Vice President Biden’s article, “China’s Rise 
Isn’t Our Demise” (2011), published in the New York Times, following the Chinese 
government’s white paper, China’s Peaceful Development (2011), marks a joint effort to 
promote and explain the idea of China’s commitment to peace and international cooperation 
(Brookings, 2012). On the one hand, the nation-branding campaigns on the China end is growing 
ever more elaborate for Western audiences (Xinhua News, 2011). On the other hand, the “win-
win” partnership between the United States and China serves as the driving force behind foreign 
policy changes in both nations (New York Times, 2012), which may lead to the changes in media 
representation as well as public opinions.  
 
Continuities in representing the image of China 
 
Despite the above changes in the representations of China, the anti-China tradition of 
American news media is by no means disappearing without a trace, although the hostility is 
currently expressed in a far more indirect and subtle manner. As Harvey points out, “the 
spectacular emergence of China as a global economic power after 1980 was an unintended 
consequence of the neoliberal turn in the advanced capitalist world” (Harvey, 2006). Such 
“unintended-ness,” though complicated by the ever-thriving economic and diplomatic 
cooperation between the United States and China, is represented by the rejection of representing 
China without any “conventionalism” (stereotypes of communist countries formed before and 
during the Cold War era). As Hall has amply argued, “conventionalism of discourses requires the 




because they reproduce the conditions of the perception in the viewer” (Hall, 1996). 
Consequently, under the current political economic context between China and the United States, 
the representation of China, although having undergone significant changes, still bears deep-
rooted continuities from the past.  
Tension, as a structural inevitability, can be managed, but never resolved, between an 
established power (United States) and an emerging one (China).  Thus far, the political and 
economic hegemony of Western states still exists, but the challenge of rising China and other 
non-Western powers and cultural centers is evident. In particular, China seeks to increase trade 
and diplomatic activity, as well as strengthen geopolitical alliances throughout the world. As 
noted by Mawdsley (2011), China’s fast economic growth necessitates its development of 
bilateral relations with countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. China no longer finds itself 
on the periphery of globalization, which is still a challenge for many other developing countries, 
even ones in Asia, such as the Philippines, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and many others. That 
explains why one of the enduring foreign policies of the United States is to isolate China so as to 
limit its competitiveness in the world economy, making China “the loneliest rising power in 
world history” (Lee, 2010). Although de-politicization marks the emerging characteristic of the 
visual representation of China, with the focus on China’s economy, art, culture and education 
gradually taking over the searchlight, the half-century long unease between the United States and 
China did not just disappear without a trace, although now the subtle grudge is mostly coming 
from on the competition between the emerging-established great power rivalry rather than the 
old communist-capitalist conflict.  
             The nation branding efforts within China have been trying hard to strike a balance 




authoritarian state, in order to sustain its continued economic growth. Harvey (2005) also argues 
that China has constructed "a particular kind of market economy that increasingly incorporates 
neoliberal elements interdigitated with authoritarian centralized control” (p. 120). The politics 
are difficult to fathom, masked as they are by the mysterious power struggles within a 
Communist Party determined to maintain its singular and unique hold on political power in 
China. Because of China's authoritarianism and centralized government, it is widely considered 
in the West that the economic development of China is not to be accompanied by any progress in 
the fields of human, civil, or democratic rights.  
 
Figure 4.6 
              Figure 4.6, a painted re-creation from the old Chinese propaganda posters in the 
Cultural Revolution period, vividly visualizes the strangely developing China. The 21st century 




French luxury brand Louis Vuitton logos all over his traditional Zhongshan suit,21 an iconic 
communist leader outfit. With an out-of-place, blank gaze, this Mao is far from threatening 
anymore as he was pictured in the 1960s; rather, here, he appears as a confused, oddly dressed 
clown—precisely resembling the ridiculous mix and match of market economy and the 
communist leadership in China. It also implies, at the same time, rampant social inequality in 
China. Reports show that China is now the largest market in the world for Mercedes-Benz, as 
well as other luxury goods, including Louis Vuitton, Gucci, Chanel, just to name a few (Fortune, 
2012). “Somebody, somewhere and somehow in China, is getting very rich,” remarks the 
commentary, raising the issue that China now belongs among the world’s most unequal societies. 
It is also noteworthy that although the topics on China are freed from sheer political attacks, the 
color theme of these covers still clings to the old theme—the iconic red-and-yellow communist 
color pattern.   
																																								 																				
21 Zhongshan Suit (also known in the West as Mao’s Suit), is named after Chinese revolution leader Sun 
Zhongshan. It was first designed in the early 20th century, and has been considered the formal outfit for 







            Aside from the mix-matched weirdness, another tendency of portraying China that 
alluding to past representations of China is that China is constantly represented through large 
crowds of people in uniform and/or moving in unity. This is a deep-rooted tradition of 
visualizing “communism” (Liu, 2012), as the Latin root word “com-” itself means “with, 
together, jointly, thoroughly” (Oxford English Dictionary, 2014). The Beijing Olympics opening 
ceremony (Figure 4.7 bottom left) and medical care reform of China (Figure 4.7 bottom right) 
are depicted respectively by countless copies of performers and countless copies of public 
hospital nurses. Individuals, completely free of individuality, are represented here as an 
indistinctive part of the crowd moving in unison—implying the stereotypical communist 
characteristic.  Also, a number of presidents' visits pictures all bear a similar pattern as pictured 
in Figure 4.7 (upper), with the presidents themselves on the periphery of the shot, making ample 




styles of visual representation of China bear significant similarity to the visual representation of 
the world’s most feared communist enemy, North Korea.   
 
Post-political Entertainment    
 
             As earlier findings suggest, the current Time Magazine covers on China focuses less on 
Chinese political leaders, and noticeably more on Chinese celebrity, particularly film stars from 
recent Chinese blockbusters popular in the United States. The following cluster of Time covers 
(Figure 4.8), also from the 2000-2010 era, represents China through Chinese film stars. The 
related films, such as Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (2000) and Hero (2002), are American-
based, Hollywood-style Chinese-language films with multi-national crews and production 
companies, which by definition are neither produced by China, nor for the purpose of promoting 
the image of the nation. But, as Bhabha (1990) points out, literature and film have long been a 
means of “narrating the nation” by disseminating popular culture. As Chinese mainstream media 
is usually criticized as “the mouthpiece of the Party,” The promotion of China through the 
official channels (such as the Olympics, World Expo, and CCTV-style promotion videos) is 
usually received with critical suspicion. Comparatively, the China-ness collected in the 
Hollywood blockbusters appear to be, however unrealistic, a more natural and uncritical process 
for the Western audience to piece together the image of China. Thus, the by-product of the 
popularity of these films, besides their commercial success, is the worldwide representation of 






Figure 4.8 exemplifies the Chinese-film-themed Time Magazine covers. They represent China in 
intriguingly distinctive and consumable ways (the classic Chinese reds and yellows, the pre-
modern figures posing with inviting smiles), which I will analyze from two cultural aspects: 
imperialist nostalgia and on-screen violence vs. China’s peaceful rise. 
 




“Cinema is like the Great Wall, a symbolic system that shapes our perception of reality, a 
transnational product that serves to bring China and the world together even as it defines the 
difference between China and the world” (Tan, Feng, and Marchetti, 2009). The difference is 
usually exaggerated in the Hollywood Chinese-language films as a selling point. As seen in 
figure 4.8, these covers, with actors and actresses mostly still dressed in historical drama outfits, 
did not only reproduce China as mystical and traditional, but also, through modern technology, 
updated that "ancientizing" view of China to be more entertaining and consumable. As was 
discussed in the previous chapter, the exoticizing strategy depicting China as the ancient and pre-
modern is fascinating, because it is tailored for the West’s longing for the historical and the pre-
modern. Such longing can be explained by a typical Western mentality called “imperialist 
nostalgia” (Rosaldo, 1993), as was elaborated in the previous chapter. Usually, the exotic 
consists of two key elements: the Other and the fascinating. These figures, with their gold-tone 
Asian skin glowing against the mysteriously dark backgrounds, provides the perfect home for 
both of these elements: The desire for the primitive or fantasies about the Other is continually 
exploited, and such exploitation “will occur in a manner that reinscribes and maintains the status 
quo” (Hooks, 1992, p. 425).  
The commercialization of Native American culture, for instance, similar to that of ancient 
China, is also an explicit example of imperialist nostalgia in American popular media. 
Imperialist nostalgia usually takes the form of reenacting and re-ritualizing the imperialist, 
colonizing journey as narrative fantasy of power and desire, of seduction by the Other. However, 
few Western audiences would be willing to give up the status quo, or to become the exotic, 
however fascinating it looks on the brochure or film poster. As renowned scholars such as Said, 




resource for exotic pleasure, the ancient culture of specific groups is merely sold and 
manipulated to constitute an alternative playground where members of the dominating 
institutions, races, and cultures affirm their power-over in the temporary intimate relations with 
the Other. In other words, through the potent expression of longing for the exotic, one merely 
desires “a bit of the Other to enhance the blank landscape of whiteness” (Hooks, 1992).  
 
2. Dramatic on-screen violence vs. a “peacefully rising” China 
Ever since its very first attempt to brand itself, the Chinese government has consistently--
though with different levels of vigor—presented China as a peace-loving nation. Previous 
campaigns to promote China, from Peace and Development to Harmonious Society all stressed 
the peaceful nature of China. As was revealed in Chapter 2, even the recent and comparatively 
most arrogant China Dream campaign continuously plays up China’s peace-loving identity, as a 
former victim of foreign aggression, an opponent of hegemony, and a developing country 
(Wang, 2011). Overall, the Chinese government wants China to be seen as a stable, reliable, and 
responsible economic partner, a rising economic power that the international community does 
not have to fear. Although China’s actions do not always suggest this, China still strives to be 
considered as a trustworthy and responsible member of the international political community, 
capable of and willing to contribute actively to world peace (D’Hooghe, 2011). However, these 
historic Chinese action dramas tell an entirely different story, as represented in Figure 4.8. These 
action stars, although mostly posing with (cold) smiles, are known to be fierce fighters in the 
historical epic dramas set in the mythical landscapes of ancient China. The matching verbal on 
the covers, such as “Cinema’s toughest twosome kicks up a storm” (Figure 8, top right) and “Star 




figures, who embody the violent, anarchic, and reckless underworld governed only by codes of 
chivalry. The historic law is simple in these films: “kill or be killed,” and it usually leads, says Li 
Mu Bai in Crouching Tiger, to “endless sorrow” (Berry & Farquhar, 2006). Evidently, These 
Time covers, although not attacking China politically, neither represent China in a modern and 
up-to-date way, nor coincide with the peaceful-rising image China strives to present and 
convince the world. They are, however, representing China through the entertainment industry, 




Despite the above subtle uneasiness and skepticism, the overall fundamental change in 
portraying China in a more peaceful and de-politicized light in the U.S. leading news media is 
prevailing. This trend is largely coincident with nation branding efforts in China, where China is 
promoted as a peacefully rising super power in a de-politicized way. The evolution of the 
portrayal of China in the United States reveals two characteristics of contemporary international 
relations: more complexity and more simplicity. Neoliberalism-- as an opener of new markets-- 
accelerates globalization, which is “an essentially undirected process of increasing global 
complexity” (Harvey, 2005, p. 108). Such complexity explains why the US has a repeated 
pattern of aligning itself with totally despicable despots, such as China, and redefine them as 
strategic partners or “frenemies,” if the US government and major corporate interests have seen 
strategic advantage in it. The simplicity, on the other hand, lies in the stark fact of the constant 




mixture of both the simplicities and complexities suggests how the position of China as the U.S. 
“strategic partner” is highly tentative and fraught, and is represented with ambiguities, 
ambivalences, and contradictions, in the induced stability of US-China relations. There is the 
appearance of diplomacy and eased tensions, in part because the rise of China’s power and the 
potential for both China and the United States to thrive through cooperation and networking, 
underneath that veneer there are still tensions, evident not in the images, per se, but in the 
historical, cultural, political, economic, and military context behind those images, that those 
images imply.  
Whether or not the significance of nations has diminished as a result of globalization, 
Bhabha identified the “nation” as a powerful historical idea and a symbolic force (1990). 
Twitchell (2009) compares nation-branding to story-telling: “Human congregate to share stories, 
the fantasy town/nation is more than economic community and physical safety, it’s narrative 
community, Brandtopia. The story is told through a willingness to share a common fiction” (p. 
288). Those states that successfully fictionalize themselves to others, rather than those being 
fictionalized by others (or just fictionalize themselves to themselves), will prevail. This chapter 
sampled the American reception and re-creation of the Chinese image, illustrating the 
complexities of such story-telling of China. Although a fiction from China is hard to tell when 
there are already so many competing fictions pre-exist in the West, intriguingly visible changes 
are taking place in the shaping and re-shaping the image of China. This chapter also reveals that 
such image make-over of a nation guarantees no connection with how its image is represented by 
the media aboard, even with a massive specialized team the country is capable to put together at 
different government and administrative levels. However, despite the historical complexities and 




culturalized, comparatively benign new world power in America and the West largely echo the 
internal branding efforts of China. After all, these seemingly loose pieces will all fit into the 
“Post-political politics” game in the new era of “complex globalization,” in which old models 







As I am concluding this dissertation, the brand-new Disney Resort is celebrating its grand 
opening in Shanghai, China. With the scale four times larger than a regular Disneyland and a 
budget of $5.5 billion, this grand resort stands out, even though over the years the entire 
Shanghai itself has already become a gigantic theme park. According to Iger (2016), CEO of 
Disney, the Shanghai Resort is mission critical as it is designed to be “a machine in China for the 
Disney brand […] More than 330 million people live within a three-hour drive or train ride, and 
Disney is bent on turning them into lifelong consumers.” In doing so, the control-obsessed 
Disney substantially bent its rules and dialed back its demands, which was not seen in any other 
cases: handing over a large piece of the profit, giving the Chinese government a role in running 
the park, and dropping its longstanding insistence on its television channel.  
In order to please its Chinese partner, the state and private co-owned Shanghai Shendi 
Group, Disney infused the park with Chinese elements. The Shanghai resort’s signature 
restaurant, the Wandering Moon Teahouse, has rooms designed to represent different areas of 
China, and was styled to honor the “restless, creative spirit” of ancient Chinese poets. The New 
York Times published an extensive editorial on the Shanghai Disney, stating that “such 
accommodation is becoming increasingly common. A growing number of multinationals have 
agreed to cooperate with the Chinese state through alliances, joint ventures, or partnerships, all 
with the hopes of garnering more favorable treatment and gaining access to the world’s second-
largest economy” (New York Times, 2016). It also criticized the Chinese government which is 
“growing more assertive and nationalistic […] Emboldened by the size and breadth of its 




over proprietary technology and help advance the country’s development goals, even if that 
means financing the growth of local rivals” (ibid).  Ever since the Party first invited overseas 
companies into China after its market economy reform in 1979, global businesses have been 
learning to team up with the state, despite the fact that the interest of theirs is far from that of 
China’s. Such partnership vividly echoes a Chinese proverb 同床异梦, meaning “an odd-couple 
sharing the same bed, but dreaming different dreams.”   
Such contradiction and negotiations exemplify once again the complexities of branding in 
a globalized market: Disney, one of the biggest media brands in the world, and longstanding 
juggernaut of Western popular culture, bent to push its brand into the authoritarian Chinese state, 
which has become more open to public-private (state-commercial) partnerships. China, on the 
other hand, “wants Shanghai to be its dragon’s head, a showcase city for all the world to see […] 
Disney is part of that grand strategy” (New York Times, 2016). The editorial went on about how 
the “nationalist” Chinese leaders and the Party is using Disney to bolster the country’s own 
media and entertainment companies, as well as to improve China’s image abroad. As illustrated 
earlier, Disney is also going to extraordinary lengths to prove its commitment to China and the 
Party. During a 2010 meeting with China’s propaganda minister, Iger (2010) pledged to use the 
company’s global platform to “introduce more about China to the world.” This is a particular 
showcase where China and a Western media conglomerate bring their brands together, each 







Photograph 1 The four-faced “Celebrating the Year of the Rooster” statue at the main entrance 
of the Shanghai Disney Resort. On the opening day of the parks, the tickets for the first two 
weeks were sold out within a couple of hours. 
               
            The news about Disney materializes my project in many ways, from the debate about 
government and commodification, to the discussion of media, culture, and place/space. China is 
of course not an isolated case. Mitsuhiro Yoshimoto (1994) wrote about the relationship between 
the Tokyo Disney Land and Japan nationalism, exposing how Japan appropriates Disney’s 
cultural power to enact its own cultural power, and how the Tokyo Disney is in fact one of the 
most powerful manifestations of contemporary Japanese nationalism. This shows the other side 
of the coin, that the U.S. brand can in fact be taken over by Japan and China, with no one 
ultimately controlling the power of the brand, and anyone being able to stake their financial 
future on them. This is, of course, also far beyond the problem of Disney. Disneyfication, 




instrumentalization of social relations, production and consumption, and therefore an 
appropriation of local cultures by global flows. This is what Uri Ram (2010) called 
“Glocommodification” when analyzing the McDonald brand in Israel – which is “global 
commodification combining structural uniformity with symbolic diversity” (p.27).           
*                    *                   * 
With various examples stretching from the past and the present, this dissertation offers a 
platform for recognizing and reconsidering the evolution of China’s global image, and serves as 
a necessary critical addition to nation branding literature. The four body chapters, each with a 
distinctive case, lead to the conclusion of this dissertation that (1) China has come a long way 
from state-led propaganda to commercial-led publicity in diplomatic communication, and such 
transition is to fit and participate in the rise of global capital. (2) During the process of self-
branding, China’s distinctive historical and cultural aspects are mobilized for symbolic and 
material profit and consumption in the global marketplace. (3) Nation branding--a set of ideas 
rooted in Western marketing (Kaneva, 2012), although gaining popularity in the post-communist 
world, is not promising a quick fix for the identity malaise of transitional societies such as China. 
However, it addresses the intersections of nation and (de)globalization, and it has brought the 
politics of the production, marketing, and consumption of the branded nation under new public-
private partnership into public discourse. The following sections will elaborate in further detail 
each of the key findings of this dissertation: branding as post-political politics, nostalgia, and 
consumption, the brand that cannot be owned, the practical significance of this research, and last 
but not least, the wedded space where the global consumes the local. 	  





As Walter Benjamin (2008) wisely put, fascism renders politics aesthetic, while 
communism responds by “politicizing art” (p. 242). The change of time, however, witnessed the 
fading of communist China, along with the emerging of its de-politicized art and the art of de-
politicizing.   
Having undergone tremendous social and political changes over the last decades, China is 
using various nation branding strategies not only to build a brand, but rather to re-construct one. 
It not only has a makeover story to tell the world, but it is imperative for the country to do so 
more effectively. And this is not merely because the world seems to be always watching China 
these days, with its dramatic rise in global prominence, but also because the Chinese public are 
paying greater attention to how their country is perceived and judged overseas. It is a question of 
their collective identity, prestige and, arguably, China’s face project (面子) in the increasingly 
connected global society (Wang 2011). Aronczyk (2008) also summarized the distinctive but 
inter-connected internal/external tasks of nation branding: while internally nation branding is 
used to manage consensus by encouraging positive perceptions of international decisions, in 
external mediation, nation branding is used for both reactive and proactive purposes, such as 
accession to the European Union, the United Nations or other multilateral organizations; 
repairing reputations damaged by legacies of hard power; or dodging the spotlight of unfavorable 
international media attention.  	
This dissertation also demonstrates that the tensions China faces actually come less and 
less from the cold-war aftermath as between a capitalist system and a socialist system. Rather, it 
comes from between an established power (the West) and an emerging one (China). This gives 




attracting positive recognition by “breaking through the clutter” with a distinctive image is a 
critical dimension of the nation branding practice (Aronczyk, 2008). Culture is the key for China 
to market its distinctive, and yet non-aggressive recognition. The previous chapters identified 
various cultural heritages, historical resources, and internal qualities that was identified and 
defined, highlighted and captured, in China’s nation-branding initiative which is both pleasing 
and economically effective. As was analyzed in chapter 3, while branding China to its domestic 
audience highlights prosperity, and branding China to the external audience highlights peace, 
culture is at the center of both branding efforts. It is because culture is more likely to promote a 
de-politicized, harmless image of “the peaceful rise of China” (Xi, 2013), and create the least 
amount of tension between classes and different social groups, domestically and internationally.  
 
Nostalgia, Heritage, and Consumption    
Modernity supplies the condition for nostalgia, and our cultural landscapes supply the 
memory to fill the voids of perceived loss (Ceisel, 2014). As chapter 4 reveals, the globalization 
of McWorld has certainly triggered an “imperialist nostalgia” (Rosado, 2006), a longing for the 
different and the pre-modern. Kent Ono (2009) also elaborated a similar sense of nostalgia: “for 
older, safer, colonial times, for the mythical early days of Western expansion, and for systems of 
conquest prior to the official end of colonialism” (p. 9). In China’s nation branding, nationalism 
and nostalgia converge, particularly around the category of tourism and films, to create a sense 
of longing for homelands’ past—both of the actual, diasporic past, and the romantic, imagined 
past. These homelands are recreated via invented traditions (Hobswam and Ranger, 1993) as 




“cultural revitalization” is a key part of the branding of China (Xinhua News, 2010). In this 
sense, “globalized nostalgia” (Ceisel, 2014) is the performance of authenticity and heritage that 
emerges from pressures of late modernity. The ancient town example in China demonstrates that 
such nostalgia is a socially constructed and performed concept of an essential identity that can be 
recovered and enacted through our legislative policy, consumption habits and promotional 
efforts. In summary, on the one hand, nostalgia is an intentional, strategic part of the overall 
branding project of China. On the other hand, nostalgia is also an unexpected effect of the 
nostalgic representations of the branding regimes.  
Among the various projects that seek to manage and profit from cultural difference, the 
global marketing and advertising apparatus is “uniquely positioned in terms of its access to the 
mass media” (Mazzarella, 2003, p. 17). A comprehensive nation branding strategy is seen by its 
proponents as a “public good” (Leonard, 2002), uniting municipal, regional and national interests 
in the increasingly competitive quest to attract international legitimacy, foster and maintain 
domestic loyalty, and reap the financial rewards in the trade-liberalized global marketplace 
(Aronczyk, 2008). Along these lines, China also adopted commercial nationalism to coordinate 
government and citizens’ efforts to manage a country’s image – whether to improve tourism, 
investment, or foreign relations. It pushes for the need to reassess the viability of the notion of 
nation-state, as well as the contradictory presence of globalization that gives vent to nationalism 
and mass commodity consumption at the same time (Volcic and Andrejevic, 2008).  
 
The Brand that Cannot be Owned 
What distinguishes branding the nation from branding other products and cultural 




typical product brand. As the analysis of magazine covers in Chapter 5 demonstrates, China does 
not really “own” its own brand. As Twitchel (2004) notes, “in the next generation of diplomacy 
the ability to brand your nation before your competition does it to you is going to become 
crucial. Those states that successfully fictionalize themselves to others, rather than those 
fictionalize themselves to themselves, will prevail” (p. 292). Such story-telling, or, branding, is 
also defined as “the unique, multi-dimensional blend of elements that provide the nation with 
culturally grounded differentiation and relevance for all its target audiences” (Dinnie, 2008, 
p.15). In addition, branding the nation and branding other type of branding also differ by 
“speed”: the extrapolation of branding from “fast-moving” consumer goods to “slow-moving” 
cultural services to “slowest-moving” nation-states is happening with or without government 
sponsorship (ibid). Compared with the former, branding the nation is the slowest and the most 
long-term process, with its intense historic and ideological complexity. Such complexity also 
grants nation branding a more sophisticated task than merely a cultural market. Melissa 
Aronczyk (2013) argues that nation branding has become a solution to perceived contemporary 
problems affecting the space of the nation state: problems of economic development, democratic 
communication, and especially national visibility and legitimacy amidst the multiple global 
flows of late modernity.  
 Every nation has an image that can vary across time and space to a greater or lesser 
extent (Simonin, 2008). Nation branding is “a very long-term project, and it involves a very 
comprehensive strategy bringing in all the players’ governments, whether it’s city governments, 
national governments, tourism authorities […] who help to define the way all those billions of 
people out there, in particular the several millions who really matter, view your place” 




stability and favorable internal conditions for China’s peaceful rise and sustained growth are of 
paramount importance. And with the complexity of internal and external challenges it faces, 
China certainly has a long way to hike in order to pair up its reality to its package.  
 
Practical Significance 
The practical significance of this dissertation has two layers: for the China side and the 
US side. As neoliberalism has encouraged “the commodification of everything” (Harvey, 2005, 
p.165), the private-public collaboration in nation branding is made possible by particular forms 
of legislation, nationalist mythology and transnational circulation. Nation branding does do 
“real” work, evidenced by the shifts this practice has effected on government policy and fund 
allocation. Unfortunately, the logic of nation brand become easily distorted, mainly by naïve 
governments in willing collusion with ambitious, private consulting firms, into nation packaging, 
a misleading concept which seems to contain a promise that the images of countries can be 
directly manipulated using the techniques of purely commercial marketing communications 
(Anholt, 2010). This research, with the potential of publishing a Chinese version, could be a 
timely critique of the Chinese policy makers that branding cannot be simplified as gold-plating 
or sheer profit-centered image makeover. It could hopefully invite Chinese scholars and 
government officials to de-familiarize themselves from the taken-for-granted terms such as 
“branding,” “propaganda,” and “prosperity,” acknowledging their expansion into realms where 
the politics of identity loom large, as well as the ongoing effects the practice can have on 




On the U.S. side, this research reminds the public how representation is a source of 
power, a tool of government’s intervention that shapes its citizens. A new model of major-
country relations in the contemporary world is marked by the strategic-partnership between 
China and the United States. The heightened attention China is paying to its image in the United 
States and West attempts to reshape its image to create a positive impression in U.S. public 
opinion. Exploring both sides of the river decides where we build the bridge. The evolution of 
mainstream U.S. media representation of a “problematic” foreign nation predicts a trend in 
American foreign policy: the growing tendency of aligning itself with old-time foes, such as 
China, and transforming them into strategic partners to adapt into the accumulation of world 
capital. As Dewey (1938) puts it, the most vibrant and useful social research grows “out of actual 
social needs, tensions, ‘troubles’” (p. 499). The reception of the branded China in the US 
mediascape is clearly attributable to the increasingly diffused centers of interest and power in 
international politics and the ever more complex communication dynamics. 
 
Wedded Space: Where the Global Consumes the Local 
All the cases throughout the dissertation, from the promotion videos to (re)constructed 
ancient towns, show the marriage of commercial culture and nationalism adjusted to the rise of 
global capital. The local can be understood as a product of the global—a means of carving out a 
particular brand identity that takes shape as a response of globalization itself. China as a 
controversial but active member of the capitalist globalization serves as a rich and informative 




analysis of the interrelation between global nature and global culture in late modernity argue 
that:  
Since its appearance as an image, the blue planet has been deployed as a symbol of global 
international collaboration and shared planetary interdependence. Instead of the horizon 
being the natural limit of humanity's expectations, a limit set by the curve of the earth and 
its movement around the sun, 'mankind' encountered a planet made visible as a whole, 
discrete entity. Space became a new location from which to view ourselves, and this 
perspectival shift has produced both a new context for universalisms and an added visual 
dimension by which the universe scales the order of things. (Franklin et al., 2000) 
 Both marketers and anthropologists understood that the local and the global are not 
opposites; rather, they are mutually constitutive imaginary moments in every attempt to make 
sense of the world, whether for disciplinary, commercial, scholarly, or radical purposes. The 
global is constructed locally just as much as the local is constructed globally, and within these 
formations authenticity and heritage are tied to both space and labor. The (re)construction of 
ancient towns had to involve a process of disconnect and reconnect its original residents. And for 
the newly opened Disney Resort, state-run construction companies cleared a 1,700-acre tract as 
its ground, and city-planning authorities have relocated residents, moved graves and closed more 
than 150 factories. The government also built new infrastructure, including a subway line that 
goes directly to the park’s front gate. Some of the dangers of casting a nostalgic, and 
commodified, glance at the local are evident, when we consider the pressures the residents find 
themselves under within the confines of today’s global economy. From the branded new China 




citizenship. The brand management for a nation is not simply a matter of marketing or promoting 
a place. After all, the identity and image of the places we inhabit are really a natural extension of 
the identity and image of ourselves. As Aronczyk (2013) reminds us, it is an inherent tendency 
for humans to identify themselves with their city, region or country, as our sense of self is not 
bounded by our own bodies: it extends out into family, neighborhood, region, nation, continent, 
and ultimately to the entire human race.  
*                         *                         * 
Nation branding refers much more than slogans, logos, and colorful advertisements. Rather, it 
seeks to reconstitute nationhood, at the levels of both ideology and praxis, whereby the meaning 
of experience of reality of national belonging and national governance are transformed in 
unprecedented ways.  
                                                                                                                                   –Kaneva, 2012 
  
“Globalization and modernity are historicized, and their unevenness and irregularities 
must be contextualized against time and space” (Ono & Washington, 2016, p.11). This 
dissertation historicizes the nation branding practice in China by over-viewing various, 
contextualized examples of such practice. I am conscious, however, that these chapters (from 
different times and spaces) do not add up to a common definition of branding, of late modernity, 
or of global governmentality. Rather, these cases could work together as a provocation to make 
sense of contemporary China, and a relatively open space for dialogues on globalization from 
contextualized samplings. I am also aware that these partial accounts of a relatively new 
phenomenon may raise more questions than answering them, but it is my hope that this 
dissertation will stimulate greater critical interest and invite further conversations on this topic. 




offer a fruitful counterpart and comparison to the study of the global image of other nations 
undergone social transitions, i.e., the post-communist nations in East Europe, the BRICS nations 
besides China, and others. This research could also fruitfully lead to further study on the future 
development of a session of on-going phenomena, i.e., the increasingly commercialization of 
heritage and culture with ancientizing projects and alike, in countries like Cambodia, Thailand, 
central America, etc.  
As we zoom in back to China, the glitter on the castle tips in the Shanghai Disney caught 
our eye. As discussed in the previous chapters, China has been a producer for various 
propagandist, or not so propagandist, slogans. Now Iger himself even came up with a new slogan 
for the Shanghai Disney, calling it “authentically Disney and distinctly Chinese,” asking Disney 
executives in Shanghai to post the slogan around their offices, “as a sign of respect for China and 
its people” (New York Times, 2016). I do not have the access to the visuals of such slogan 
postings, but I can only imagine it to be a somewhat postmodern and surreal version of Mao’s 
postings around the villages back in the Cultural Revolution days. The wedded, negotiated, and 
transformed China brand would wave like a flag over the theme parks, against the dawning skies 
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